

Don Bruno
Un agente nazi en Legazpi después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial

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[Anexo 9](#) - José María Irujo, << Los 104 de la lista negra. La historia y los nombres de los presuntos nazis que han vivido en España con la protección de Franco >>, El País-Archivo-Edición impresa, domingo 30 de marzo de 1997.

https://elpais.com/diario/1997/03/30/espana/859676418_850215.html



[Anexo 10 - Savehaven report official assets of the German Secret Service in Spain. Archivo CIA](#)

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
[Anexo 22](#) - Carlos Collado Seidel, << ¿De Hendaya a San Francisco? Londres y Washington contra Franco y la Falange (1942-1945) >>, Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea (7), 1994, p.51-84, UNED, Facultad de Geografía e Historia.

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> continúa en la página siguiente





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Eranskin digitalak / Anexos digitales

Anexo 23 - Carlos Collado Seidel, << España y los agentes alemanes 1944-1947: Intransigencia y pragmatismo político >>, Espacio, tiempo y forma, Serie V, Historia contemporánea (5), 1992, p. 431-482, UNED, Facultad de Geografía e Historia.

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Anexo 26 - Javier Rodríguez González, << Los servicios secretos en el Norte de España durante la II Guerra Mundial: el Abwehr alemán y el SOE inglés >>, Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar, vol 4(8), pp. 75–100, 12 de enero de 2016.

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Anexo 28 - Francisco Javier Juárez Camacho, << El espionaje Alemán en España a través del consorcio empresarial SOFINDUS >>, Diacronie (En línea), Nº28, 4 | 2016, documento 12, puesto en línea el 29 de diciembre de 2016, consultado el 19 de abril de 2019.

URL: <https://journals.openedition.org/diacronie/4795>

DOI: 10.4000/diacronie.4795



Anexo 11 - Johannes Bernhardt. Un personaje de leyenda

Johannes Eberhard Franz Bernhardt nació el 1 de enero de 1897 en Osterode, Prusia Oriental, en la actualidad, la ciudad polaca de Ostroda. Participó en el frente de Ucrania durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, y obtuvo la cruz de hierro. Después de la derrota formó parte de los Freikorps, las fuerzas paramilitares de extrema derecha que combatieron las revueltas comunistas en Alemania.

Fundó una empresa naviera, uno de cuyos clientes, la empresa química Stoltzenberg, acusada de suministrar armas químicas a España y a la Unión Soviética, causó una tragedia con 10 muertos en 1928, por un escape de gas venenoso. No se sabe si Bernhardt, tuvo alguna responsabilidad en la tragedia, pero al poco tiempo se trasladó al Marruecos francés como representante de Mannesmann, gran empresa metalúrgica que había conseguido importantes concesiones mineras del sultán de Marruecos.

Las actividades de Bernhardt en esos meses en Casablanca no están claras, aunque despertaron las sospechas de las autoridades galas, que confiscaron las propiedades de Mannesmann, y forzaron la salida del protectorado del empresario alemán.

En enero de 1930, Johannes Bernhardt probó fortuna en el Marruecos español. Se estableció primero en Larache, y luego en Tetuán, donde comenzó a trabajar como director comercial para una firma de importación y exportación de automóviles, H&O WILMER, de la que también se sospechaba que se dedicaba al tráfico clandestino de armas.

De hecho, entre sus actividades empresariales se incluía la venta de material a la Legión, lo que le permitió conocer y hacer amistad con algunos mandos militares españoles, como el general Mola, y el entonces coronel Sáenz de Buruaga. Operaba a la vez como activo propagandista del partido nazi en el norte de Marruecos, bajo las órdenes del secretario del partido en Tetuán, Adolf Lagenheim.

Apenas una semana después de la sublevación militar de 1936, Bernhardt se ofreció a apoyar al general Franco actuando como mediador ante el Gobierno alemán. El 24 de julio de 1936 viajó junto con Lagenheim, y el capitán de aviación Francisco Arranz Monasterio a Alemania en demanda de ayuda militar y logística para el ejército sublevado. Portaban una carta personal del general Franco en la que solicitaba el suministro de aviones de transporte y caza, así como de artillería, a fin de superar el bloqueo marítimo que la Marina, mayoritariamente leal al régimen republicano, sometía al Estrecho de Gibraltar. Hitler les recibió en el balneario de Bayreuth durante la celebración de un festival wagneriano, y aceptó su propuesta.

Durante los siguientes días, una veintena de aviones Junkers J-52 llegaron al Marruecos español en la denominada operación Fuego Mágico. Fue el inicio de la intensa cooperación militar con el bando sublevado, y el comienzo de una exitosa actividad empresarial para Bernhardt, convertido desde entonces en el intermediario de las demandas franquistas ante el gobierno alemán, y particularmente ante Hermann Göring, encargado personalmente de atender la asistencia miliar como ministro del Aire.

Bernhardt fundó el 31/07/1936, la compañía Hispano-Marroquí de Transporte (HISMA), con domicilio en la calle O'Donnell 12, de Tetuán, y un capital social de 200.000 pesetas, aportadas a partes iguales por el empresario alemán y por un oficial de marina retirado, Fernando Carranza, que actuó como simple testaferro para justificar la presencia española en su accionariado, y nunca se implicó en la gestión. Se escrituró como inicio de su actividad el mes de abril, para evitar que se relacionase su creación con el alzamiento militar en España.

HISMA canalizó desde ese momento las ingentes aportaciones militares alemanas, que en ocasiones se enviaban por aire, y a menudo por barco a través del puerto de Lisboa. En octubre de ese mismo año, se fundó en Alemania la compañía ROWAK, que operaba como contraparte germana en los intercambios. A cambio del suministro para el ejército, ROWAK (Rohstoff-Waren-Kompensation Handelsgesellschaft) percibía alimentos y materias primas españolas, siempre con un saldo deficitario para España.

Mientras tanto, Bernhardt se estableció de forma itinerante en Sevilla, Salamanca y Burgos, a medida que el ejército sublevado avanzaba en su ofensiva y cambiaba de ubicación la sede del Gobierno provisional. Su presencia ya era imprescindible en el entorno del máximo centro de decisión del régimen.

Bernhardt mantuvo unas estrechas relaciones con Francisco Franco, quien le hizo un regalo personal de 1,4 millones de pesetas una vez acabó la guerra civil.

En 1938 HISMA se transformó en un conglomerado empresarial denominado SOFINDUS (Sociedad Financiera Industrial), cuyos intereses abarcaban todos los sectores estratégicos. A diferencia de HISMA, nació claramente como una herramienta para afianzar el control alemán sobre la economía española y garantizar el suministro de materias primas, y Bernhardt fue el artífice de su creación.

En el verano de 1943, Johannes Bernhardt se reunió en Berlín con Schellenberg, y juntos acordaron colaborar en la creación de una red de inteligencia, denominada en clave GRILLE, y facilitar el establecimiento en Madrid de la persona que la dirigiría: Walter Mosig.

Una segunda red de inteligencia, operaba en paralelo, bajo la autoridad de Bernhardt, y responsabilidad del también agente del SD (Sicherheitsdienst), Karl Arnold. Su misión era servir como puente con las actividades políticas y de espionaje de Alemania en la América Latina.

Bernhardt sería uno de los 104 agentes nazis reclamados por el Consejo de Control Aliado a la España franquista, en 1947, si bien no fue deportado.

Mientras muchos de sus compatriotas eran repatriados, Bernhardt asistió impasible a la liquidación del imperio económico que le había convertido en el ciudadano alemán más influyente en España entre 1939 y 1945. Además, a cambio de entregar una pequeña parte los activos de Sofindus a los aliados, consiguió que los ingleses le eliminaran de las listas de indeseables a expatriar. Durante estas negociaciones, Bernhardt se ofreció a liderar la gestión de las empresas de Sofindus, en beneficio aliado, cifrando el valor de sus activos en más de 500 millones de pesetas (750 millones según otras fuentes).

Finalizada la guerra, Bernhardt, no interrumpió sus actividades, en el [Archivo BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0022-Anexo 18](#), fechado en 1948, se da cuenta de sus actividades, en empresas de su propiedad, o “de alguna manera” conectadas con él. Posiblemente la lista no será completa.

1. Sagitario Films, S.A. Productora cinematográfica.
2. Cine Arte. Laboratorio cinematográfico.
3. Erce, S.A. (Madrid). Export –Import.
4. Empresa de motores Diesel, que trabaja en colaboración con el ejército español.
5. Oficina de préstamos a empresas en Madrid.
6. Fábrica de jabón en Maliaño, Santander.
7. Tres grandes fincas agrícolas una en Madrid, otra en Denia, con importantes plantaciones de naranjos, y una tercera cuya localización se desconoce.
8. Custodia de fondos secretos dejados en su poder.

Hans Thomson, jefe del partido nazi en España, le entregó 1.700.000 ptas., al finalizar la guerra y ser repatriado. También recibió 2.000.000 ptas. de las SS. La fuente de información dice que esas sumas son “small potatoes”; que la Alemania subterránea en España, tiene centenares de millones de pesetas que, hasta el momento, no han sido utilizadas, parte de las cuales están en forma de joyas.

9. La fuente indica que Johannes trata de dar la impresión de necesitar dinero. Está negociando un préstamo de 3 millones de ptas. de crédito oficial para sus negocios cinematográficos. Ha enviado grandes sumas de dinero a Argentina, donde según sus amigos tiene dos o tres empresas, pero que le cuestan dinero, en vez de ganarlo.

Su secretaria, Mrs. Scheaffer, ha hecho dos viajes a Suiza, en los dos últimos años, así como a Portugal y Argentina. La fuente considera que su secretaria -que tiene pasaporte español- le ayuda en el movimiento de fondos desde Suiza a Argentina.

10. Bernhardt, puso de director de Sagitario Films, S.A., a un anterior Gobernador Civil de Salamanca, falangista de los viejos tiempos. Con motivo del despido de 8 empleados de las empresas de Sagitario Films y Cine Arte, tuvo un conflicto laboral, que terminó en los tribunales. El director de Sagitario Films, denunció a Bernhardt, acusándole de haber estado dando información durante la guerra, a los ingleses, sobre las relaciones entre militares de alto rango españoles y los nazis.

El director falangista contactó al ministro Girón, y al secretario de Justicia, ¿Fernando? Cuesta. Un oficial de la policía secreta -Lazcano- a pesar de estar convencido de la culpabilidad de Johannes, no dio un paso hasta estar todo absolutamente probado (cosa que nunca ocurrió).

11. La fuente informa de las amistosas relaciones con William Hilton de la embajada británica. Éste pasa tardes enteras hablando en la oficina de Bernhardt. Se atribuye a Hilton las negociaciones con los británicos, mediante las cuales, consiguió su exclusión de las listas de repatriación, a cambio de la entrega de una pequeña parte del patrimonio de Sofindus a los aliados.

Unos años después Bernhardt residió en Denia, pasando prácticamente inadvertido. Se dice que estaba obsesionado con agentes israelíes que supuestamente, querrían asesinarle. En 1953 se trasladó hacia Sudamérica, instalándose en Argentina, donde siguió manteniendo diversos negocios. En su finca "La Elena", en Tandil (Provincia de Buenos Aires), se jactaba de tener un Greco, regalo del Caudillo.

Escribió un libro "Johannes Bernhardt, recuerda 1936" en la segunda mitad de los años setenta, y falleció en Múnich en 1980.

Según una fuente de confianza (para la CIA) de 02/04/1946, era Oberfueher der SS, título equivalente al rango militar de general. Sin embargo, eligió la vía administrativa y llevaba en el uniforme, estrellas de plata en lugar de las de oro. Siempre que viajaba a Alemania, vestía el uniforme de Oberfuerher de las SS, en cuanto llegaba a Hendaia, según el documento [BERNHARDT,JOHANNES-0018-Anexo16](#)

La ficha N°7 del documento [BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0001-Anexo 12](#), dice que, Johannes construyó un considerable negocio minero de mineral de wolframio y tungsteno.

La ficha N° 6, da cuenta de un informe de Abril de 1944, según el cual, Bernhardt estuvo comprometido en el contrabando de wolframio a Alemania.

En el documento [BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0005-Anexo 13](#), de 26/04/1944, se señala el compromiso con el contrabando por correo de wolframio, mencionando además otros cuatro informes de Enero de 1945, del mismo informador.

Anexo 12 - BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0001

BERNHARDT, Johannes

SPAIN

Card 1

SF-5*

Madrid

While in Tetuan, lived at 14 O'Donnell. German, born 1/1/97; branch manager of H. & O. WILLMER, automobile importers and exporters in Tetuan. In 1936 was secretary of the Tetuan Nazi party; one of the most active propagandists in Sp. Morocco; worked with Adolf Langenheim, one of chiefs of German I.S. in Morocco. Is dangerous.

LA 1236

9/2/42

ts/cmb

At Palace Hotel in Madrid. Managing director of SOFINDUS. Is in contact with German I.S.
/cmb

LA 100

British

10/14/42

Sent the following cable to General Faupel: "Glad that you are coming, and request that you notify us through Hisrowak concerning the date of your arrival in Irun and Madrid."
/cmb

LA 739

Madrid

5/13/43

Sent radiogram from Madrid to "Akrobat. Attention Schroeder. Berlin. After examination of local situation I see no prospects for closings (of business on other deals) at this time, wherefore I advise against planned journey." Censor's note shows that the signature, Bernhardt, has appeared on many messages in recent months to the German capital, disclosing subject to be a German official agent engaged in the development of armament works and metallurgical industries in Spain. cc/cmb

LA 1223

7/15/43

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 2

There is a German firm in Larache and Alcazarquivir owning flour mills. Although these mills are electric this firm has accumulate large quantities of gasoline as well as stocks of foodstuffs. Subject, a very wealthy German, is the head of this firm. He is said to have made his money buying up lorries, arms, ammunition, etc., in Germany for Franco's account. He enjoys Franco's entire confidence due to the good services he rendered him during the Civil War. This firm is said to be supplying German subs at night by means of small fishing craft. Subject is highly respected by the Spanish authorities and by the public in general on account of his intimate and friendly relations with the Generalissimo which are known.
er/cmb

VT 376a

Raza; B-2

2/4/44

Subject is head of German I.S. in Spain, according to Emil Best. He ordered Best to return to France. Subject also told Best that they had a wonderful agent who could come and go in North Africa and brought back plans of aerodromes, etc.
mjb/cmb

XK 621

XLW 898

British

2/14/44

MAWICK is associated with subject.

VX 005-308

EF001

3/4/44

/cmb

Declassified and Approved for
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

1) Privacy ☐2) Methods/Sources ☒3) Foreign Relations ☐

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2001 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Radiogram from subject to procure tickets from Frankfurt to Berlin for subject, secretary, Frau Schaefer and Director Saul.
mjb/cmb

H 51614
4/15/44

Subject is about to leave for Germany according to radiogram sent from Madrid to Frankfurt. Subject is Oberfuhrer of the SS in Spain.
dd/cmb

10452-417
4/17/44

Subject sent cable to Hitler on his birthday. "With unshakeable faith."
dd/cmb

10452-420
4/20/44

Subject is the official middleman for the German Government in the purchase of priority materials that are still allotted to Spain. Believed to work with two other German businessmen, BREUER and HEINEMANN.
mjb/cmb

RX 010-506
XMO-35
4/26/44

Subject left instructions that his address would be the Hotel Furstendorf in Berlin A 26015e during his current visit there. During the Allied bombings recently only a section of this building was left open for business.
dd/cmb

10452-424B
5/29/44
B-2

Subject frequently sends radiograms from Madrid to Berlin concerning the shipment from Germany to Spain of various war materials and the construction in Spain of armament works. Following radiogram appears to identify him as a head of German secret operations in Spain. "To Reichfuhrer SS Himmler, Berlin. On your birthday sincere wishes and the assurance of unconditional loyalty. Bernhardt."

RI
10/7/43

prf/cmb

Subject sent a cable to Frau Oberst Veltjens, Heerstr, Berlin, wishing her his sincerest sympathy on the tragic death of her husband.
ncm/cmb

H 46194
Censor.
10/11/43

Pablo WIEDENBRUG is subject's son-in-law.
dd/cmb

SJ FIN 9594
Condemned
11/25/43

Subject seems to be oberfuhrer of the SS in Madrid. He sent New Year's greetings to the following people by radiogram: Himmler, General von Faupel, Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Rosenberg, Rommel, Gen. Sperrle, Gen. Richthofen, Gen. Jeschonek, Gen. Warlimont, Koerner, and Ohnesorge.
ncm/cmb

10452-101
1/1/44

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 3

Cable from HISROWAK, Berlin, to SOFINDUS, Madrid, as follows: "For BERNHARDT your 922 (attached) radio set (?) so far not received."

H 53249
6/26/44

cmb

German; SS Upper Group leader. Political head of Sofindus. Plans to send Luis LLANSO JORNET to U.S. as personal representative to investigate export field for post war. Reported to enjoy the confidence of Germanofiles who are high up in the Spanish Government and is the medium through which are arranged the purchases of priority materials bought by Spain from the Allies. Tel. 61304. Hans HEINEMANN stated that UNICOLOR owns wolfram mines in Spain and that in general, 50% of the capital of the mines is German owned. Subject manages a great part of this business. He sold the first airplane to Franco in 1936.

RX 163
Madrid
8/21/44

Cable from subject to HISROWAK, Berlin, as follows: "BERNHARDT and SCHAEFERS arrived safely in Madrid today."
hft/cmb

XX 986
W/T
8/30/44

Radiogram from subject and the staff of SOFINDUS, Madrid, to the Fuehrer of the German Reich, Adolf Hitler, Reich Chancellery, Berlin, as follows: "We are sending our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler our heartiest congratulations on his birthday, With unshakable faith."

cmb

BERNHARDT, Johannes

card 4

Subject is head of SOFINDUS and HISMA. He is also director of MONTANA S.A., estudios y explotaciones mineros, Bilbao, of which Guillermo PASCH is also a director.

hft

XL-5830
1/26/45

Subject is the organizer of HISMA and the president of SOFINDUS and ESTUDIOS Y EXPLORACIONES MINERAS MONTANA and director of TRANSPORTES MARITIMOS, S.A., and VITAL, S.A., and is closely associated with all SOFINDUS operations.

hft

XL-5616
Madrid
11/24/44

Subject is listed among "certain prominent Expulsion Candidates" the British requested Madrid to include in the 2/2/45 expulsion list which will be submitted to the Embassy for its consideration in requesting expulsion from Spain. Subject and the other "prominent Candidates" appeared on the British June 1944 list.

RX-406
Madrid
2/2/45

cmb

With regard to RX-406, subject is on previous or forthcoming British expulsion list.

cmb

XX-004-2602
2/26/45

Johannes BERNARDE, listed as Director, arrived in Lisbon from Madrid and stayed at the Hotel Vitoria between Sept. 23 and Oct. 1.

XL-2299
ONI
A-2
11/9/44

cmb

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Johannes BERNHARDT, German, Madrid, was granted a Portuguese visa at the Madrid Consulate on 12/12/44; requested for 6 days. Subject was born in Osterode, East Prussia, 1/1/97; bears passport #2031 issued at Madrid 10/5/43. He arrived from Madrid 9/28/44 and registered at the Hotel Victoria; left 10/1/44. Arrived in Portugal through Elvas-Caia, 9/28/44; Portuguese visa granted in Madrid and good for 3 days only. Was in Lisbon again 12/1/44, arriving from Madrid by plane.

HX-350
Lisbon
1/31/45

cmb

Subject applied at the Madrid Consulate for a 3 day Portuguese visa. German director. Passport 2031 issued Madrid 5/10/43, arrived in Portugal via Elvas Caia 5/29/44, registered at the Victoria Hotel the same day. On 5/31/44 he was at the Palace Hotel at Bussaco, left 1/6/44.

HX-214
3/10/44

mrw/cmb

Subject now lives at Avenida del Valle 3, Madrid. He is reported to have left Malaga in 1934 for Tetuan, where he worked as a clerk in the TOCOMIAS Company. In 1936 he received financial assistance from the German government to form a Lisbon Export and Import Company. In 1937 he was made chief of the Spanish-German claims commission, and since that time has supervised the investing of 24 billion Reichmarks in Spanish industries, factories, commercial companies and real estate; moreover, he has allegedly invested large funds for Hermann Goering, who regards him as a personal friend. He is the key German operator in large scale foreign exchange transactions involving the purchases of dollars and pounds. Two of subject's principal assistants

3-CLD-A-2
CNI
C-3
1/10/45

Leiter of SOFINDUS in Madrid; of the Wirtschaftsministerium.

**XX 1354
KLN 1333
10/23/44

cmb

Subject arrived at the Av. Palace Hotel in Lisbon from Madrid on 11/15/44.

XL 5345
NA; A-2
12/12/44

cmb

Radiogram from Baron von HOYNINGEN HEUNE, German Ambassador to Lisbon, to subject, sending New Year's greeting to subject and SOFINDUS.

TR 00146/44
12/31/44

dd/cmb

Nazi Minister, Wilhelm Obnesorge, (Minister for Post and Telegraph), replies to greeting sent by subject, as follows:
"Many thanks for your kind New Year wishes which I most heartily reciprocate. With kind regards and with firm confidence in victory, Heil Hitler, yours," Sig. Wilhelm Obnesorge.

Bellmore
2171
1/22/45

hrt

Subject wrote note of sympathy to KOMMEL's widow.

Subject's address: Av. Generalissimo I, Madrid; is head of SOFINDUS. Sometimes, on Nazi political occasions, he signs messages "Bernhardt, SS Oberfuhrer".

Bellmore
1051
10/20/44

hrt

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 5

are Herbert and Oscar WILMER, Madrid. hft

One SCHMIDT, Estoril, Portugal, of the MASSENSTEIN Bureau, German post-war espionage organization in Portugal, has worked in a large transport firm at Frankfurt s.Main. He has directed all transport to Germany with Mr. Bruno LESSER, an accomplice of subject in Madrid. Dr. ECKERT, also connected with this Werwolf organization, has created a solid organization with ZICKERMANN, WILMER, PORST, WALDHAUSEN, BERNHARD in Spain, Bruno LESSER, LASSEN & Co., GELLWEILER, Dr. JACOB, etc. These firms have worked openly and ECKERT has allowed them to make as much as they wished. ECKERT controls the affairs and finances of his friends. ECKERT, Commercial Attache in Lisbon, is directly connected with HIMMER.

**HX-466
Lisbon
4/19/45

Subject is on the board of HINGSTE, CORCHOS ZUM. (Firm - q.v.), and of NOVA S.A. (Firm - q.v.) Was a German gov't nominee for latter.

XL6436
15 Feb 45
SH Series

Subject is named as a War Criminal by Von GOLDAMMER. Subject is a General and S.D. head in Spain.

20637-112
7 Feb 45
Madrid Emb.

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 6

Informer was on subject's payroll. Subject's immediate superior is SWALD-KRUSE, head of the skins export section of SOFINDUS. Subject wanted to send informer to South America and told him to study code work.

**X-2TS-1268
HX-706
5/22/45

Summary of London info on subject:

Johannes Eberhard Franz BERNHARDT (?Sturmfuhrer). German. Born Osterode (East Prussia) 1.1.197; as managing director in Madrid since at least 1941 of the German firm SOFINDUS he collaborated closely with both the Sipo and SD and the Abwehr; under his direction SOFINDUS, in addition to serving as a purchasing agency, handled foreign exchange transactions for the German government and the German I.S.; provided cover employment for Sipo and SD agents, sometimes paying a part of their salaries, facilitated the granting of Spanish visas to Abwehr agents by promising employment, set up bank deposits (probably in Spanish names) to provide for Abwehr expenses in case of a diplomatic break between Spain and Germany, and assisted the German I.S. in various other ways; reported in April 1944 to be engaged in smuggling wolfram to Germany; helped Kdm Spain with customs problems at Irun in Sept 1944; handled, in Nov. 1944, the transfer by SOFINDUS to the German Embassy of Ptas. 16,000,000 for the use of Kdm Spain; closely connected from Oct. 1944 to April 1945, in collaboration with the German Embassy, the Naval

XX7873
2 July 45
London

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(con't)

Attache and KdM Spain; with a numb. of attempts, mostly unsuccessful, to ship supplies clandestinely from Spanish ports to German garrisons isolated on the French coast, these undertakings being separate from those being conducted simultaneously for the same purpose by Ast Hamburg; list d for expulsion, out was still in Spain in April 1945; married with at least three children; passports (1) No. 1621/40, (2) No. 01567 issued Madrid 30.1.40, (3) No. 2031 issued Madrid 5.10.43 and (4) No. 1936. Address: (1944, office) Av. del Generalisimo 1, Madrid (tel. 36822, 36821, 32714, 42364, 42365); (1944, private) Av. del Valle 3, Madrid (tel. 44997).
(This info sent to Spain)

_____ jld

Name submitted by HOHENLOHE in list of German Nat. Soc. who have been outstanding because of their reproachable attitude. 20637-613 #465 6/13/45
cmb

BERNHARDT of SOFINDUS - SD agent.

RX 797
REX 179
6/11/45

cmb

At Madrid (1 avenida del Generalisimo) is the headquarters of German secret services under the orders of General BERNHARDT. Probably subject. FFI-6114 3/6/45
hft Under subject's direction, the S.D. in Spain extends its ramifications toward South America and Portugal, while maintaining contact with La Haya and the German I.S.

Subject arrived in Portugal on LUSITANIA EXPRESS 3/21/45. Carried passport #1936/45, issued at Madrid 3/6/45. HX-454 Lisbon 3/29/45
cld

Dr. Heinz JORNES, who in 1940 was head of the Iberian Section of Amt VI of the RSHA, stated that in 11/40 he was asked to go to the Iberian Peninsula to become a director of the transport firm MARION in Salamanca. MARION was an affiliation of SOFINDUS, the owner of which was an SS Standartenfuhrer whose name JORNES could not remember, and who was evidently the German Liaison Officer with Franco. Originally, this Nazi dignitary was sent to Spain in connection with the delivery of Junkers-52 planes. MARTIN was to establish a branch office in Lisbon with JORNES as manager. The possible occupation of Spain and perhaps Gibraltar was in thought to be the reason behind all this.

XX 7019
5/21/45

(The SS Standartenfuhrer is believed to be subject. --cmb)

Subject is included in list of German holders of safe deposit boxes in Lisbon banks. HX 416
Described as follows: German director; born Osterold, East Prussia 1/1/87. Holds passport 2031, issued Madrid 10/5/43. Arrived via Elvas-Cala 5/29/44; registered at Hotel Victoria same day. Registered Palace Hotel, Bussaco 5/31/44; left 6/1/44. On 9/22/44 obtained a six day visa for Portugal, issued by the Port. Consulate, Madrid. Entered 9/28/44 by Elvas-Cala. Left Hotel Victoria 10/1/44. On 12/12/44 was granted 6 day visa for Portugal, issued by Port. Consulate at Madrid. 3/1/45
cmb

BERNEARDT, Johannes

Card 7

LWX-002-707
7/7/45

FOIMER states that financial reserves had been amassed in Spain to supplement Abwehr activities after the cessation of diplomatic relations between Germany and Spain. SS Gruppenführer BERNHARDT built up a sizeable mining business in wolfram ore and tungsten. Subject's home is located in Madrid on the Avenue del Generalissimo, next to the Deutsche Bank. Otto BRANDT was involved in the 4-year plan and probably has connections with BERNHARDT. Hptm ENGELKE, manager of the purchasing agency for the Waffen SS in Paris, was in Spain around the end of 1943 and had contacted subject.

cmb

XX-7785

The British have informed us of the following situation which has developed in Madrid 6/28/45 between their representatives and subject, head of the German holding company SOFINDUS. SAINT and the American Ambassador have been kept informed and are participating in the discussions.

Subject has offered to work for Allied interests in the management of SOFINDUS. He has agreed to accept any directives laid down by an Allied advisory committee, which would act as a board of directors of SOFINDUS. Subject estimates the present capital assets of SOFINDUS to be five hundred million pesetas. Subject appears to be the only person in Spain able to establish that the companies are German-owned and the capital provided by the German Government. Subject is prepared to give all assistance and would continue to direct the whole SOFINDUS combine under complete Allied control. He would reveal all assets which SOFINDUS has hidden in Spain.

/over

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 8

continued...

Holding Company

SOFINDUS

Trading Companies

LANACO (Cia. Gral de Lanas)
PIELOU (Exportadora de Pielas)
CORCHOS DE ANDALUCIA
TRANSPORTES MARION
SCHOLTZ HERLANOS
MINERALES DE ESPANA
H. GAERTNER S.R.
AGRO S.A.
NOVA S.A.

Mining Companies

ARALAR S.A.
MONTANAS DEL SUR
BIGREDOS (Sierra de Gredos)
SANTA TECLA
MONTES DE GALICIA
MAURETANIA
MONTANA S.A.

Mines

SOMAR
FLORURCS
IMSAE

/over

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Shippin; Companies

E: CHH
TRANSCOMAR
NISA
BAU

cmb

XL-12621
7/11/45
elw

Otto CRAWERT was in contact with subject, Standardfisher in the S.S.
6th page from end of doc. description of subject, etc.

FPX-6814
21 June 45
Interrog of
Willy BLEYhft

Subject has provided the following info re his activities in Spain:
At the outbreak of the Civil War, subject, a German, who was living in Spanish Morocco, offered his services to FRANCO, who was a friend of his. The urgent problem of the moment was transport, and it was decided that subject could see Hitler to arrange for transport aircraft and material to be sent to Spain. Although Hitler was willing to send supplies as a political favor, Goering insisted that they be paid for in Spanish products. In order to accomplish this exchange, subject set up two companies, ROWAK in Berlin and HISMA in Tetuan. As the exportable surplus available to Spain consisted of products such as wines, resins, skins, cork and minerals, subject found it necessary to launch subsidiary companies to deal with each of these commodities. He therefore founded AGRO, EXPORTADORA DE PIELS, C.L., GENERAL DE LINAS, HERMANN GAERTNER and MINERALES de ESPANA, all under the control of HISMA. In the course of time other companies were either bought or acquired. Subject set up a number of mining companies, and SOFINDUS in possession of one of the most comprehensive mineralogical surveys ever made in Spain. HISMA became the largest and probably the most important single factory in the economy of Nationalist Spain. In 11/38 it was replaced by SOFINDUS, an organization virtually controlled by the German Government under the direction of subject. As a condition to his cooperation with the Allies, subject has stipulated that, as he is personally indebted to many persons in Spain in high places, no trouble be caused these persons. Subject reiterated that under no circumstances would he compromise the people who had assisted him in his work. A British expert in Madrid considers that, although a defeated enemy national, subject is still a forceful personality and a potent factor in Spanish politics. He is said to be responsible for Spain's present government, more than any other individual. He has more influence with Franco than the British and American Embassies combined. It is doubtful that the Spaniards would ever agree to hand subject over to the Allies.

The following are the German state-owned enterprises in Spain which are either controlled by subject directly or through SOFINDUS: continued on card

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 9

RX-825
6/20/45

Upon Germany's surrender, subject's name was presented to the Spanish Foreign office for immediate internment.
cmb/hft

cmbXL 12762
7/12/45

Page 1, par. 3

XX 7999
7/11/45cmb

Page 2, par. # 5

XX 7780
6/18/45cmb

Page 2, par. # 6

RX 208
6/30/45cmb

Pages 1 and 2, par. 5,6,7

RX 907
B-2
8/4/45cmb

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 10

cmbXX 8837
8/20/45

Page 5, para. 3

FPX/6646
D.S. DOC.
18 May 45

Page 6, para. 5

XX 9084
9/1/45

Page 8, para. 2

cmb

Page 4, para. 7,A

XX 8910
8/20/45cmb

Page 3, #7

HX 621
10/3/45cmb

Re Laura.

** IN 35795
Madrid
13 April 46

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

XX-8707
no date

German. Oberfuhrer of the SS. Did not belong to the RSHA service. Director general or technical adviser of SOPINDUS. At first was an unimportant employee of the WILMERS firm. During the Spanish civil war engaged in arms traffic to France. Very clever. Has been employed to deal directly with Franco, who likes him. Has made a considerable sum of money. Married a daughter of WILMERS. Within eight years, he has acquired money and titles. He now has a villa at Madrid and two large farms, one at Salamanca and the other at Alicante. His connections are powerful and although he is no. 1 on the list of expulsions demanded by the Allied he has never left the country. Gives the cover of SOPINDUS to the services of the German I.S. About 35 years old.
hft

Page 5, para. 26
cmbXX 9837-9839
11/13/45

In 1936 subject received financial assistance from the German government to form HISMA Import and Export Co. In 1939 was made chief of Spanish-German Claims Commission and since that time has supervised investing of 24 billion Reichsmarks in Spanish industries. Personal friend of GOERING. His principal assistants are Herbert and Oscar WILMER. Heinrich BAUER, when he was in the Puerta del Sol, wrote his wife and asked her to go to subject and explain to him that he must get him out of jail.
hft

RX-955
8 Sept. 45

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Herbert and Oscar WILMER are two of the principal assistants of subject, who was formerly the representative of their firm, H & O WILMER, in Tetuan. Subject is now head of SOPINDUS, the German holding company which acts as cover for SD operations. Subj. is considered the principal figure in the SD in Spain.
cmb

545 (2)
RX 549
B-3
4/9/45

Document gives list of employees of H & O WILMER. Source is Spanish police records dated Jan. 4, 1944. Subject is not listed as an employee, nor does his name appear as connected with this firm.
cmb

RX 586
W/BC; B-3
4/18/45

No additional info.

XL 10127
Madrid
5/3/45

cmb

RX-866
V/BC; B-2
19 July 45RX-896
V/BC; B-2
1 Aug. 45

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BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 11

Page 23, #3; page 24, paras. 1,2; page 25, #4,6. App. VI & VII.

XX 9618
10/26/45

cmb

Subject is included in list of Ant VI representatives and agents in Spain. After his name is "comprehensive economic organization). In Spain one of the big tasks was to supply the French Atlantic ports still occupied by the Germans with food. Almost all the sailing boat expeditions succeeded. It was managed by subject and STEINLE.

44TS 1837
SCHELLENBERG

hft

SCHOERER-STOLLE, when he went to Buenos Aires on an espionage mission, was given a firm in Madrid which SCHMER thought was called BERNHARDT as a cover address.

XX-9771
5 Oct. 45
Interrog of
H. SCHMER

Subject is alleged to have 80 million pesetas, most of it in southern Spain. Frau SCHAEFFERS, subject's secretary, went to southern Spain with him. He allegedly has several fincas in the south.

20637-528
#370
5/28/45

cmb

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 12

collector and pseudo-official foreign currency, gold and art dealer of the Reich and its former leaders. Became extremely rich in his service in Spain.

Contrary to statement on Interrogation Report to the effect that subject was head of GRILLE and that he was installed as General Manager of SOFINDUS, POW states that MOSIG was head of GRILLE and that BERNHARDT always had been General Manager of SOFINDUS in that he had founded the organization in 1938.

cjd

Info from Karl DEININGER of Starnberg:

SOFINDUS was set up as a big corporation, under the leadership of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer HERRMANN, fnu (believed to be subject), a personal friend of both Franco and Hitler. HERRMANN established a bank account of several million pesetas for DEININGER, whom he had advised to remain in Spain. HERRMANN was further charged with the transport of Spanish Moroccan troops to Germany. He speaks perfect Spanish, and travels in Spain under four different Spanish names. His family lives in a villa at Sevilla. One of his aides is HAMMES, who was chief of the SD in all Spain. Both HERRMANN and HAMMES are still living in Spain, presumably still continuing their activities.

XX-12231
5/16/46

cjd

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Federico CARRUNCHO is well known as one of subject's right-hand men. SERRANO SUNER was first contacted by Germany's top agent, subject, who elicited valuable info re Franco's plans. Demetris CARCELLER SECURA, Spanish Minister of Economy, contacted through subject. Subject also contact of BAU, former Minister of Commerce. Under the influence of subject's clever machinations, General ARANDA served indirectly as a source of info. MUNOZ GRANDES, formerly commander of the Blue Division and later Franco's Adjutant maintained contact through subject. Subject was one of SCHELLENBERG's top agents. SINGER and MOSIG also top. The "Organization Grille" was covered and camouflaged through SOFINDUS. The purpose of "Organization Grille" was to further develop social and commercial leads and connections initiated by subject, and to exploit them from a counter intelligence point of view; to establish new connections and to maintain existing links with sources of info represented primarily in the persons of CARCELLER, BAU, MUNOZ GRANDES and General ARANDA. Subject was SCHELLENBERG's main representative and No. 1 person of confidence in Spain. Began career in GIS in Spanish Civil War. Became the most influential personality and important intermediary between the German Government and Franco. The most important sources of info in Spain were initiated by subject. His preoccupation with matters of economic and commercial nature resulted in neglect of contacts in intelligence. To assist in his tremendous task, to maintain contacts he had established, and to exploit sources of info in Spain, the organization "GRILLE" with MOSIG in charge was created. Subject aged 48; 1.73 m tall; stocky build; black hair; bushy eyebrow. Believed still in Madrid. cjd

XX-11487
4/1/46

One of the wealthiest Germans in Spain.

20637-524
#192
5/1/45

SS Oberführer. VI Beauftragter in Madrid. Head of German-Spanish firm of Sofindus and Rowak. Arranged for air transport of Spanish Moroccan troops from Africa in Civil War.

IX-3815
Dr. Klaus
HEEGEL
18 Aug. 45

Bernard ROHE said that subject had on hand as of March 19, 1945, so-called personal funds believed to amount to 80,000,000 pesetas, apart from all other assets of SOFINDUS and affiliates. ROHE was an accountant with SOFINDUS.

Econic 00037
Embassy, Madrid
18 Jan. 46

Page 9, para. 2 - no additional info

X-2 30247
1/15/45
Schagen

From Fritz LACKNER Interrog: Liaison officer of the German Embassy Madrid to Gssimo FRANCO. Installed as General Manager of the SOFINDUS Co., Chief of the Organization GRILLE of Amt VI of the RSHA, which engaged in interior Spanish problems. Description: 50; 1.68 m; heavyset; glasses; round face; brown eyes; dark hair. Owns great property near Alicante, Spain (in town of Denia) with a private W/T station. Aft (cont)

XXI-187
3/8/46

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card 13

A Mr. SCHEEL, formerly an employee of SOPINDUS, mentioned to a member of the British Trusteeship of the former German Embassy, the existence of a "secret fund" of several millions, and of a camouflaged enterprise called "Anton". The fund of several millions is probably the monies handled personally by subject but there is no trace of "Anton", other than the Christian name of WAHLE. On 2/17/45 it was reported that WAHLE ranked next to subject as the most important organizer of supplies for Germany. In view of the connection of all three subjects, WAHLE, BERNHARDT and SCHEEL, with SOPINDUS, the reported existence of a "secret fund" of several millions and of a camouflaged enterprise called "Anton", there is a possibility that WAHLE and SCHEEL may be implicated with subject in such an enterprise.

RX 1218
2/4/46

cmb

6

Subject worked for the OKW organization, which was interested in buying merchandise, acquiring foreign exchange and circumventing the Allied Blockade.

HX-744
22 Mar 46
Kurt
MAULAZ

hft
Shaefer No. 24124. Rank Oberfuhrer. Referat VI. Beauftragter in Madrid. Connected with Sofindus Firm.

XX-9249
9/20/45

cjd

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card-14

From Final Report of Otto WIEDEMANN:
WIEDEMANN, who was in Barcelona in summer of 44, received instructions to accompany BAU and subject to Berlin.

LMX-358
5/15/46

cjd

Subject was Nazi Party member no. 1572819, having entered the Party on 1 April 1933.

RX-1383
29 Aug. 46

st

No new information.

F-8300
25 Aug. 46

BC364 reported that subject had sent 21 baskets full of food, cigarettes, etc., to the jail where the Germans were held sometime during the past week and even went so far as to appoint a "Blockwart" (cell leader) among them. Source is of the opinion that subject is still the leader of German resistance groups and morale in general.

RX-1388
8/29/46

cjd

HAUSTEIN says he recalls that a certain LENNERTS (phonetic) probably Sustart) LENZ) was the Chief of the German Abwehr in ~~XXXX~~ Madrid. On 20 July 1944, he was supposed to have been replaced by a BERNHARD, the leader of the HISMA. With his two brothers-in-law, he was supposed to have been the head of the S.D. Their names were Herbert and Oscar WILMER.

FERO 667
22 Oct. 46
Interrog of
Martin
HAUSTEIN

hft

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

KSM 1
30 Oct. 46
B-2

NOLTING de la PENA was reported in Jun3 45 to be training W/T operators for future service in a clandestine German organization to promote post-defeat activities in Spain. Subject and MOSIG were said to be part of this organization.

hft

When SOPINDUS heard of the plan to transfer the OTTO Organization's activities from France to Spain, subject started a wild campaign against the project, being afraid of competition. Since ~~had~~ subject had the greater power, being an SS Standartenfuhrer and also an influential personage with the different Spanish Ministries, the Abwehr's request to transfer the OTTO Org. to Spain was turned down.

20637-822
#5761
7/31/46

cmb

SOPINDUS was the Sp. continuation of the firm HISMA founded by subject and CARRANZA in ~~Tetuan~~ Tetuan as cover for the support given by Goering to Franco during the Civil War. SIMROSS states that the Condor Legion later became the official organ and took the place of HISMA, which then became a purely commercial firm under the direction of subject and with German approval and the support of Franco, for the purpose of implementing the GORING 4 year plan as regards ROWAK, Berlin. Subject, chief of Sofindus, was former chief clerk with H & O WILMER & Co.

XX 12391

8/14/48

Interr.

SIMROSS

cmb

A report by the American Military Attaché at Madrid: "Who's Who in Madrid" Walther BECKER, former Commercial Attaché to the German Embassy, Madrid, Spain, No. 407-45 of October 16, 1945, setting forth BECKER's own account of his life and career, together with interesting info on his activities in Brazil. BECKER and subject are regarded by Madrid Embassy as the two Germans who were probably most conversant with the economic activities of the Nazi Party and Reich in Spain.

2/21/46

cjd

Fritz HARDER Interrog: FLANZE had just returned from a trip to Salamanca, where he had inspected the station and its personnel, and had come to an arrangement with subject, the manager of HISMA, the German-Spanish clearing firm at Salamanca, regarding a projected loan of about 100,000,000 Pesetas to be made by the German Reichspost to the Franco Government. After the necessary formalities had been completed, FLANZE and POW travelled via Stuttgart, Geneva and Marseilles to Salamanca. Here POW met subject, ZEPP his secretary, Consul-General KOHN, the Attaches KROGER and BOBRICK of the German Embassy in Salamanca. FLANZE and POW had further conferences with subject re suitable wavelengths for use in Spain. A general plan was worked out, but was still incomplete when discussions were interrupted by subject's departure to Berlin on urgent business. Subject's car, chauffeur and an interpreter were placed at disposal of FLANZE and POW.

XXI-40
3/2/46

cjd

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Card-15

KSM-61

Subject has not been named for repatriation of this list. The Allied Safehaven Committee has requested that subject's name not be included inasmuch as he continues to be in a position to render ~~ix~~ valuable assistance, and for that reason they do not wish to jeopardize his collaboration. On numerous occasions, subject has been reported to be the head of an important Nazi resistance group in Spain. He continues to occupy offices in the Allied controlled Sofindus building in Madrid, where he continues to receive visitors. He was recently reported to have held a meeting, in his Sofindus offices, of several well-known Nazis, at which time he is said to have remarked that his office was a most appropriate meeting place inasmuch as he enjoyed what he termed "extraterritorial rights". It has also been argued by the British and American Embassies that any attempt to secure subject's repatriation would meet with failure in view of his intimate relations with Spanish authorities and his former financial assistance to Franco during the Civil War.

ojd

GRIMM stated that SOFINDUS or HISMA was a German government agency and was headed by subject, who is still at large in Spain.

ojd

KEL-1005
20 Dec 46
Han GRIMM
Interrog.

BERNHARDT, Johannes E. P.

Card-16.

Report refers to and expands.

Subject's name is under consideration for Repatriation List to be presented to the Spanish during the current week. The State Dept. wish his name included. The British have asked our State Dept. for help in advising the State Dept. that they wish to use him for a long-term intelligence project, and also that they believe the Spanish Govt. would refuse to repatriate him. BERNHARDT has not yet been used for any intelligence purpose apart from Safehaven information on German assets. The British consider him qualified to investigate reports that wolfram is being smuggled from Spain and going by clandestine channels to the USSR. British letter quoted in report mentions subject's "present good-will towards us".

hft

BERNHARD (subj) and others, said Wolfgang Otto FROBERG, to whom he is known owing to his cooperation with the Allied Control Council, continue to make his life impossible in Spain with the assistance of the Nazi friendly Falangists. They have decided to kill him (Frohberg).

hft

Subj's name was deleted from the repatriation list by the Spanish who gave the following reason: This name does not appear on previous lists; subj has been in contact with the Allied authorities - Madrid.

hft

WEL-1566
27 Oct. '47

Cable State
15 Jan 48
Madrid

State Madrid
no. 378
1 July 48

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BERNHARDT, Johannes E. F.

ESMA-109
15 Sept 48

A new radio station called "Radio Atlantis" was opened in Tangier, having been organized by Mario PIRELLI who is employed by Clarence Oscar Lamberth, Jr., American. Broadcasts are frequently devoted to tracing individuals for the IRO (Internatl. Refugee Org). Recently Lamberth made a trip to Madrid to see one of his business associates, Athanas KEFSISOFF. PIRELLI asked Lamberth to call on BERNHARDT, SALVICCI and AVILA. When Lamberth asked KEFSISOFF about them, K discouraged him from calling on them by explaining that they would ask him to smuggle funds from Spain to Tangier.

hft

Memo to COPS dated 21 Oct 47 written C

65-7-6

Misc outgoing

Col. Roland J. H. MERTZ of the US Army in Germany was assigned by the army to purchase perishable foodstuffs in Spain for the American occupation troops in Germany. He asked the Embassy's assistance. He was a Colonel but was acting in a private capacity without any connection with the army, it was learned. Also, it came out that his Spanish agent was Johannes E. F. BERNHARDT. MERTZ said subj was the only one with whom he could do business on a profitable basis. This is not true, says State. MERTZ later severed his connections with subj.

hft

doc in CIA library

State, Madrid
No. 628
3 Nov 48

"Fascist Movement in Spain and other countries". dated 4 August 1948.

WEB-783.

Subject claimed to be a member of movement in Spain. See Document.

Current commercial activities of Johannes E. F. BERNHARDT in Spain.

WSM-293
8 Mar 1949

Subject is probably German referred to who is still at large, living at Avenida del Generalísimo, and who was one of those who at the beginning of the civil war financed capital necessary and who with his money took a very active part in transferring nationalist forces from Marruecos to Spain.

cjd

Subject and Oscar WILMER are two Nazis who live undisturbed in Madrid. In 1936, when Franco began activity against the Republic in Africa, subject and WILMER lived in Melilla. They were both high agents of Hitler in Spain. Through them Franco made his first demand for help from Germany. Subject and WILMER went to Berlin to present Franco's proposition. The talks in Berlin were not with Hitler but with Goering. As a result the first help came from German -- men, technicians, war material for the so-called national zone. For all this important and delicate mission of sending troops and arms, subject was designated. Subject often seen at hotel where Hans THOMSEN's wife stays.

cjd

SCHULLENBERG sent Eugen MOSIG to Spain to gather political intelligence, and MOSIG used his assignment to prevent sabotage in the Safindus tungsten mines as a cover. BERNHARDT did not have a high opinion of MOSIG's ability.

MOHA 1087
4 Sept 47

--np--

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BERNHARDT

WSM-344

1 March 50.

Major Fernando SANTAMARIA, Head of Falange network "D", which concerns itself with foreigners in Spain, claims that there are two classifications of Germans in Spain. One is that of Germans who continue to be Nazis, and the other of those who "have sold out to the Americans." He identifies as the outstanding member of the second group, BERNHARDT, "who has close connections of a financial and economic nature with the Allied Control Commission." He claims that BERNHARDT was mainly responsible for the fact that commercial representatives of the Bonn Government went back to Germany empty-handed after having come to Madrid to negotiate a trade arrangement with Spain. The Bonn representatives were disgusted to find that in order to carry out their negotiations, they had to deal with Nazis. SANTAMARIA thinks, however, that the main underlying reason for the failure of the negotiations is the fact that the United States controls the German economy, and does not wish to lose its hegemony.

-er

Subject is reported by one Karl R.A. WITTIG to continue to control SOF1 BUS and to give financial support to Nazis of Western Germany. Lengthy details of a rather general nature are given in the document. Report says that Anton WAHLE is still Subject's assistant.

HICOG-Frankfurt
465
27 March 1950
German external
Assets in Spain

CIA 424363

Subject and Johann W. THER have interests in common.

Q-11911
16 May 50

Subject, after being turned down on his visa application to the States, has changed his route and is believed to have left in mid-July for South America, allegedly on business for his film companies (Sagittaria and Europa). His trip

WSM-1221
3 Aug 50

BERNHARDT, Johannes

Acc. to QUAMK subject has brought a device to Spain which the Sp. Army has been using successfully, called DEZ IMETERGERAT. It sends out micro waves.

WSM-742
9 May 52

(over)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

was to take six or eight weeks. BERNHARDT says he is trying to build up an international advisory bureau with a Flemish refugee lawyer. Offices are called Informaciones Juridicas Internacionales, located at Jose Antonio 43, Madrid.

One Alfred O. PFISTERER, German, applying for work with this Agency in Germany listed subject as a reference, claiming he was chief manager in subject's firm SCFINDUS till 1941.

MOLA-8298
24 Sept 51

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BERNHARDT, Johannes

RUSHTOWN reported that subject unofficial rep. of the Hitler government in Spain in 1937, responsible for supplying the Nationalists. He is of the opinion Subject acquired Spanish citizenship. RUSHTOWN informed that he suspects that Subject is now working in Spain for the British I.S. CFPA-3977
4 Nov 1953

BERNHARDT, Johannes Eberhard Franz

REF ID:	TO
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONTACT
CARD	INDEX

Naturalized Spaniard of German origin, personal friend of FRANCO and of Sir Oswald MOSLEY (qv). Food supply organizer for Germans for nationalist Spain during civil war. Contact and intimate friend RUSHTOWN. (See also CFPA 3977; Spanish Primer)

CFPA 6056
30 Mar 54

main index

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Anexo 13 - BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0005

NAME AND ALIASES Mr. BERNHARDT, J. F.		COUNTRY AND PLACE Madrid, Spain	
NATIONALITY, BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE		STATUS	
DOCUMENT NO.	DATE OF DOCUMENT	SOURCE	EVALUATION
BD/18/20-7/13	26.4.44	OSS	
Official middleman for the German Government in purchase of priority materials that are still allotted to Spain. Believed to be working with two other German business men, one, Heinemann and other, Breuer.			
o Wood - 4.7.44 Engaged in smuggling of wolfram by mail. Connected with SOFINDUS, WAHLE and representative of Madrid Embassy.			
o Wood - 30.1.45			
LORSE and BESELER connected with subject in smuggling.			
See CXG - 750 - 6/1/45			
851 - 15/1/45			
873 - 16/1/45			
875 - 16/1/45			
O Memo 272	2.7.45	OSS	
Copy of Primer write-up on subject.			
BC/7/1076	30.6.45	OSS	
AG P Br Hq 305 2-44/50M/L-4831			
ESS			
BERNHARDT, JOHANNES E.F.		Portugal Spain	
OSS			
NY/EC POUCH 21789. Address: Palace Hotel, Madrid. Business man, managing director of Sofindus in contact with German I.S.			
BD/18/HX-214	3.10.44	OSS	
German director. Born at Osterode, East Prussia on 1.1.97; residence at Madrid. Passport #2031, issued Madrid on 5.10.43;			
BD/18/HX-350	31.1.45	OSS	
Came to Lisbon 28.9.44 for 3 days, and again on 1.12.44.			
BD/18/HX 416	7.3.45	OSS	
BD/18/HX-466	19.4.45	OSS	
Bruno LESSER is an accomplice of BERNHARD. Subject is a close associate of Otto ECKERT.			
BC/3/144	1.4.45	OSS	
Subject is "the head of the German firm which conducts all economic negotiations between the German government and Spanish government of private firms. Was responsible for supplying the besieged German bases on the French coast by clandestine boat trips from Spain, working closely with			

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BC/7/663 9.4.45 OSS
Herbert and Oscar WILMER are active members of the NSDAP in Madrid and are two of the principal assistants of Johannes BERNHARDT, who was formerly the representative of their firm in Tetuan. BERNHARDT, now acting as head of Sofindus, the German holding company at Avenida Generalísimo I, which acts as cover for SD operations, is generally considered the principal figure of the SD in Spain.

BC/10/265 23.8.45 OSS
BERNHARDT has offered to work for Allied interests in the management of SCFINDUS. He has agreed to accept any directives laid down by an Allied advisory committee. Subject estimates capital assets of SCFINDUS, including subsidiary company (all German-owned, although in the names of Spanish nominees) at five hundred million pesetas. See document for BERNHARDT's account of his past activities and for list of subsidiaries of SCFINDUS.

the Naval Attache, the Madrid intelligence station and the German Embassy. Another similar project was entrusted to the Hamburg intelligence station.

V/48/D 22.5.45 OSS
Tried to recruit Luis LIANSO JORNET to go to the United States and South America as his personal representative, and saw that LIANSO had instructions in Morse Code.

BC/7/496 RX-406 2.2.45 OSS
On British June 1944 Expulsion list.

BC/7/998 RX-797 6.6.45 OSS

SD man, Barcelona (according to RESENBERG).

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BERNHARDT

Spain

NAME AND ALIASES

COUNTRY AND PLACE

NATIONALITY, BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE

STATUS

DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOGRAPH

DOCUMENT NO.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

SOURCE

EVALUATION

BC/9/33

11.8.44

OSS

Reported as head of German firm in Larache and Alcazarquivir which owns flour mills. Wealthy, and said to have made his money buying lorries, arms and ammunition and so forth in Germany for Franco's account. This firm of which this man is manager is said to supply gasoline to German submarines.

14 PP HQ ETO 3-44/504/L-0524

BERNHARDT, Johann

Tetuan

NAME AND ALIASES

COUNTRY AND PLACE

German

NATIONALITY, BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE

STATUS

DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOGRAPH

DOCUMENT NO.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

SOURCE

EVALUATION

BC/9/33

11.8.44

OSS

Address: 14 O'Donnell, Tetuan. Reported to be branch manager of H & O WILMER, automobile importers and exporters. Reported also to be local Nazi party in 1936 and one of most active propagandists in Spanish Morocco, working with Adolf LANGENHEIM.

BC/7/175

July 1943

NA

B-2

BC/7/496 (RX-406)

2.2.45

OSS

SOFINDUS; resides in Madrid; "certain prominent expulsion candidate" included on British June 1944 list.

BC/7/1029

RX-825

20.6.45

OSS

BC/8/176

19.7.45

OSS

Translation of Statement by SCHELLENBERG, No. 17 27.7.45

(filed in V/48/P8)

Stated by SCHELLENBERG to have been Amt VI representative in Madrid.

14 PP HQ ETO 3-44/504/L-0524


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Anexo 14 - BERHNARDT, JOHANNES_0010

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE					
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT			DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
			2. RI FILE NO.	WASH-1-2-PT 550	
			3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
			XARZ-13854		3 Jan 1945
			7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. AHA	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE		
	24 Oct 61				
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
<p>14.BERNHARDT, Johann In September 1952 was in Tetuan; branch manager of H. O. WILMER automobile importers and exporters; in 1936 was secretary of local Nazi Party; was one of the most active pro-pagandists in Spanish Morocco; worked with Adolf LANGENHEIM, one of the chiefs of German I.S. in Morocco. Described as dangerous; was born 1/1/97. Managing Director of SOFINDUS; in contact with German I.S. Is very wealthy; said to have made his money buying up lorries arms and ammunition in Germany for Franco's account. He enjoys Franco's entire confidence due to the food service rendered him during the Spanish Civil War. Is head of a German firm in Larache and Alcazarquivir, owning flour mills; this firm is said to be supplying German subs at night by means of small fishing craft. Is greatly respected by the Spanish authorities and by the public in general on account of his intimate and friendly relations with Franco. Is described as a high German official engaged in the development of armament works and metallurgical industries in Spain. Has sent cables to Faupel, Himmler, Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Rosenberg, Rommel, Sperrle, Richthofen, etc. Has been described as the official middleman for the German Government in the purchase of priority materials that are still allotted to Spain. Is believed to work with two other German businessmen, BRUER and MEINEMANN. Has also been reported as head of German I.S. in Spain. A report dated 8.21.44 states that subject is SS Upper Group Leader; political head of SOFINDUS; manages great part of UNICOLOR; enjoys the confidence of the Germanophiles who are high up in the Spanish Government and is the medium through which are arranged the purchases of priority material bought by Spain from the Allies.</p>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 					

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FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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Date: 2001

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(C) So. Plan 2-1-1-1 ☐

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Anexo 15BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0013

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 Date: 10/20/01

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

ABSTRACT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DATE	JUN 45

INFORMAL BIOGRAPHIES, PORTUGAL

XARZ-
JUN 451. Johan or Johannes Eberhardt Franz BERNHARDT

Av. del Valle 3, Madrid

Married with at least three children. He holds the following passports: (1) #1621/40; (2) No. 01567 issued Madrid January 30, 1940; (3) #2031 issued Madrid October 5, 1943; and (4) #1936.

Subject is an officer of the SS, his rank being probably either Gruppenfuehrer or Obersturmfuehrer. He is a native German, born January 1, 1897 at Osterode, East Prussia.

At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 BERNHARDT, who was then living in Spanish Morocco, offered his services to Franco, a personal friend of his. It was arranged that subject handle the exchange of Spanish products for German war material; the holding companies ROWAK in Berlin and HISMA in Tetuan were set up for the purpose and became important economic factors on the Nationalist side.

In 1938 SOPINDUS (Sociedad Financiera y Industrial, Av. del Generalissimo Franco 1, Madrid) replaced the earlier corporations. As managing director of SOPINDUS in Madrid since at least 1941, subject collaborated closely with both the Sipo & SD and the Abwehr. Under his direction SOPINDUS, in addition to serving as a purchasing agency for wolfram and other strategic commodities, handled foreign exchange transactions for the German Government and the German intelligence services, provided cover employment for the Sipo & SD agents, sometimes paying a part of their salaries, facilitated the granting of Spanish visas to Abwehr agents by promising employment, set up bank deposits (probably in Spanish names) to provide for Abwehr expenses in case of a diplomatic break between Spain and Germany, and assisted the German intelligence services in other ways. Specifically, subject is known to have handled the transfer by SOPINDUS to the German Embassy Ptas. 16,000,000 for the use of KdM Spain in November 1944. Between October 1944 and April 1945, he collaborated with the German Embassy, their Naval Attache and KdM Spain in a number of unsuccessful attempts to ship supplies from Spain to the German garrisons holding out in France.

BERNHARDT has many influential connections with high officials of the Spanish Government.

BERNHARDT is the self-declared founder of both SOPINDUS and HISMA (since dissolved). He is also vice-president of Geral. de Lanas, S.A. (Lanaco), vice-president

KID/MILSWEL

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of Exportadora de Pieles, S.A. (Pielco), and a director of Nova, S.A. During the German domination of France, BERNHARDT held extraordinary powers to control transportation for the more efficient delivery of goods, not only in Spain, but in France as well. He started a branch of SOFINDUS in Lisbon, under the orders of Bethke of ROWAK, and was rumored to have participated in the running of the "pirate" radio station "Atlantik", because he received a Christmas present from the German Government which also went to others connected with the station.

BERNHARDT is also said to have a substantial camouflaged interest in Prodag (Productos Agrícolas, S.A.).

In June 1945, the British reported that BERNHARDT had offered to direct SOFINDUS in the interest of the United Nations, with an Allied committee as its Board of Directors. He (BERNHARDT) estimated the present assets of the company at Ptas. 500,000,000.

2. Anton (Antonio) WAHLE

Calle Castellán 2, Madrid, June 45

German engineer. President of the Consejo de Administracion of the Cia. General Importadora de Lanas, Ayala 10, Madrid.

Given on Board of Directors of SOFINDUS and H. GAERTNER, S.A.

WAHLE is also President of Geral. de Lanas, S.A. (Lanaco) and of Soc. Exportadora de Pieles, S.A. (Pielco) and on the board of directors of Hermann Gaertner, S.A. de Productos Resinos.

RECEIVED G.I.S.

A report dated June 1944 reveals that correspondence from German agents in South America is sent via Spanish seamen addressed to subject or to Carlos ARNOLD, who uses HIS FIRM, LANAS, as a cover for intelligence activities.

WAS USED

3. Dr. Friederich BETHKE X

Apart from Managing Directorship of ROWAK, Berlin, no additional information as yet.

4. Dietrich PROPPE

Calle Ponzano 62, Madrid

Subject has been associated with the management of SOFINDUS and at one time appeared on its Board of Directors. Subject is secretary to the following firms: PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS, S.A.; TRANSPORTES MARION, S.A.; ARALAR, S.A.; and General de LANAS, S.A.

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5. Hermann Gaertner SCHWIEKER (also SCHWEIKER)

President, Hermann Gaertner, S.A., de Productos Resinos.

Subject was reported as a member of the German colony in Madrid who has not been politically prominent and who deserves complete confidence.

6. Fernando CARRANZA (also CARANZA and CARRONZA)

In May 1944, CARRANZA, a naval commander, acted as assistant to Colonel ZEA in Tetuan. Colonel ZEA at that time was head of Spanish I.S. in Spanish Morocco.

CARRANZA is a director of NOVA, S.A., and of Cia. Explotaciones Mineras de Aralar, a SOPINDUS holding. Was a joint founder with (BERNHARDT) of HISMA.

LINKED WITH SUBJECT OF []

7. Ernesto KLINGENBERG (also KLINKENBERG, KLINKENBURG, and by FEA, KINGENBERGER)

General Pardinias, 114, Madrid

On Board of Directors of NOVA, S.A., SOPINDUS, and Hermann Gaertner, S.A.

Is the German Director "Gerante" of Baquera, Kusche y Martin (BAKUMAR), Plaza de las Cortes 3, Madrid.

In 1944 he was one of the men who received the power of attorney to vote the shares of Slomann from the Slomann heirs. He is considered a Slomann man. He says that he was advisor to the German Embassy and dependencies on shipping and transport matters throughout the war. At several places including one occupied by an intelligence officer of the German consulate, the phone pads contained the name of Klingenberg as one of the principal Germans in Spain who was available for specific kinds of assistance such as shipping, etc. It appears that Klingenberg entered Bakumar in June 1924. As Consul he is believed to have received 8,000 to 10,000 pesetas per month.

8. Juan Barber ALANDETE

Salamanca, SPAIN. LINKED WITH COVERT AXIS FUNDING AND CURIER ACTIVITY.

On April 16, 1943, reported as one of the owners of Marion, S.A. Later he is given as Technical Director on the Marion Board of Directors. In May 1945, he was reported as the Managing Director of Marion.

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The American Embassy in Madrid reported on May 17, 1945 that Serrano SUNER, a lawyer for Marion (Franco's brother-in-law?), asked Barber to choose someone to go to Lisbon in order to obtain some secret Axis funds from the Portuguese Minister of Finance and bring the money back to Spain.

In April 1945, BARBER was reported to be organizing two cover firms for the concealment of Marion physical assets. The first was the firm Minerva, S.L., at Travesia de Luis Vives 2, Salamanca, and the second Transportes Ebro, S.L., Calle Zamora, Salamanca. The first was started by Don Gaetano Lo Grasso Vinceguerra and Don Leonard Criado Garcia. Lo Grasso is Barber's brother-in-law, and Italian, and the address of Minerva, S.L., is his own private residence. Transportes Ebro, S.L., was started by Jose Morollon, and two office employees of Marion. Both firms are being given trucks and equipment by Marion without making full payments.

9. Berkhardt ANGER (either Burkhardt or Bernhardt is correct)

Gerant General of Transportes Marion. Also executive of German Consorcio, Madrid. Reported to have assisted in the removal at different times (April 1945) of 400 liters of gasoline and 200,000 pesetas from the Marion garage and offices to his own home.

10. Jose Martinez ORTEGA (Conde de Argillo)

Cava de San Miguel 6, Madrid

Vice-President of Sierra de Gredos, Cia Minera, and of Cia. Explotaciones Mineras de Aralar. Also reported head of SOMAR, S.A.

ORTEGA is an important Spanish financier and it is probable that his name will be used as the owner of a considerable portion of SOFINDUS' mineral properties.

11. Guillermo PASCH

G. Pasch Hermanos: Madrid Office: Alcala 48, Piso F 24,
Also the Palace Hotel

(In the same office building are: Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg Diesel Iberio, S.A., subsidiary of main German firm represented by Pasch. Also the Banco de Vizcaya.)

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Bilbao Office: Calle de Perez Galdes,
Also has quarters at Guecho,
Bilbao, Calle de Carmen,
7.

He reportedly used the
Hotel Excelsior, in Bil-
bao, for contacts with
German agents.

G. Pasch Hermanos is the association for Karl *Adolf*
and Wilhelm Pasch, two Germans acting as independent com-
mercial agents in Spain. It appears that Karl, or Carlos,
Pasch is generally in Bilbao and Wilhelm, or Guillermo, in
Madrid. *ENGAGED IN UNDERCOVER GERMAN ACTIVITIES*

The firm is engaged in two principle fields of
commerce, the exploitation and shipping of ores for and to
German consumers, and the development of Spanish hydro-
electrical projects using German capital, equipment, and
personnel. Since December 1944, their activity in mining
and shipping has almost ceased.

The two brothers came originally from Germany.
It is known that Wilhelm was born in Hochdahl, Germany, in
August 1889. Hochdahl is about ten kilometers away from
Dusseldorf and about thirty kilometers from Oberhausen,
the two main centers for Gutehoffnungshuette and the Haniel
family, the most important Pasch customers. This may be
coincidence, although it is hardly likely that both Pasch
and his customers have not discovered the fact.

Page 89 Guillermo Pasch is believed, by many sources, to
be very strongly engaged in espionage activities. It has
been recently reported that the U. S. and British Embassies
requested his expulsion from Spain. He was reported in-
terned in February 1945, but in May, 1945, another report
said that Wilhelm Pasch was negotiating for the purchase
of a valuable piece of property on the outskirts of
Torrelavega (Santander) which belongs to a local business-
man, Jaime Diestro. Diestro is said to have asked 1,000,000
(pesetas?) and Pasch seemed ready to agree.

The Pasch brothers have been, in various ways,
connected with Sociedad de Minerales y Metales, a Lipper-
heide y Guzman-I. G. Farben subsidiary; with the Banco de
Vizcaya; SOFINDUS; and Sociedad Espanola de Construcciones
Electromecanicas. Most of their Spanish associates in
business are of the group that has always been strongly
pro-Nazi and is suspected of continuing their efforts to
gain control and cover for German individuals and assets
in Spain. The Pasch brothers seem to be undoubtedly en-
gaged in undercover German activities, and, as such, are a
known security problem. In addition, their company may
already have provided a channel for the escape of large in-
vestments or accounts from Germany to Spain.

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12. Enrico de ASTIGARRAGA

No additional information. There appears to be also a Ramon ASTIGARRAGA who is connected with Hijos de Astigarraga. This firm owns the Naviera Bachi at Bertendona 4-1, Bilbao. On April 20, 1945, it was reported that Bachi was sold to Rafael ARRANCUDIAGA on behalf of German interests to cover the real ownership. Most of the vessels of the firm are still in operation.

13. Ernesto PECHE

Maria de Molina 22, Madrid

Member of Nazi party. Member of SOFINDES. Gerante of Productos Agricolas, S.A. (PRODAG), and through them controls the PRODAG subsidiary, "FRUTAL" in its operations in VITAL, S.A. *DOB. 5. 5. 1917. Spain. 1945. 1945. 1945.*

14. Angel PEREZ de LEZA (or Lesa, and Losa or Loza)

Hotel Gaylord, Madrid, *SPAIN 45*

Forty years old, small, very dark, dresses well. Reported clever and unscrupulous.

Founded the "Fluoruros Corporation", with the following on the Administrative Council: Tomas de Bordegaray, Elorza, Rafael Perez G. Salvador, Angel Perez de Leza, and Juan Mans Cardoni.

In 1941 or 1942, Leza visited the United States and upon returning to Spain announced that he had been named President of the International Commission on Fluorspar. Negotiations were opened with the American Purchasing Commission with Juans Mans Cardoni acting as negotiator between the Commission and Fluoruros. During these negotiations de Bordegaray and Mariano Elorza (Elorza?) resigned from the company and were substituted for by Rodolfo Carneal and Carmelo Eguigurea.

Between July 1942 and August 1943 Leza sold large quantities of fluorspar to the USCC. Just before delivery of the last lots, Leza told Mr. Walser, then Chief of USCC, and Mr. Barrel, Chief of the fluorspar section, that a new contract must be signed immediately. The Commission offered a temporary request for 3,000 tons, pending advice from the American Government, but the offer was refused in favor of the Germans.

Brugarolas and Mans Cardoni resigned, apparently with the approval of Mr. Henry Ellison. They turned in their shares of stock, amounting to 10% of the company.

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(None of the above American names, facts or figures have been checked by OSS in Washington.)

Leza made an agreement with Buttellier, Purchasing Delegate of the Germans, for the supply of minerals. The British Embassy reported at this time that negotiations were under way for the acquisition by SOFINDUS of Fluoruros. The negotiations were apparently conducted by someone named Muller, De Leza and Perez G. Salvador. The purchase was made reportedly at 20,000,000 pesetas, part of the payment being made in Swiss francs. Perez G. Salvador renounced his shares in Fluoruros, because of fear of Allied black-listing. Perez de Leza then liquidated all shares in the company but his own, basing the redemption price on the profit made from the sale to SOFINDUS. The payment from SOFINDUS was made through the Banco Germanico, and the payment by Leza to the shareholders through the Banco Viscaya.

A different report stated that Leza worked with the Bilbao company, Importacion de Minerales, supplying the Germans with wolfram and other minerals. During this period he is supposed to have made several trips to Galicia on behalf of the Germans. It was thought that he made a profit of several millions, particularly through an alleged illegal acquisition and re-sale to Germans of valuable mines in Leon or Asturias.

During the Spanish Civil War, Leza belonged to the S.I.M. and is now thought to belong to the Gestapo. It is believed that he has assisted the Germans in hiding capital. Apparently, he has made or stolen large sums of money, and may also have had money entrusted to him by German interests for placing in Argentina or other South American companies.

Leza was reported in February 1944 as a Falange exterior agent in Argentina.

In June 1945, it was reported that Leza was the head of a company known as Sociedad Americana de Fomentos Comercial y Industrial, which is also known as the Grupo Financiero de la Safoci, with offices in Madrid and Buenos Aires. He is believed to be connected with Juan OLASO.

15. Joaquim and Heinz SIEVERS

No record of Heinz Sievers.

A Sievers supposed to have purchased with Peché the Prodag, S.A., on behalf of Fisselhof.

Joaquim Sievers reported July, 1944, as German agent in Vigo. Given on list of Lufthansa departures from Barcelona for Germany on December 5, 1944.

Sievers-Becker, Joachim. Staff Fuehrer in the SS division (Oberschnitt) XIV at Bremen, 1944.

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Anexo 16 - BERHARDT, JOHANNES_0018BERNHARDT, Johannes Eberhard Franz

MICROFILMED

MAR 22 1965

The following Spanish Primer has been furnished by an attached agency:

German: born Osterode (East Prussia) January 1, 1897: as managing director in Madrid since at least 1941 of the German firm SOFINDUS (Sociedad Financiera Industrial, S.A.) he collaborated closely with both the Sipo & SD and the Abwehr: under his direction SOFINDUS, in addition to serving as a purchasing agency, handled foreign exchange transactions for the German Government and the German I.S., provided cover employment for Sipo & SD agents, sometimes paying a part of their salaries, facilitated the granting of Spanish visas to Abwehr agents by promising employment, set up bank deposits (probably in Spanish names) to provide Abwehr expenses in case of a diplomatic break between Spain and Germany, and assisted the German I.S. in various other ways: reported in April 1944 to be engaged in smuggling wolfram to Germany: helped KdM Spain with customs problems at Iran in September 1944: handled, in November 1944, the transfer by SOFINDUS to the German Embassy of Ptas. 16,000,000 for the use of KdM Spain: closely connected from October 1944 until April 1945, in collaboration with the German Embassy, the Naval Attaché and KdM Spain, with a number of attempts, mostly unsuccessful, to ship supplies clandestinely from Spanish ports to German garrisons isolated on the French coast, these undertakings being separate from those being conducted simultaneously for the same purpose by Ast Hamburg: listed for expulsion, but was still in Spain in April 1945: married with at least three children: passports (1) No. 1621/40, (2) No. 01567 issued Madrid Jan. 30, 1940, (3) No. 2031 issued Madrid Oct. 5/43 and (4) No. 1936. Address: (1944, office) Av. del Generalísimo 1, Madrid.

From a reliable source dated April 2, 1946: Johannes BERNHARDT, former head of SOFINDUS, has been Oberfuehrer der SS. - a title corresponding to the military rank of General. Subject, however, chose the administrative field and wore silver stars instead of gold ones. Whenever he travelled to Germany, he wore the Oberfuehrer's uniform after reaching Hendaye.

See despatch No. 3408 of January 15, 1947, sent to London and Berlin, which gives a full account of the activities of Johannes BERNHARDT in Spain.

GCHowell

DATE 15 Jan 1947

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
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<https://www.legazpi.eus/burdinola/> Date: 2001

Anexo 17 - BERHARDT, JOHANNES 0019**SECRET**

21 October 1947

TO : COPS
 FROM :  FBW
 SUBJECT: Johannes BERHARDT

1. S.S. Oberfuehrer Johannes Eberhard Franz BERHARDT is a German national, born in Osterode, East Prussia, in 1897. When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, BERHARDT was living in Tetuan, Spanish Morocco, as local manager of the import-export firm H. & O. WILMER and secretary of the Tetuan Nazi Party. He was a friend of General FRANCO, and immediately offered to arrange the procurement of war materials for the Nationalists in exchange for Spanish products. For this purpose, BERHARDT set up two companies, ROWAK in Berlin and HISMA in Tetuan, later adding numerous mining companies and other subsidiary firms, all under the control of HISMA. HISMA thus became the largest single factor in the economy of Nationalist Spain. In November 1938, HISMA was replaced by SOFINDUS (Sociedad Financiera Industrial S.A.) with headquarters in Salamanca, a company virtually controlled by the German Government under BERHARDT's direction. After FRANCO's victory in 1939, SOFINDUS established its main office in Madrid; by this time it was a very complicated system of holding-companies, subsidiaries, dummy organizations and interlocking directorates.

2. With Germany's engagement in World War II, SOFINDUS assumed new importance as the official German purchasing company in Spain, where (by 1941) it controlled assets of 500 million pesetas. The firm acted under orders from the Reichsministerium in Berlin and was given access through the German Embassy to German credits and other German resources in Spain. The large-scale smuggling of wolfram out of Spain by SOFINDUS was a major issue in U.S. and British relations with Spain during the war.

3. As managing director of SOFINDUS, Johannes BERHARDT collaborated closely with the Sipo & SD and with the Abwehr. SOFINDUS provided cover employment for SD agents, sometimes paying a part of their salaries; it facilitated the granting of Spanish visas to Abwehr agents by promising employment, set up bank deposits (probably in Spanish names) to provide Abwehr expenses in case of a diplomatic break between Spain and Germany, and assisted the German I.S. in other ways. A specific instance was the transfer by BERHARDT in November 1944 of 16 million pesetas from SOFINDUS to the German Embassy for the use of the RSHA (KdM Spain). In the first part of 1945, BERHARDT collaborated

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- 2 -

Memo re J. BERNHARDT

21 October 1947

with the German Embassy in attempts to ship supplies to the German pockets of resistance on the French coast. BERNHARDT was also a special agent of Amt VI, responsible directly to Walter SCHELLENBERG, who exploited his high-level contacts and considered him the best Amt VI agent in Spain.

4. BERNHARDT was originally (in 1944) listed by the Allies for expulsion, but the Safehaven Committee requested that his name not be included on the later repatriation lists, since he was in a position to render valuable assistance. It was also felt by the British and American Embassies that any attempt to bring about BERNHARDT's repatriation would fail because of his intimate friendships with high Spanish authorities and their remembrance of his help during the Civil War.

5. BERNHARDT has several times been reported as the head of a post-war Nazi resistance group in Spain, and was reported in January 1947 to have held a meeting of prominent Nazis in the SOFINDUS offices.

6. All of the foregoing information is from the most reliable sources, most of it repeatedly confirmed. Unconfirmed reports indicate that BERNHARDT administered a "secret fund" of several million pesetas that he handled sizeable investments for Hermann GOERING (a personal friend), and that he has in Spain a private fortune amounting to 80 million pesetas.

7. Johannes BERNHARDT was last reported as living at Av. del Valle 3, Madrid. He is married (wife nee WILMER) and has at least three children. He held German passport no. 0156, issued at Madrid in 1940. He entered the Nazi Party in April 1933 and his Party no. was 1572619.

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Anexo 18 - BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0022

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BERNHARDT, Johannes E. F.

Subject either owns or is in some way connected with the following companies:

1. Sagitario Filas, S.A. This is a film production company which was founded about a year ago. The entire capital is BERNHARDT's. The company has produced or is in the process of producing the following films:
 - a. "Castro Mujeres". Released in Spain, and has just been sold to England.
 - b. "El Huesped de las Tinieblas". Story of the Spanish philosopher Bequer. Released in Spain.
 - c. "La Fiesta Sigus". Finished, but not yet released. The film was shot in Salamanca. Story concerns bullfighting.
 - d. "El Senor Esteben". Film now in production.
 - e. ? ? Film now in production.
 - f. ? ? Film now in production.

BERNHARDT is trying to sell number b. to South America and to the United States.

Sagitario Filas has recently opened a distribution department, located on Calle Zurbano. They have at the moment nine films to distribute - three of their own and six foreign films.

2. Cine Arte. Entire capital is BERNHARDT's. This is a film laboratory where they make educational films, synchronize films, etcetera. There is a large staff.

3. Erce, S. A., Gran Via 31, Madrid. This is an import-export company. The entire capital is BERNHARDT's. Among other employees is the German national HELMUNG, who was employed in the German Embassy in Madrid during the war. Another employee is RAHLKE (probably Rudolf), a former Sofindus employee. One Doctor FRANZ or GANTZ, a Dutchman, also works in Erce.

4. A motor factory in Madrid which works together with the Army. This factory has a big work shop with very modern installations. BERNHARDT owns the entire factory. The factory has been operating since the end of the second

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World War. Source believes the factory has some relation to a Diesel engine factory which is being put up in Valencia. BERNHARDT is said to be contributing capital to this Diesel factory, but will not own it exclusively. BERNER (?), the man who handled secret accounts in Sofindus during the war, worked for the motor factory in Madrid for some time, but was later dropped by BERNHARDT - reason unknown.

5. A new office at Jose Antonio 42 or 46. BERNHARDT opened this office about the middle of September. Source does not know what the purpose of this company is, but said it was possibly a money lending business. Last year (1947) BERNHARDT was operating a money lending business on the Calle Zurbano, where he loaned money at a very high rate of interest.

6. A soap factory at Maliano in the Province of Santander. BERNHARDT provided all the capital. Doctor YOST, a former teacher of the Colegio Aleman in Madrid, is manager and persona de confianza in this undertaking.

7. BERNHARDT is believed to have recently purchased a big finca somewhere near Madrid. Source does not know at all if this is true. BERNHARDT is known to have a finca in Denia, near Valencia, which includes a large orange grove, and owns still another finca, location unknown.

8. Secret funds left in BERNHARDT's custody. Source states that Hens Thomson, Nazi Party Chief in Spain, who was repatriated at the end of the war, turned over to BERNHARDT some 1,700,000 pesetas. At the same time about 2,000,000 pesetas of SS funds were put in subject's custody.

From the end of the war until recently subject made monthly payments to some (not many) widows of German soldiers in Spain. He recently stopped these payments to the widows, although source believes he could not have used up more than 5% of these funds. When there was some adverse comment about subject's failure to continue the payments, he resumed some of the payments and source believes he is making the payments at the present time.

Source stated that the above sums are really "small potatoes"; that the German underground in Spain has hundreds of millions of pesetas which is not being used at the moment, some of it in the form of jewels.

9. Source states subject tries to give people the impression that he needs money. He is now negotiating for a loan from the government branch (el sindicato) which supervises the Spanish film industry. He is asking for a loan of three million pesetas. Source believes subject is doing this in an attempt to cover up his true financial status. He has sent large amounts of money to Argentina. According to subject's friends, he has two or three business enterprises in the Argentina. Recently he complained that one of his enterprises in the Argentina was costing him money instead of making money.

Subject's secretary, Mrs. Scheaffer, has made two trips to Switzerland in the last two years. She also made one trip to Portugal and another to Argentina. Source believes she assisted in moving some of BERNHARDT's money from Switzerland to Argentina. Mrs. Scheaffer travels with a Spanish passport.

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She was a German up to the end of the war, when she suddenly became a Spanish citizen. Her husband was the banner bearer of all Nazi parades, and an official of the Party. He was previously a chauffeur and she previously worked in SEPU, Madrid. The explanation given by BERNHARDT for the trip to Argentina by his secretary was that she was assisting his wife who visited the Argentine for six or eight months in 1947.

Source states that BERNHARDT has a good contact in Argentina in the person of the Spanish Ambassador ARELLA. He states that ARELLA was bribed several times by BERNHARDT during the war, when ARELLA held a high post in the Spanish Foreign Office. One favor he did for BERNHARDT was to convince Spanish frontier authorities that they should "look the other way" when German supply trucks arrived at the Spanish-French border. ARELLA was paid 500,000 pesetas for each of his favors for BERNHARDT.

10. BERNHARDT chose a Spanish manager and director for his film company, Sagitario Films, S.A., since it was not advantageous to operate in his own name. The manager is a former Gobernador Civil of Salamanca. BERNHARDT hired two German employees to work with the Spanish manager in the belief that their nationality and friendship would naturally make them loyal to him (Bernhardt) and they could be depended on to report to him any irregularities in the procedures of his Spanish manager. One of the German employees was Clara ZEPP, former secretary to MOSEIG, BERNHARDT's righthand man in Gestapo affairs, and the other was Adolf MOHR, former Sofindus employee.

BERNHARDT recently dismissed eight employees from Sagitario Films and Cine Arte, and all eight have filed suit against the companies. Among the eight were the two German employees mentioned above. BERNHARDT personally called the two Germans by telephone and attempted to persuade them to call on him to talk the matter over, and offered to pay them indemnization, which he had at first refused. He later sent his secretary, Mrs. Enrique Schaeffer, to persuade them from taking action, but they stood firm. Source states the two were fired when BERNHARDT began to suspect that they were more loyal to the Spanish manager than they were to BERNHARDT. This matter was to be settled at the session of the Special Court for Labor Affairs on 7 October 1948.

The Spanish manager of the film company, who is an old time Falangista, is trying to persuade the Spanish government to take action against BERNHARDT, based on the belief that BERNHARDT has been giving information to the British concerning relations of high Spanish officials with the Nazis during the war. In this regard the Spanish manager has contacted Spanish Minister GIRON and also the secretary to the Minister of Justice, Fernando or Francisco CUESTA. Source states that an official of the Spanish secret police, one LASCANO, who lives on Serrano, is investigating this matter. LASCANO is convinced of BERNHARDT's guilt, but will not take any steps until he has absolute proof.

11. Source stated that BERNHARDT was on very friendly terms with William Milton of the British Embassy. The latter spent several afternoons in BERNHARDT's office having tea and talking for several hours at a time.

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12. Source also made the comment that whenever he meets any of BERNHARDT's present or former collaborators on the street, their remarks are to the effect that the only solution for the future of Germany is to cooperate with Russia.

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Anexo 19 - BERHARDT, JOHANNES 0025

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE			
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
British Intelligence Service in Spain		1. RI FILE NO.	2. DATE
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE
		5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	6. DATE OF INFO.
7. ANALYST	8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED IN	10. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION			
11. COPIES	12. LE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>14. Page 2.</p> <p>E. W. B. Milton, Head Sec. (Commercial) Madrid</p> <p>.....During late 1944 or early 1945, when subject was actively working in the field of economic warfare in Spain, he established contact with Johannes BERNHARDT, the top German economic expert in Spain and head of the Sofindus complex. BERNHARDT, sensing that the war was lost, made a deal with the British to provide information on hidden German assets, provided that he would not be tried as a war criminal after the war. David THOMPSON, then B.I.S. chief in Spain, began to work BERNHARDT through MILTON. Some of BERNHARDT's information was given by MILTON directly to the Allied Commission, but some was also transmitted through THOMPSON to London and passed by B.I.S. channels there to the Americans. Called to account on this, MILTON said that in certain aspects of the BERNHARDT operation, he was working for THOMPSON and not the ACC.</p> <p>When BERNHARDT's repatriation to Germany seemed imminent, the O.S.S. unit in Madrid received a communication in writing asking that a subterfuge be found to prevent the American Embassy from pressing such action, inasmuch as BERNHARDT was being used as an agent by British intelligence. At the present time, David THOMPSON is under and may be dealing directly with BERNHARDT; however, it is considered more likely that MILTON is still handling the operation.</p>			
<p>15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C</p>			

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Anexo 20 - BERNHARDT, JOHANNES 0026

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313425

163 Empresas
Reunidas Comercio
Exterior S.A.
9-949UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Madrid, Spain, May 9, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 229

Subject: Addition of Empresas Reunidas Comercio
Exterior, S. A., to List of Undesirable
Foreign Trade Contacts.REC'D
MAY 20ACTION
ITPINFO
FR
DCR
SY
EUR
CA
OLI
OFD
COMThe Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Embassy is in receipt of several communications from the Office of the Political Adviser for Germany at Frankfurt commenting on evidence received that the firm Empresas Reunidas Comercio Exterior, S. A., Avenida Jose Antonio No. 31, Madrid, sometimes known as ERCESA, is a cover for Johannes BERNHARDT, former S. S. General and operator of the German state holding company, SOFINUS, and on intimations that Bernhardt also has some connection with the firm of H. V. Oswald Company, of whom the principal proprietor is Mr. Victor OSWALD, a Swiss national resident in Madrid. This Embassy has thoroughly investigated this matter, utilizing the facilities of a controlled American source, normal credit agencies, and available files.

It is found that Empresas Reunidas Comercio Exterior, S. A., is unquestionably controlled by or serving in the interests of Johannes Bernhardt. The management has changed hands at least twice in the last two years. All three of the present Spanish directors are known to have been former pro-Nazis. Two of them, Gregorio PEREZ Ruidobro, an officer of the Madrid police department, and Federico CARUNCHO Astray, have long been known to be intimates and employees of Bernhardt. Evidence is available indicating that Bernhardt owns all of the capital of the company.

With regard to any financial or business connections between Bernhardt and Victor Oswald or his firm, the Embassy has been unable to secure any evidence. Oswald is known to be acquainted with Bernhardt and readily admits such acquaintance, but disclaims any connection or dealings with him whatever. From evidence at hand, it is my opinion that Oswald is too intelligent and too well-connected to either wish or need to have any dealings with Bernhardt.

It is recommended that the firm of Empresas Reunidas Comercio Exterior, S. A., be added to the list of undesirable foreign trade contacts to be issued by the Joint Export Import Agency as a supplement to their Operations Memorandum No. 18, provided such action is consistent with present operating policy. The Office of the Political Adviser for Germany reminds us that they can take no action to prevent ERCESA from trading with German firms unless they are added to this list. On the other hand I seriously doubt whether this action will prove more than a minor annoyance to Bernhardt, inasmuch as it is believed that he already has several other front concerns and can create

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Despatch No. 229

May 9, 1948

Madrid, Spain

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more at will. Furthermore, unless he should accidentally fall into our lap, there is probably very little that we can hope to accomplish in regard to Bernhardt, since he is most strongly entrenched with the present Spanish Government, which is considerably indebted to him. I certainly do not suggest condoning Bernhardt in any way, but if for any reason the adding of this firm's name to the list, when in the past we have been deleting names as rapidly as possible, appears inconsistent with present policy, I do not feel that any significant accomplishment will be lost by leaving matters as they are.

Respectfully yours,

Paul T. Culbertson
Charge d'Affaires, a. i.

Copies to:

American Embassy, Paris
American Embassy, London
Office of the Political
Adviser, Frankfurt.

HGF:rbert/mk

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Anexo 21 - GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (WWII), VOL 2 00

S E C R E T

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE WAR
LONDONLIQUIDATION REPORT NO 7* Amt VI of the RSHAGruppe VI BDECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
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Preamble

- Part I The Historical Development of Gruppe VI B
- Part II Referat VI B 1 and its Activities against Italy
- Part III Referat VI B 2 and its Activities against France and
the Low Countries
- Part IV Referat VI B 3 and its Activities against Switzerland
- Part V Referat VI B 4 and its activities against the Iberian
Peninsula
- Part VI Miscellaneous
- Appendix I Chart of the Distribution of Work in Amt VI from 1939-45
- Appendix II Gruppe VI B Personnel at RSHA
- Appendix III Referat VI B 1 Personnel at Outstations
- Appendix IV Referat VI B 2 Personnel at Outstations
- Appendix V Referat VI B 3 Personnel at Outstations
- Appendix VI Referat VI B 4 Personnel at Outstations
- Appendix VII Alphabetical Index of Gruppe VI B Personnel 1939-45.

Gruppe VI B and Western EuropePreamble

It is merely a matter of convenience to treat the history of Western Europe under Amt VI in terms of the activities of Gruppe VI B such as it existed at the time of the German collapse: for it has to be remembered that in the various reorganisations of Amt VI, especially in the early part of its history, the section designated as Gruppe VI B was not throughout competent for Western Europe, nor were the territorial divisions between the various Gruppen without frequent modification. In Part I of this paper therefore, which deals roughly with the years 1939-41, care is taken to refer to Western Europe rather than to Gruppe VI B; the remaining Parts dealing with the work of the Referate against the various countries, however, are dealt with in terms of Gruppe VI B as if the organisation of the Gruppe had remained unchanged throughout, unless where specific points require clarification.

This treatment is somewhat inaccurate, but not seriously so. Amt VI activities against Western Europe fall into two well defined parts, as does indeed the history of the Amt as a whole - the periods before and after the appointment of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef. SCHELLENBERG's accession in late 1941 marks a turning point in Amt VI; a change in organisation, in personnel and in policy. The results of Amt VI activities in the time of JOST were meagre, in the case of Western Europe almost negligible. Parts II-V deal in fact very largely with the SCHELLENBERG period from early 1942 onwards, by which time Gruppe VI B was finally established with only minor subsequent changes. Part I therefore serves as a historical background to the remainder of the paper.

A further complication to be noted is that caused by the military campaigns themselves; broadly speaking Amt VI as the Auslandsnachrichtendienst dealt with foreign territory, while Amt III as the Inlandsnachrichtendienst dealt with the home territory. Occupied territory, however, became a source of friction between the two Aemter, and no well defined policy seems ever to have been established. The 1940 campaign in the West and the subsequent occupation of the Low Countries and part of France led to a reorientation of Amt VI policy against these countries. The change however was ill defined, as is evidenced by the strong Amt III representation in Holland and Belgium as against the equally strong Amt VI representation in the BdS Frankreich. This factor is of importance in dealing with Holland and Belgium.

The main purpose of this paper is to give an account of the development of Amt VI activities against Western Europe and to attempt to assess the degree of success which attended its efforts to obtain through its representatives in the countries under review the information it desired. In this assessment two points must be borne in mind. Firstly all the necessary evidence is not available since some leading personalities have not yet been arrested and interrogated. Secondly, this paper deals only with the SD and its personnel; any advantages which the absorption of the Abwehr in 1944 bestowed on Gruppe VI B do not form any part of the scope of this review. The first defect is however not serious and further information is not likely to modify this interim assessment. The reservation however must still be made.

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Part I The Historical Development of Gruppe VI B

A. Western Europe under JOST

1. The Original Organisation

When the RSHA was created on the outbreak of war, Amt VI of the new organisation under Adolf JOST in effect broke new ground for the SD which until then had not officially concerned itself with the Ausland. The organisation of the new Amt therefore in the early stages could only be tentative and would naturally be subject to modification in the light of experience. Such in fact was the case and the Amt underwent drastic reorganisation on at least two occasions before the end of 1941. By January 1940 the Amt had lettered Gruppen up to the letter H. Under this organisation Western Europe was divided between two Gruppen - Gruppe VI E and Gruppe VI F. ~~X~~Gruppe VI E under (Stubai) ROSSNER dealt with Italy, Spain, Portugal, and South America, while ~~X~~Gruppe VI F under ~~X~~Hastuf BIELSTEIN controlled France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. Roughly therefore, Western Europe was divided into two North-West and South-West groups, while the appearance of South America in the South-West group is explained by the fact that penetration of that country was envisaged from the Iberian Peninsula.

2. The Beauftragter - JOST's first appointments.

Side by side with this central organisation in Berlin was the appointment by JOST to the various countries listed above of Amt VI representatives whose function it was to provide the Amt with the information it had been set up to obtain. In Western Europe these appointments were the following:¹ Ostuf Dr. PETER was sent to Switzerland, Stubai PLATH to Spain, EAST to Portugal, and Dr. ERB to Holland. No appointment was made to Italy, as in accordance with the Fuehrerbefehl, no espionage activities were to be carried out in that country. No representatives were sent to France and Belgium before the occupation of these two countries in 1940 and in deed Dr. ERB in Holland was not a permanent appointment. ERB merely travelled on several occasions to Holland and in the course of his other duties acted on behalf of Amt VI.

Generally speaking, the Beauftragter were badly chosen, ill-trained, and given no clear instructions on their duties. They were given commercial cover, as the Foreign Office opposed giving diplomatic cover to such intruders on its own sphere. They were charged with providing their respective Gruppen with political information regarding the countries to which they were sent, but had in general to find their own contacts, spurned as they were by the Foreign Office, and in some cases had to find their own channels of communication. In these unfavourable circumstances the Beauftragter achieved little in the way of results. The development of these original appointments abroad are dealt with in the Parts dealing with the activities of the Referate of Gruppe VI B.

3. The Reorganisation of Amt VI in early 1941.

The first major reorganisation of Amt VI took place in January 1941. In this change an entirely new system seems to have been envisaged, but it is doubtful if it was ever in fact put into operation. The number of Laendergruppen was decreased, and in particular a new Gruppe VI B came into being, having under its control the whole of Europe, Africa, and the Near East. The Gruppe, having such a wide territory to cover, had the unusually high number of ten Referate, but there is no indication of the territorial division between these Referate: nor are the names of the Gruppenleiter or Referent available. This organisational structure however was obviously an unwieldy one, and it is not surprising that before long it was abandoned in favour of a decentralisation of territorial control. The existence of this Gruppe VI B must have been very short lived.

4. JOST's final Organisation.

By the summer of 1941 JOST had finally decided on the organisation of his new Amt. The Gruppen were again seven in number, but the territorial divisions and the lettering of the Gruppen had undergone considerable changes. Of these Gruppen, Western Europe was assigned to Gruppe VI E which represented in fact an amalgamation of Gruppe VI E and Gruppe VI F of 1940 as the countries controlled by the new Gruppe were Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Italy. South America however passed to VI D. The new Gruppenleiter was Hastuf BIELSTEIN, the Gruppenleiter of the 1940 VI F.

5. The Personnel under JOST.

Mention has been made in paragraph 2 above of the poor quality of the Beauftragter chosen by JOST as Amt VI representatives abroad: the personnel in the Amt itself did not present a very much brighter picture. JOST, the weakest of the Amtschefs in the new RSHA both in personality and in status, was not in a strong position in choosing the personnel of his new Amt, and Gruppe VI E was little better than any other Gruppe. The original Gruppenleiter was Hastuf BIELSTEIN who was replaced in early 1942 by Stubar*FREISE. Neither was competent. The main source of recruitment open to JOST was the personnel of Abteilung III of the old SD-Hauptamt of which Abteilung JOST had been Leiter. But the work of that department was an inadequate training ground for the new duties assigned to Amt VI. The main weakness was that few of the officers had any knowledge of the countries which now came under their control, a weakness which they shared with the Beauftragter who had been sent as representatives to these countries. It is of interest to note that of the original officers chosen for Western Europe in 1939, two survived until the end. They are Ostubar*BERNHARD and the then Ostuf*ZSCHUNKE, who later became respectively Referat for France and for Belgium. As the following history of Gruppe VI B will show, ZSCHUNKE can claim to be not only one of the original members but the last officer of the Gruppe to be operationally active. The remaining original members however had almost entirely disappeared by 1942 as a result of the efforts of SCHELLENBERG to improve the work of

B. Western Europe under SCHELLENBERG

1. Reorganisation under SCHELLENBERG

It is with the advent of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef in the latter half of 1941 that Amt VI took its final shape. The Amt subsequently merely expanded and apart from minor readjustments of territory between the new Gruppen, the organisation of the Amt remained substantially the same until the end. The fate of Western Europe in this reorganisation is easy to follow. VI E as created by JOST became Gruppe VI B, its final designation. The territory controlled by the new Gruppe suffered only one adjustment as Italy passed to the new VI E which dealt with the Balkans; but even this change was only a temporary one as in late 1944 Italy returned to Gruppe VI B to become Referat VI B 1. Between 1942 and 1945 however there were readjustments in the Referate of the Gruppe. It is under the final internal organisation of the Gruppe nowever that its activities will be considered. This organisation is as shown at Appendix II.

2. SCHELLENBERG's Efforts to improve Personnel

Changing the organisation of Amt VI was the least of SCHELLENBERG's troubles. Much more important from his point of view was the necessity of improving the standard of personnel both in the Amt itself and abroad. Gruppe VI B was no exception in this reform, but here as in the other Gruppen, SCHELLENBERG was limited in his plans by the very restricted field available to him for further recruitment. By 1942 SCHELLENBERG had decided to recall the Amt VI representatives from SD Stellen in Germany where they served very little useful purpose, in the hope that the personnel thus available would strengthen the position in Berlin. Among the leading personnel BIELSTEIN was the first to go, being replaced by Stubaf FREISE. The latter however did not meet SCHELLENBERG's requirements as a Gruppenleiter, and in the Spring of 1943 he in turn was replaced by SCHELLENBERG's final choice, Stubaf STEIMLE. STEIMLE had previously been Amt VI representative in the SD Abschnitt Stuttgart, where he had worked against Switzerland. STEIMLE was ambitious and capable and remained in charge until the end.

As Referent for France and the Low Countries, SCHELLENBERG chose Ostubaf BERNHARD, who also remained in that position until the collapse, though even he has been described by SCHELLENBERG as an "altogether negligible person". Hastuf NEUBURG became Referent for the Iberian Peninsula. The personnel problem remained however until the end, and SCHELLENBERG was faced with the everlasting problem of whether to send his reliable men to the outstations to improve the work there at the expense of the Amt, or strengthen the Amt at the expense of the outstations.

The results of SCHELLENBERG's efforts are discussed
II - V.

Part II - Referat VI B 1 and its Activities against ItalyA. The Period before the Italian Armistice.1. The Fuehrerbefehl

As has been mentioned in Part I, JOST in 1939-40 sent no Beauftragter to Italy, as in accordance with the instructions laid down by Hitler himself, no espionage activities were to be carried out in that country. Amt VI therefore had no representation in the country until 1942 when attempts were made to circumvent the Fuehrerbefehl. By that time of course Italy's own position in the war had seriously worsened and Hitler's decree made it extremely difficult for Amt VI to be well informed on the state of Italian morale and the trend of political thought in official Italian circles. The only existing source of information (apart of course from the Foreign Office and its official channels) was in the person of Ostuba~~K~~KAPPLER, the Polizei Attache in the German Embassy in Rome.

2. KAPPLER's work as Polizei Attache

KAPPLER had been appointed to Rome as early as 1939 as Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer, later to become Polizei Attache. In this capacity he carried out his normal functions as political adviser to the Embassy and liaison officer with the Italian Police, and was not an Amt VI representative. KAPPLER did, however, submit regular but unofficial reports through the Havel Institute on Italian politics and morale: these reports were proved by subsequent events to be sound, but being sound were not highly popular. KAPPLER in the main relied on official contacts for his sources of information and was in fact the political observer on the spot. He did however succeed in tapping the Vatican as a source through the medium of an employee in the Vatican Library.

3. Attempts to circumvent the Fuehrerbefehl

By 1942 the Fuehrerbefehl had become too awkward to be strictly obeyed: Italy presented great advantages for Amt VI work, and with the changing war situation attempts were made to increase activities in the country, but such attempts had of course to be camouflaged. The first step was the appointment of Stubaf LOOS as assistant to KAPPLER, with the specific assignment of using this cover to collect information on general political matters. LOOS, who had to establish his own contacts, was largely ineffective. Side by side with this appointment was that in late 1942 of Hastuf GROEBEL who was sent to Rome under cover as an employee of a German travel agency with the specific assignment of preparing a post-occupational network in the Rome area. GROEBEL was to work independently of KAPPLER and contact between the two was to be avoided. By March 1943 instructions from SCHELLENBERG became more specific: KAPPLER was now charged with the preparation of a post-occupational network in Sicily, while GROEBEL was to be responsible for South Italy. These preparations did not get beyond the initial stages and from the point of view of results, both KAPPLER and GROEBEL failed completely.

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The failure however was confined to the organisation of the networks; the political reports from both KAPPLER and GROEBEL continued to be an accurate reflection of opinion, but especially after the fall of Mussolini in July 1943 when an accurate picture reflected the strong existing anti-fascist feeling, the reports were ignored as running counter to official German policy. In Italy, as elsewhere, it was difficult to report objectively and at the same time meet with favour.

3. The Period after the Italian Armistice.

1. BdS Italien and the Aussenkommando Rome

The collapse of Italy and the altered situation created by the Badoglio armistice led to a modification in policy regarding Italy as a theatre of espionage operations. The previous restrictions were removed and indeed both HIMMLER and ALTENBRUNNER, quite irrespective of SCHELLENBERG, gave full encouragement to espionage activity, as it was realised that a territory where contact could be made with so many nationalities serving under the Allies, could prove to be a valuable source of information regarding Allied morale and the degree of cooperation or non-cooperation which existed between the Allies themselves. Functionally, Gruf HARSTER was appointed BdS Italy, while KAPPLER remained in Rome as head of an Aussenkommando there. GROEBEL meantime had been killed by partisans almost immediately after the armistice.

2. Aussenkommando Rome and its Post-Occupational Plans

Between the setting up of the ~~Aussenkommando Rome~~ in September 1943 and the fall of Rome in June 1944, the task of preparing a post-occupational network in the Rome area and in Southern Italy fell on the Abteilung VI representative in Rome under the command of Stubaf HASS. HASS had taken part in the liberation of Mussolini and stayed on in Rome as a replacement of LOOS; he had as his second-in-command Ostuf SCHUBERNIG. HASS took over one of GROEBEL's agents whom he sent to Naples to allow himself to be overrun, and act as a contact for further agents to be sent to the area; the agent (KALLMEYER) was never heard from after his departure. Two further attempts were made, using a cloister and a bee farm as cover, but these too came to nothing. By May 1944 HASS had some five or six groups prepared for operations, while independently of these groups which were to work together, HASS had brought from The Hague the female agent BENKATE BROUWE to remain in Rome. The network was a complete failure and the fall of Rome in June 1944 made other arrangements necessary.

The Period after the Fall of Rome

1. Reorganisation in the North

With the fall of Rome and the dissolution of the Aussenkommando there, the Aussenkommandos of BdS Verona in the North assumed greater importance, and the preparation of stay-behind networks were made through them. The growing seriousness of the position led to further attempts by Amt VI to improve the situation.

Stubaf HUEGEL, a competent officer at the Amt, was sent as representative to the BdS Verona, while Stubaf WOLFF (later to become Leiter of the ~~Leitstelle~~ Siegfried under VI B 2) was given the special assignment of organising the post-occupational networks in Northern Italy. By October 1944 the Aussenkommandos had been given their clear instructions and by April 1945 networks had been established in eight different areas in Northern Italy - Genoa, San Remo, Milan, Como, Trieste, Venice, Bologna, and Fiume.

2. The Failure of the Networks

The networks however were not set up without the usual difficulties. There was the problem of finding suitable material and having found it, the question of training prescribed further complications. The training had to be carried through under rushed conditions owing to the pressure of time, and as a result was generally inadequate, especially on the W/T side. The language difficulty itself was a hindrance to speedy training, and the provision of W/T sets capable of overcoming the geographical conditions presented by the Alps was an added problem. On technical grounds alone, therefore, the I-Netze were doomed to failure. But even had these technical difficulties been overcome, and even if sufficient personnel had been available on the German side to train in time a sufficient number of reliable agents, the networks would not have been able to rise above the sequence of events. They were essentially post-occupational networks; no provision had been made to operate them as post-defeat networks. The general surrender in Italy therefore rendered them quite ineffective.

3. * Einheit Ida

While the Aussenkommandos in the North were preparing their stay-behind networks, the former Aussenkommando Rome which had operated under KAPPLER dispersed on the fall of the city to reform as a separate unit with its headquarters near Parma. The unit, known by the cover name of Einheit IDA, came under the command of Stubaf HASS with Ostuf SCHUBERNIG still as his deputy. Einheit IDA did not prepare post-occupational networks but trained its agents for line-crossing missions. The agents were given W/T instruction and the mission given included the obtaining of information on both political and military matters. By October 1944 at least six agents trained by the unit had been arrested and were able to give sufficient information on the personnel of the unit, other agents in training, and even its intended line of withdrawal, to make it a comparatively easy target for counter-espionage. The unit achieved very limited success.

4. Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca

Although this enterprise operated from Northern Italy, it was in fact under the control of VI B 2 and directed against France. It is therefore discussed in Part III.

D. Amt VI Work against the Vatican

1. Ostuf ELLING and his mission

When Italy was still dealt with by Gruppe VI E in 1943, there existed a ~~Referat~~ VI E 1 (Vat) under Ostuf ~~REISMANN~~ which became

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VI B 1 (Vat) when Italy was transferred from VI E to VI B in late 1944. REISMANN carried on his work against the Vatican in VI B: he is reported to have died in December 1944. By May 1943 Amt VI had decided that the existing channel for obtaining information on the Vatican through KAPPLER was insufficient. A special representative was therefore chosen in the person of Ostufaf ELLING. ELLING had had a long career in the RSHA concerned with research in church matters and had seen service in that connection with both Amt III and Amt VII. ELLING therefore was given a period of training in Amt VI under REISMANN preparatory to being sent on his mission.

2. ELLING's work at the Vatican

The usual difficulties were experienced in trying to obtain for ELLING proper Consular cover through the Foreign Office. So long was the delay indeed that ELLING was finally sent in November 1943 to the Aussenkommando at Rome under KAPPLER to familiarise himself with his new territory pending the granting of his Consular cover into the Vatican itself. It was not until January 1944 that ELLING finally succeeded in establishing himself in the German Embassy under Ambassador WEIZSAECKER. In his comparatively short stay there, ELLING succeeded in making only limited contacts, which enabled him to submit reports on the Vatican finances, its relations with Russia, and the Vatican attitude to the war and Germany. The appointment however was made too late for any results of real value to be forthcoming.

3. Attempts at Post-Occupational Work

When it became apparent that Rome would be occupied sooner or later by the Allies, an attempt was made to instal ELLING in the Vatican as a post-occupational agent. For this purpose a W/T operator was chosen to work with him, but the arrangements were made too late to be effective. ELLING in any case was not himself an enthusiastic supporter of the plan which led to nothing. ELLING in fact was interned with the other members of the Embassy staff who remained in Rome after its fall.

E. Conclusion

It is not difficult to reach the conclusion that Amt VI work in Italy was a failure; the Fuehrerbefehl had of course deprived it of what in the early stages of the war should have been a profitable ground for its activities in view of the many official contacts which could have been exploited. It deprived the Amt too of a suitable base for operation against North Africa. The removal of the restriction came too late for any effective work to be done. The reports received from KAPPLER and through VI E 1 (Vat) and later VI B 1 (Vat) were good and accurate but, as has been explained above, official policy did not welcome reports which showed its policy to be wrong. The one great success of VI S in restoring Mussolini was a false success in that the restoration of the Duce was against the recommendation of the reports received through VI B 1. The lack of coordination in Amt VI policy is nowhere better illustrated.

Part III - Referat VI B 2 and its Activities against France and the Low Countries.

A. The Period before the French Armistice

1. ZSCHUNKE as Referent

The first Referent for France chosen by BIELSTEIN, Gruppenleiter of the original VI F, was Ostuf ZSCHUNKE, to whom was assigned the task of preparing V-Men for despatch into that country. ZSCHUNKE had no easy task, since prior to the outbreak of war the SD had not even attempted to instal agents in France, nor was there, as in Eastern Europe, any pro-German minority in France which could be exploited to advantage. In addition, little background material regarding France was available to the Gruppe, so that ZSCHUNKE had virtually virgin territory to exploit. The SD-Abschnitte in the West had nothing to offer in the way of agents, and ZSCHUNKE's efforts at recruitment met with failure.

2. The LORENZ Enterprise

There was however one exception; in November 1939 ZSCHUNKE took over a prospective Abwehr agent, Ostuf LORENZ, who had been destined for a mission in Paris. ZSCHUNKE was successful in providing LORENZ with false papers of sufficiently high standard to enable him to get to Paris through Italy in March 1940, armed with three W/T sets and sabotage material. LORENZ was a failure in his mission, but on his return in April claimed to have obtained through a telephone operator in Paris details of a conversation between Reynaud and Chamberlain regarding the dispositions of Weygand's Near East armies. The story was an invention on the part of LORENZ, but was accepted on its face value and passed direct to Hitler himself. The story was given great prominence in the German Press for propaganda purposes, and was the first success claimed by Amt VI. It was a success of a rather ominous quality.

B. The Period after the French Armistice

1. Early Difficulties

When the French campaign began ZSCHUNKE passed what little material he had on France to Amt III as occupied territory was considered by that Amt to be its concern. The fall of France and the occupation of Paris however opened up new possibilities for Amt VI, but contrary to what might have been expected, there was no coordinated plan for such an eventuality. FILBERT, Gruppenleiter VI A, but in effect directing the work of the Amt, sent both ZSCHUNKE and LORENZ to Paris to carry on their work there. Their stay did not exceed a fortnight as Staf KNOCHEN, the new BdS Frankreich, had his own ideas, and sent them quickly packing. The conflict between Amt III and Amt VI on occupied territory was an added complication. It was not an auspicious start. Soon two lines of development emerged - the steady growth of Abteilung VI in the Paris Dienststelle with KNOCHEN as BdS and Hastuf NOSSEK as Leiter of Abteilung VI, side by side with the despatch by the Amt itself of individual representatives to different parts of France.

C. The Activities of BdS Frankreich

1. KNOCHEN and NOSSEK

Of the two tendencies mentioned in the previous paragraph the more considerable was the strong development in Amt VI work from Paris; it also yielded least results. KNOCHEN, the BdS, was ambitious and jealous of his reputation, largely based on the Venlo incident; he personally undertook to send reports on France and Vichy direct to the Cds, thus circumventing Gruppe VI B. This relationship continued when KALTENBRUNNER became DdS. Meanwhile NOSSEK developed his VI Abteilung, but on lines hardly profitable to Amt VI. The results achieved under the JOST regime were negligible. By the end of 1941 however SCHELLENBERG had become Amtschef, and some attempt at improvement was made, though it is to be noted however that SCHELLENBERG had little faith in Amt VI work carried on under a BdS, normally ignorant of what secret intelligence meant and unsympathetic towards it, especially when it dealt with political matters.

2. The Situation in 1942

Ostuf BERNHARD was appointed by SCHELLENBERG as Referent for France in January 1942. By now the Paris Dienststelle had grown to the extent of having its own Abteilungen. It became indeed the largest Dienststelle under Amt VI in Europe. It extended its interests beyond the borders of France itself, and thus we find an Abteilung VI B responsible for France, Abteilung VI C under Ostuf ALISCH collecting information on the Iberian Peninsula, Abteilung VI D under Ostuf ZUCHRISTIAN working against England and the USA (ZUCHRISTIAN was in fact a Gruppe VI D officer), and a section under Ostuf DOERING responsible for North Africa. This section was later to become VI B 4 (Parseval). This organisation however was impressive rather than effective. No results of any importance were achieved and the Dienststelle was more concerned in combatting Resistance Movements than in collecting political information. NOSSEK in July 1942 was replaced by Ostuf HAAGEN, who showed himself equally Resistance minded. BERNHARD's attempts at improvement of a rapidly deteriorating situation failed, and the failure was due to the everlasting problem of finding personnel of sufficient ability to carry out the work.

3. The Position in 1943 - NOSSEK and the PPF

Further attempts at improvement were made in the course of 1943. An added impetus was the order to prepare I-Netze in the event of an Allied invasion of France, which preparations are dealt with in the following paragraphs. By April 1943 HAAGEN, whose conception of Amt VI work continued to be operations against the Underground, became personnel Referent to the HSSuPF Frankreich, and was replaced by Ostuf BICKLER who remained in command until the evacuation of Paris. In the same month Ostuf BOURJEAU took over from NOSSEK who was given the special assignment of concentrating on Vichy and North Africa, for which purpose he exploited the PPF. In this work NOSSEK employed as a specialist Leopold VOELKER (later despatching officer for agents at Leitstelle Siegfried). A certain amount of success was achieved, especially through contact with those PPF delegates who attended the conference in Paris in 1943.

4. Preparations for the I-Netze.

A serious start on the preparation of the stay-behind organisation in the event of an Allied invasion was begun by March 1943. For the purpose additional staff was sent to Paris, the actual task of preparing the networks being in the first instance

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given to Ustuf RISSMANN. Later Hastuf KOENIG, Stubaf LANG, and Haschaf ZUANG were sent, and a training school established at Rue Desbordes-Vallmore. Ustuf ZACH of VI F became the W/T expert at the school. By June 1944 agents had been placed with W/T sets at Rennes, Paris, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Marseilles, and Toulouse. The proportion of agents rejected in training had however been exceptionally high and the comparatively small number of agents ready by June 1944 was a small return for more than one year's work. It is to be noted too that apart from this activity, the Paris Dienststelle as an Amt VI station had almost ceased to function, the chief contributing factors being the continued poor quality of officers and the attitude of KNOCHEN himself. The Dienststelle therefore had its last chance of justifying its existence.

5. The Invasion and the fall of Paris.

The I-Netze in fact failed completely; soon after the break-through in Normandy the first of the stay-behind agents was arrested in the second week of August. Before the end of the month five more were picked up, and the faults in training were now apparent. Little attempt had been made to segregate agents in training, close contact between the agents and the officers themselves had been allowed, the agents themselves were unreliable and easily swayed by the fortunes of battle; the inevitable result was that before the end of August an almost complete list of agents in training together with the names, functions, and ranks of the officers responsible for the organisation of the network was available to the counter-espionage forces of the Allies. The liquidation of the network became comparatively simple. When BERNHARD visited Paris just before the evacuation two W/T links were still available while three more agents could be reached by courier. By February 1945 one W/T set in Montpellier (MARCAUD) was still operating, but on MARCAUD's arrest the network ceased to function. The information achieved by the network had been negligible.

6. The Retreat from Paris

Early in August 1944 the BdS Paris split up and retreated into Germany in sections. Abteilung VI withdrew to St Die and then to Strasbourg where it underwent reorganisation. After some initial confusion it was decided to set up a new organisation to work against France from Germany making use of the subversive elements which had withdrawn from France - the Doriot and Darnand groups. The organisation was placed under the command of Staf BICKLER and was known as ~~Leitstelle~~ WALTER.

7. The Leitstelle Walter Organisation

Leitstelle Walter set up its headquarters in Baden-Baden in October 1944. The personnel was largely composed of the personnel of Abteilung VI of the BdS Paris, while Stubaf HUBIG from the Amt was sent as BICKLER's second-in-command. The Stelle was divided into some nine Kommandos, each Kommando recruiting its agents from one or other of the French subversive organisations; each Kommando having a cover name. These Kommandos were as follows:-

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I-BAER under NOSSEK recruiting from the PPF.
I-IGEL under MORO recruiting from the PPF.
DACHS under DETERING recruiting from the Milice.
FUCHS under BOURJEAU recruiting from mixed sources.
MARDER under MORITZ recruiting from Groupe Collaboration.
HIRSCH I and II under KUNZE as the central W/T school.
BIBER under WILD recruiting from the Breton Group.
ELCH under WENZEL recruiting from mixed sources.

The Stelle recruited both for line-crossing and parachute operations. The MORITZ Kommando concentrated on sending its agents through Switzerland, while NOSSEK worked in collaboration with Stubaf GOHL in Milan. In March 1945 DOEHRING of VI B 4 (Parseval) also joined the unit.

8. The Failure of Leitstelle Walter

The results achieved by Leitstelle Walter were meagre in the extreme; of the line-crossing operations about a 20% degree of success was achieved in agents reporting back. The parachute operations were a dismal failure; one plane crashed on the take-off, another left but missed its course, a third dropped its agents who were immediately arrested. At the end a further batch of eight agents was ready for despatch but no planes were available. Eventually the Stelle itself was overrun by the speed of the Allied advance and instructions were given to the remaining officers and agents to disband. The Stelle evacuated from Baden-Baden to Horalberg and finally to Heiligenberg, where it dispersed. This dispersal brought to an end the history of the Dienststelle in Paris, the end of five years of continuous failure.

D. Other Activities against France.

1. The Individual Representatives

It was noted in paragraph B(1) above that the growth of the Dienststelle in Paris was one development of Gruppe VI B activities against France from 1940 onwards. The other independent development was the despatching of individual representatives to different parts of France reporting directly to the Amt and not through a BdS. This development had its beginnings with ZSCHUNKE in 1940, not because ZSCHUNKE considered such a method superior to working through the BdS, but because no other method was open to him since KNOCHEN had regarded control of his work by the Gruppe as unnecessary. By the time SCHELLENBERG took command however in late 1941, the system became a matter of policy and not of convenience, as SCHELLENBERG considered that Amt VI work such as he envisaged it was much more likely to succeed through the activities of a single well trained officer working under proper cover than by a large and self-advertising Dienststelle. The trouble as ever, however, was to find the competent well trained officers.

2. ZSCHUNKE's first agents - REICHE at Vichy.

It is to ZSCHUNKE's credit that he was instrumental in recruiting the most successful VI B officer to operate in France in the person of Ostuf Dr. REICHE. In the Autumn of 1940 ZSCHUNKE sent REICHE to Vichy under cover as the representative of the German Embassy in Paris. Soon after his arrival in

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Vichy in October 1944, REICHE was given a W/T operator through whom his reports were sent to Amt VI. REICHE was successful in making good contacts in official Vichy circles, and until his departure in 1942, was able to submit reports of a consistently high standard on political trends in Vichy. REICHE had only one paid agent - a Swiss newspaperman. His information was obtained almost entirely through social and diplomatic channels. REICHE left Vichy in 1942 and was transferred to the Eastern Front where he was killed in action. He was replaced by Hastuf SCHMIDT, whose work was not of the same high standard.

3. Ostuf GROSS at Biarritz.

ZSCHUNKE's other venture was hardly so successful. Ostuf GROSS (alias GRANDE) was sent as an ordinary civilian to Biarritz armed with a W/T set. He did not have REICHE's advantage of any kind of official cover. GROSS was quite unsuccessful in his work, falling foul of the Abwehr, in the first instance his W/T set, of which the Abwehr had had no notification, being taken to be an enemy set, and secondly becoming involved in a drunken brawl, which led to his recall early in 1941.

4. SCHELLENBERG's efforts to improve the work against France.

As explained in paragraph 1 above, SCHELLENBERG was not long in deciding that proper Amt VI work through the BdS in Paris was not to be hoped for, and his efforts were concentrated on finding single officers of suitable ability for work at outstations. The following officers were given special assignments:-

(a) Ostuf SCHNEIDER: was sent in the Spring of 1942 to Strasbourg with the task of exploiting Corsican circles. SCHNEIDER was a failure in his work and achieved nothing. He was eventually recalled in the Autumn of 1943 and dismissed from the Amt.

(b) Stubaf FREISE, the Gruppenleiter before STEIMLE, was appointed at the end of 1942, did little to redeem his past failures. He was sent to Portugal in 1943 but was expelled before the end of the year. On SCHNEIDER's recall from Strasbourg, FREISE went as replacement. FREISE attempted liaison with the Paris Dienststelle, but only succeeded in arousing jealousy and suspicion there. His work achieved nothing and he too was recalled in 1944 to be transferred eventually to Amt IV. His assistant, Kriminalrat UHRING, was arrested on the fall of Strasbourg.

(c) Hastuf SENNER at Marseilles was a more serious effort. SENNER was sent under consular cover to Marseilles early in 1942. He succeeded in recruiting a network of some 20 - 30 agents, finding his material among the Groupe Collaboration. The SENNER network covered the South of France and extended into Spain. The results achieved however were negligible owing to the very poor standard of agent available. SENNER remained in Marseilles until the retreat, and after his return to Germany was sent to Milan to work with GOHL in the Unternehmen BERTRAM (see para 5).

(d) Stubaf FANELSA at Metz is the last of the group. FANELSA was a complete failure and it is only necessary to record his name.

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5. Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca.

SENNER returned to Germany from Marseilles in August 1944. He had not attempted any stay-behind network before the invasion. It was decided by STEIMLE to send SENNER to Milan in order to operate against his former territory of Southern France from the Italian side of the border. SENNER accordingly established himself at San Remo in October 1944 and made tentative plans to utilise subversive French groups for frontier-crossing operations into France. These efforts came to nothing; by the end of the year Stubaf GOHL was sent to San Remo to become head of espionage activities against France and the enterprise now became the Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca. SENNER's function was to organise the crossings into France either direct through Switzerland or by sea. The agents were sent to him from Berlin already briefed for their missions. The agents were chiefly from the PPF groups. In all SENNER had nine agents to despatch; the majority were arrested soon after reaching French territory. SENNER himself surrendered to the French soon after the collapse.

E. Activities against the Low Countries.

1. Relations with Amt III.

The part played by Gruppe VI B in the Low Countries was a minor one throughout the five years of occupation. The chief factor was that the territory came under the control of Amt III as occupied territory and it was Abteilung III of the BdS both in Holland and in Belgium whose responsibility it was to submit reports on political trends and public opinion in the two countries. Amt VI activity was as a result very limited though some effort was made to use the Low Countries as a base for operations against the U.K. These efforts in the first three years of the occupation were very limited and quite futile, but in 1943 STEIMLE made some effort at improvement, while the preparation of I-Netze in 1944 gave the Stellen in Brussels and The Hague a somewhat more important part to play.

2. BdS Brussels in 1940-42.

The early history of Gruppe VI B activities in Belgium can be very summarily dealt with. The original appointment to BdS Belgium was Hastuf ~~IOECHELT~~ who attempted nothing and achieved nothing. He was succeeded in 1941 by Hastuf ~~BAUSS~~ whose activities were limited to employing minor agents to submit reports on France, a futile field in view of the existence of the large Dienststelle in Paris engaged on the same work. When BERNHARD became Referent VI B 2 in January 1942 the inefficiency of the work in the Low Countries caused him some concern; at that time Belgium and Holland in the Gruppe were dealt with by the Referat for France. BERNHARD therefore decided to set up a new Referat dealing with Belgium and Holland with Hastuf LAWRENZ as Referent. To improve the work at the outstations he was instrumental in having recalled from the Eastern Front Ostuf ZSCHUNKE, previously Referent for France, who had been sent there in disgrace at the end of 1941 after a quarrel with Stubaf ROSSNER. ZSCHUNKE therefore was sent to Brussels in September 1942 to replace BAUS.

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3. ZSCHUNKE's Activities in Brussels

ZSCHUNKE spent approximately one year in Brussels. His early work was largely concerned with clearing up the chaos left by BAUS. Later some effort was made to recruit suitable agents for missions to England, but this ended in failure. An added impetus to such attempts however was given by a visit in May 1942 by STEIMLE, the new Gruppenleiter, who also recommended that efforts should be made to penetrate underground movements controlled from the U.K. with a view to obtaining information on the date of the Allied invasion. No success was achieved in these attempts. ZSCHUNKE was eventually sent once again to the Eastern Front in September 1942, having again brought disgrace upon himself, this time through having married a Belgian woman.

4. Activities in Holland

The story in Holland was even more dismal from the Amt VI point of view; in Holland the Amt III representation was especially strong and the original Abteilung VI representative, Hastuf MUELLER, was Abteilung VI in title only. His work had been entirely controlled by Staf KNOLLE, Leiter of Abteilung III, and until the middle of 1943 no Amt VI work of any kind was carried out in Holland. MUELLER eventually left the service altogether about mid-1943 and advantage was taken of his resignation by BERNHARD in an attempt to set up an independent Gruppe VI B representative. The choice of officer however was not a happy one: Hastuf AHRENS, previously employed in VI B 3, from which department he was dismissed for inefficiency, was sent to Holland in November 1943 to set up his independent Stolle. KNOLLE however insisted on AHRENS working for him, and it was not until early 1944 that AHRENS finally established his independence.

5. AHRENS' Work in Holland

The task assigned to AHRENS was that of obtaining economic and political information about the U.K. and of establishing a stay-behind network in the event of invasion. He also had the job of organising line-crossing missions in the event of a partial occupation of Holland. In these tasks Hastuf HINCKFUSS assisted in the preparation of the I-Netze, and Ustuf EGIDY in the despatching of line-crossers. AHRENS was a complete failure. No information about the U.K. was obtained, three line-crossers were despatched without success, while the I-Netze failed completely. The latter subject is dealt with more fully in paragraph 6.

6. The I-Netze in Holland and Belgium

The preparation of the I-Netze in the Low Countries was a combined operation between HINCKFUSS, AHRENS and LAWRENZ, who had replaced ZSCHUNKE on the latter's posting to the Eastern Front. W/T training was carried out in the Seehof School. The preparation was begun too late to stand any chance of success. By July 1944 eight links had been established in Belgium, but the network was almost immediately liquidated by the surrender of one of the main agents to the Allies soon after Belgium was occupied. In Holland six links were prepared, but no contacts were established after the liberation. The faults in the training of agents mentioned in connection with the I-Netze in France applied with equal force in the Low Countries.

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7. Leitstelle Siegfried

Side by side with the setting up of Leitstelle Walter in the South was the creation on very similar lines of Leitstelle Siegfried in the North. The Stelle had its headquarters at Marburg on the Lahn and was set up to provide agents for line-crossing and parachute operations against Holland, Belgium and Northern France. As in the South, the supply of agents was from the subversive groups - the Rexists, Flamands, the Degrelle organisation, etc. The Leiter of the Stelle was Stubaf WOLFF, with Hastuf KOENIG and most of the personnel of BdS Belgium and Holland as staff. ZSCHUNKE, recalled from the East in March 1945, also joined the staff as the expert on Belgium. About 100 agents underwent training, of whom 30 were trained in W/T. The speed of the Allied advance however prevented the training being completed and Leitstelle Siegfried was disbanded before any operations had been undertaken.

8. ZSCHUNKE's last effort

ZSCHUNKE together with the rest of the staff of Leitstelle Siegfried withdrew to the Munich area. With the approval of BERNHARD, ZSCHUNKE suggested that he should return to Belgium posing as a D.P. and reestablish contact with his former agents in Belgium. The plan was successfully put into operation, and ZSCHUNKE returned to Brussels, where in June 1945 he made contact with one of his former W/T agents. The effort was however purely an individual one and was not symptomatic of any organised attempt by VI B to maintain post-defeat activity. In any case ZSCHUNKE's real motive was to get back to Belgium with his Belgian wife. ZSCHUNKE was arrested soon after his arrival.

Conclusion

The history of Referat VI B 2 is a long record of failure; with the exception of REICHE in Vichy, no sources of information were established which yielded any results of any value whatever. The reasons for the failure are many and are not peculiar to Referat VI B 2 alone - incompetent officers, lack of coordination in policy, personal ambitions and jealousies, lack of cooperation with other Aemter, lack of security in training of agents. Much sound and fury which signified nothing.

Part IV - Referat VI B 3 and its Activities against Switzerland.

A. The Period under JOST

1. SD Activities against Switzerland before 1939

The old SD-Hauptamt, Abteilung III/3, under JOST had met with some success in its work against the countries on Germany's eastern frontier prior to the setting up of the RSHA. There were good reasons why work in the East should have been more successful than in the West. In Austria, Czechoslovakia, and in the Polish Corridor there were very active German minorities and the constant stream of travellers crossing these frontiers provided a ready found source of information. In the West such favourable conditions did not exist except in the case of Switzerland and there only to a lesser degree. Nevertheless Switzerland represented the only country in Western Europe where the new Amt VI could build on the already existing work of the SD-Abschnitte. Operations against Switzerland had been directed from the SD-Leitabschnitte at Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Muenchen, and Innsbruck in close collaboration with the old SD-Oberabschnitt Sud West at Stuttgart under Hauptstuf Dr PETER and his assistant, Hauptstuf GUTEKUNST.

2. The First Efforts of Amt VI

The work of the old SD-Abschnitte had of course its obvious limitations in that all the work was directed from outside Switzerland and not from inside the country itself. The extended scope of Amt VI as compared with the SD-Hauptamt required direct representation within the country itself. For this reason therefore JOST chose as his Beauftragter in Switzerland Dr PETER of Stuttgart who was duly installed under cover of the German Legation at Berne in early 1940. PETER however did not long survive as JOST soon came up against a difficulty which not only hampered him but was to be one of the chief stumbling blocks facing SCHELLENBERG in his strenuous efforts between 1942 and 1945 - the reluctance on the part of the Swiss authorities to allow the SD to develop its activities within the country. PETER had to be recalled after only a few months. A similar fate befell Hauptstuf REICHE in the German Consulate at Geneva. REICHE too was recalled at the request of the Swiss authorities. (This REICHE is identical with the Vichy representative mentioned in Part III). An attempt was made to instal Hauptstuf GROEBEL as REICHE's successor, but this too met with no success. GROEBEL was recalled and acted for a time as Referent for Switzerland before being sent in 1942 to Rome, where he was killed after the fall of Rome.

3. The Position by the end of 1941

By the Autumn of 1941 therefore JOST had failed in his attempts to establish a permanent representative in Switzerland. The failure was a partial one, as the SD-Abschnitte still continued their work from inside Germany, obtaining information on Switzerland itself from the many German and Swiss nationals travelling backwards and forwards between the two countries. The pro-Nazi Swiss elements were also exploited.

The partial failure was however a serious one, as the war situation by the end of 1941 was such that Switzerland was one of the very few remaining countries in Europe where contact could be made with British and American elements, and where much needed

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information on the U.K. and the U.S.A. could be obtained. By the end of the year SCHELLENBERG had become Amtschef, and the second phase began.

B. The Period under SCHELLENBERG

1. The Change of Policy

SCHELLENBERG was not slow to appreciate the potential value of Switzerland to Amt VI and its work; he fully realised the opportunities that neutral territory offered, and his conception of how Switzerland should be exploited led to a complete change in Amt VI policy regarding that country. Two essential changes were necessary. Firstly, to establish a permanent station within the country itself instead of operating from the outside, and secondly, to improve the standard of personnel in the Amt controlling operations against Switzerland. This meant that the officers operating from the SD-Abschnitte became available to the Amt where sweeping changes in personnel took place. The problem of installing an Amt VI officer in Switzerland was however not so easy to solve.

2. DAUFELDT's appointment

SCHELLENBERG's choice was ~~Ostuber~~ DAUFELDT. DAUFELDT had a long record of service in the SD where he had operated under JOST in the old SD-Hauptamt. He had been for a period of two years Gruppenleiter of VI D where he had been in charge of operations against the U.K. and the U.S.A. It was presumably because of his knowledge of the U.K. which he had studied before the war and of his experience in VI D that SCHELLENBERG chose him for the important task of looking after Amt VI interests in Switzerland. The choice was however a bad one, as DAUFELDT's record of success was not commensurable with his length of service. His work in VI D had been quite unsuccessful in face of considerable difficulties. But his failure in VI D was accountable not only by the difficulties he faced, but by his own incompetence. DAUFELDT has been variously described as a playboy, a nincompoop, and a fool. The subsequent course of events in Switzerland largely revolves round the personality of DAUFELDT.

3. DAUFELDT's Activities in Switzerland

DAUFELDT took up his appointment in the summer of 1942 as Vice-Consul at Lausanne. His assignment was to establish contacts in Switzerland with a view to obtaining information on the Allies, with particular reference to the sounding of Allied morale and the volume of economic trade between Switzerland and the Allies; further to assess the attitude of neutral countries towards the war, as well as that of the two German allies, Japan and Italy; to supervise diplomatic travel and to report on German emigres in Switzerland. Of these objectives the most important was of course the first, and that objective was one that would require direct contact with Allied circles in Switzerland. It was just such contact that DAUFELDT was careful to avoid, as his first concern was to avoid expulsion from Switzerland, which too active operations might have entailed. DAUFELDT's sources were therefore secondrate, and such sources, together with the neutral press, formed the bulk of his reports, which reports were voluminous rather than valuable. The position therefore by the beginning of 1943 was that SCHELLENBERG had succeeded in

establishing a permanent representative, but the representative was not taking full advantage of his position.

4. Further Efforts to Exploit Switzerland

By the Spring of 1943 the war situation was already turning against Germany and the opportunities for exploiting Switzerland were becoming correspondingly less favourable. Amt VI work was therefore intensified and further determined efforts were made by SCHELLENBERG to improve the situation. Staf STEIMLE, previously Leiter of the SD-Abschnitt Stuttgart, and therefore familiar with the Swiss situation, had now become Gruppenleiter, and it is significant that he appointed as his Vertreter Stubaf HUEGEL, who at the same time fulfilled the function of Referent for Switzerland. Renewed activity developed along two lines.

Firstly DAUFELDT himself was instructed to organise a post-occupational network over the frontier in France through which contact could be maintained with Switzerland. For this purpose he was to liaise with the BdS Paris and with RETCHE's successor in Vichy, Dr SCHMID. These efforts came to nothing.

The main effort was of course an attempt to increase the number of Amt VI representatives within the country itself. In this attempt SCHELLENBERG sought the cooperation of those Reich Ministries which had stations already established within the country with a view to exploiting the cover they afforded. The plan failed as the degree of cooperation between Amt VI and these Ministries - the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economics, and the Auslandsorganisation - was never at any time very high. Relations with the Foreign Office in particular were far from harmonious. An added difficulty was the scarcity of suitable personnel. The general situation therefore by early 1944 had not improved; DAUFELDT still remained the sole representative.

5. Developments in 1944

The year 1944 brought fresh hope to SCHELLENBERG, as two factors now operated in his favour. The Abwehr was absorbed in the Spring, and as SCHELLENBERG now had control over the Mil Amt as well as Amt VI, he envisaged the possibility of replacing Abwehr representatives already established within the country by Amt VI officers. The scheme however proved impracticable; Amt VI could not find the right material and the Abwehr was strongly opposed to the idea. Secondly, the changed situation in Italy where the Fuehrerbefehl was no longer operative, made it possible to work against the country from the Italian side of the frontier. Stubaf HUEGEL, the former Referent, had now become Leiter of the Abteilung VI of the BdS Italien, and was therefore familiar with the general situation.

Operations from Italy met with a limited amount of success under HUEGEL's direction, but only one of his agents was able to provide reports of any real value on economic matters. Indeed it was significant by this time that activities against Switzerland were directed not so much with a view to obtaining information about the Allies, but in order to contact Allied authorities in Switzerland for the purpose of initiating unofficial peace discussions - a plan directed of course by SCHELLENBERG and not reflecting the official German policy.

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6. DAUFELDT's Expulsion and Subsequent Events

The situation in Switzerland deteriorated rapidly with the changing war situation. By March 1945 the Swiss authorities had requested the removal of DAUFELDT himself and Amt VI representation within the country itself ceased. There was however a replacement in the person of Graf ~~DOENHOF~~ who was appointed to the Consulate in Zurich. Surprisingly enough, DOENHOF's appointment was possible as a result of the benign cooperation of the Foreign Office, an event which did not however reflect any closer cooperation between Amt VI and the Foreign Office, but which was due to DOENHOF's own close personal friendship with STEENGRACHT of the Foreign Office. DOENHOF had had only a short period of training with VI D before his departure and was the officer responsible for the final mission of the notorious SETH. It need hardly be said of course that this unexpected assistance from the Foreign Office was too late to be effective. DOENHOF, who had in any case very little idea of what his functions were to be, was expelled soon after his arrival.

7. The Sonderlinien

There remains one aspect of Amt VI work in Switzerland to be dealt with which is of importance, not so much for the results it achieved, but as a reflection of SCHELLENBERG's conduct of Amt VI affairs. SCHELLENBERG did not allow himself to be bound by recognised channels, and when the official reporting channels of Amt VI fell short of his standards, SCHELLENBERG established where possible his own sources of information. These contacts have been referred to as his 'Sonderlinien'. Such a link existed in Switzerland in the person of ~~Hastur~~ EGGEN, and the establishing of the contact was a reflection on the inability of DAUFELDT to produce the desired results. EGGEN travelled frequently to Switzerland in the course of his business and was exploited by SCHELLENBERG to establish contacts within the country; these contacts were on a high level and it was mainly through EGGEN that SCHELLENBERG maintained relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service. The extent to which this contact proved valuable to SCHELLENBERG is still a matter of doubt but the mere contact itself was a considerable achievement. EGGEN was also responsible for arranging SCHELLENBERG's visits to Switzerland.

This method of penetrating Switzerland was also adopted by STEIMLE, the Gruppenleiter who attempted to exploit Dr GARDEMANN as a personal agent. GARDEMANN had previously been employed in the German Embassy in Madrid, where he had acted as a personal informer for RIBBENTROP. STEIMLE's effort was however unsuccessful as it was not found possible to persuade the Swiss authorities to allow GARDEMANN to enter the country.

The personal contact arrangement was further in evidence when SONNENHOHL, a professional diplomat who had seen previous service in France, was sent to Switzerland late in 1944. SONNENHOHL was not an Amt VI representative in the true sense of the term, but, through a personal agreement with STEIMLE, provided the latter with excellent political reports on Switzerland. These in any case would have gone to the Foreign Office and were not the product of the Secret Service, but were symptomatic of the strained relations existing between the Foreign Office and Amt VI.

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8. Conclusion

It will be seen from the above review that Amt VI failed to exploit what should have been a fertile field. The failure was not due to any lack of appreciation on the part of SCHELLENBERG regarding the importance of Switzerland as a field of operations, but due to the difficulties which faced him in his efforts to improve the situation. There was of course the general difficulty of finding suitable personnel; had DAUFELDT been more competent or more enthusiastic the story might have been different. But there was no way of remedying this original mistake, as the subsequent difficulties proved insuperable - lack of cooperation from the Foreign Office and other ministries, the opposition of the Abwehr even after it had been absorbed, and, also of importance, the attitude of the Swiss authorities to any attempted development of SD espionage, especially when the general war situation from 1943 onwards turned against Germany.

Part V - Referat VI B 4 and its Activities in the Iberian Peninsula:

(Note:- Part V of this report must not be considered in any way as a liquidation report. The Amt VI representatives in Spain and Portugal have not yet been expelled from those countries so that it is not possible to assess with any accuracy the success which attended Referat VI B 4 and its work in the Iberian Peninsula. The following review therefore necessarily contains many gaps and inevitably several inaccuracies, which gaps and inaccuracies can only be remedied when some of the leading personalities in the Peninsula have been repatriated and interrogated. It is for this reason that this publication has been issued as a situation report only, though the first four parts can be treated as Liquidation Reports.)

A. General1. The Importance of the Peninsula

The importance of neutral territory to Amt VI work in Western Europe has already been mentioned in dealing with Referat VI B 3 and Switzerland. This importance was considerably greater in the case of the Iberian Peninsula. Switzerland, though neutral, was surrounded by countries entirely under German domination; further, Switzerland attempted to maintain strict neutrality and was not disposed to grant any special facilities to Germany. In both these aspects the Peninsula offered much greater facilities; it had a seaboard, and the number of contacts which could be established with the outer world was thereby greatly increased. Moreover, agents earmarked for despatch to enemy territory, or to other neutral territories abroad, could be sent through Spain, while actual entry into Spain had been greatly facilitated after the French armistice, when German occupied France and Spain had a common frontier of a few miles near the Atlantic coast. Spain also offered an important observation post in the

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Western Mediterranean, and a base for operations against North Africa in view of the Fuehrerbefehl operative in Italy. Secondly, unlike Switzerland, Spain, though a neutral country, was closely bound to Germany, and its exploitation thereby considerably facilitated.

Spain therefore occupied a unique position among the neutral countries in the war as Sweden, the only remaining neutral country in Europe apart from Switzerland (and of course Eire) was greatly restricted in its communications with the outside world, and in any case its normal volume of trade did not cover the same wide field as that covered by the Iberian Peninsula. It is not surprising therefore that Spain became the cockpit of espionage in the course of the war, and the fruits would fall to that country able to exploit its possibilities to the best advantage. It is hardly necessary to point out that this advantage lay very heavily on the German side; but even then the course of Amt VI activity in the Iberian Peninsula, especially in the initial stages, was not altogether smooth.

2. The Polizei Attache

The roots of German activity in Spain go back to the Spanish Civil War. The Condor Legion which took part in that campaign contained elements of the GFP, and several of the subsequent Amt VI representatives in Spain had seen service with the Condor Legion, a typical example being Stubaf MOSIG. JOST during his period of service as Leiter of Abteilung III/3 of the SD-Hauptamt had paid official visits to Spain in 1938 to foster liaison between the Spanish and German police services, and it was under this liaison that Amt VI developed its first penetration of the Peninsula. The facilities afforded however were not entirely favourable to Amt VI. The best cover would of course have been through the Foreign Office, but that department was throughout hostile to Amt VI activities in Spain, as elsewhere. It was therefore Amt IV which held chief sway in Spain through the powerful position of the Polizei Attache, who, though not officially acting as an Amt IV representative abroad, was in fact recruited from Amt IV, as were most of his staff. In Spain the Polizei Attache from 1939 until late 1944 was Kriminalrat WINZER.

The position of WINZER in Spain was especially strong; he had been attached to the German Embassy in Madrid as early as 1936-37, and returned to the capital in 1938 where he enjoyed the special support of HEYDRICH himself. He remained throughout a special protege of MUELLER, Amtschef IV, as MUELLER regarded the Polizei Attaches as an extension of his functions into foreign territory. WINZER was on very good terms with the Spanish police and with the Falange, and in the circumstances was not likely to welcome any activity on the part of the new Amt VI into territory over which he ruled in the interests of the RSHA. WINZER was killed in an air crash over French territory in September 1944 and was replaced by Krim Kom HAMMES, who had until then worked in Barcelona as an Amt IV representative under WINZER.

3. The complexity of Amt VI Activities

The pattern of Amt VI activities in Spain differs from that in other countries because of its comparative complexity. There was latterly no single Amt VI station through which Amt VI conducted its affairs. As explained in para 2, the Polizei Attache remained the chief RSHA representative in Spain and the Amt VI official

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representation functioned under his control. This system had disadvantages for Amt VI, and in 1943 MOSIG was sent under camouflaged cover in the Sofindus firm so as to work independently of the Polizei Attache - the Grille organisation. Thirdly, the 'Sonderlinien' of SCHELLENBERG operated in Spain as in Switzerland (see Part IV, para 7) in the persons of von HOHENLOHE and Graf von PODEWILS. Finally, Oberfuehrer BERNHARD, the most important figure in Spain for Amt VI, was neither an Amt VI officer nor agent, but worked both for Amt VI and the Abwehr, and his activities covered economic as well as intelligence spheres. These separate developments were of course a gradual evolution.

B. The JOST Period (1939-41).

1. PLATH in 1939-40.

While the GIS started with an enormous initial advantage in Spain, this was not true of Amt VI, which entered too late into the field. In Spain, as in other countries, the same difficulties were encountered. The Foreign Office was resentful and unsympathetic, the Abwehr suspicious and uncooperative, while an added complication was the strength of the Polizei Attache, WINZER, who considered himself the sole representative of the RSHA and covering the interests of the SD. The general weakness of JOST and the poor quality of his Beauftragter were not likely to triumph over such difficulties, and the first period of Amt VI activities was, as elsewhere, a failure.

JOST's first appointments to the Iberian Peninsula were Hastuf PLATH to Spain and Hastuf FAST to Portugal. PLATH took up his appointment in Madrid shortly before the outbreak of war, where he soon came into conflict with WINZER, who insisted that PLATH could only work under him and submit his reports through him. This early did the Polizei Attache impose his ascendancy over Amt VI, an ascendancy which was maintained nominally until the end. PLATH was a failure and was recalled in the Spring of 1940 before being sent to the Eastern Front (in company with ZSCHUNKE of VI B 2) where he was killed in action. PLATH was in turn succeeded by Hastuf PFISTERER, who remained a short spell before being transferred to VI F. PFISTERER was replaced in 1941 by Ostuf SINGER who remained until the end.

C. The SCHELLENBERG Period (1942-45)

1. Changes of Personnel in the Amt

It was with the advent of SCHELLENBERG that Amt VI activities in Spain and Portugal developed along vigorous lines. The importance of the Peninsula was not lost on SCHELLENBERG and his changes involved both the Referat and the representatives in the countries themselves. The changes in personnel in the Amt were not of course confined to the Spanish Referat; SCHELLENBERG's general policy was to introduce into Amt VI some of the officers with whom he had been connected in Amt IV. Among these was Stubaf MOSIG, who served for a spell as Referent for Spain before going there in September 1943 on a special assignment. He had replaced Ostubaf KEINERT, and on his departure to Spain was in turn replaced for a short spell by Ostuf NEUBURG. NEUBURG was succeeded by Stubaf FENDLER who remained as Referent until the final collapse.

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2. Oberfuehrer BERNHARD and Sofindus

Side by side with these changes within the Amt itself was SCHELLENBERG's intensified direction of activity within Spain itself. The most important development was his relationship with Oberfuehrer BERNHARD. BERNHARD was a prominent shipyard owner in Germany who lost most of his money in the early 1930s. Later he established contact with Franco in Morocco and acted as intermediary between Franco and Goering regarding the provision of transport planes for Franco's troops. Thanks to this early and invaluable service to Franco, BERNHARD subsequently became the most influential German contact between the German government and Franco's government, and personally enriched himself as head of the Sofindus firm. This firm represented the controlling agency of all German economic interests in Spain, arranging in particular for the import to Germany of valuable raw materials such as wolfram and tungsten. The facilities for espionage offered by Sofindus were obvious, and the firm was exploited both by the Abwehr and by the SD. It was only with the advent of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef VI, however, that VI B exploited Sofindus to any extent.

The relationship between BERNHARD and SCHELLENBERG has been reported as a close and personal one though this has not been confirmed; in any case it is certain that BERNHARD extended the facilities afforded by Sofindus to Amt VI, whether on a personal or official basis. BERNHARD's personal contacts were of course invaluable. It was through BERNHARD that contact was established with SUNER, Franco's minister for Foreign Affairs until 1943. SUNER was a most important source on the political trends of the Franco government itself. Other valuable high-level contacts established through BERNHARD were CARCELLAR, the Spanish Minister of Economy, BAU, the former Minister of Commerce and Shipping, and MUNCOS GRANDEZ, Franco's adjutant and former commander of the Blue Division. Another good source of information, though to a great extent an unwitting one, was General ARANDA, the leader of the Spanish opposition party. BERNHARD covered of course a very wide field in intelligence and economics, and SCHELLENBERG soon realised that Sofindus offered better scope for Amt VI work than did the official representative who was subordinated to the Polizei Attache, Ostuf SINGER.

3. SINGER in Madrid

PLATH had been eventually replaced by the permanent representative, Ostuf SINGER, probably by the end of 1941. SINGER's connections in Spain had gone as far back as the Civil War, when he had been a member of the Condor Legion. He took up his appointment as a member of the German Consulate in Madrid where he was attached to the Polizei Attache, WINZER, but the hold of WINZER over SINGER was however not so strong as it had been over PLATH. SINGER was responsible to WINZER on matters of discipline only and his reports were sent direct to the Amt. SINGER's assignment was to maintain contact with those members of the Spanish police and the Spanish Foreign Office with whom contact had been established by Amt VI, while he likewise acted as paymaster and communications officer for Amt VI agents in Spain.

SINGER had as his assistant Hastuf KRUEGER, who acted independently and was responsible for recruiting and running the important agent, SCHWARZ von BERG, who specialised in Spanish military circles. SINGER in his capacity was able to make contact with minor officials in the Spanish Foreign Office from whom details of records in the Spanish Foreign Office were obtained. These records contained accounts of visits from foreign representatives.

He also succeeded in contacting the Spanish police and the Spanish Military Intelligence Service.

4. MOSIG's Appointment - The Grille Organisation.

The disadvantages in SINGER's work from the point of view of SCHELLENBERG was his continued subordination to WINZER. The position in the first place was too open, and secondly Amt VI activities were by the nature of things known to the Polizei Attache. In order to circumvent these two difficulties, and at the same time to exploit more fully the facilities afforded by BERNHARD and his Sofindus organisation, SCHELLENBERG sent MOSIG in September 1943 on a special assignment to Spain. MOSIG together with three or four agents recruited from the Lehr-Regiment Kuerfuerst set up their organisation in Madrid known as the ~~X~~ "Organisation Grille", having its own W/T station controlled by MOSIG's secretary, ~~Erl~~ ~~X~~ BRUECKNER.

The special assignment given to the Organisation Grille was the exploitation of the Sofindus firm in social and commercial circles, and further to maintain the contacts initiated by BERNHARD, and enumerated in para 2 above. MOSIG's subordinates in this work were LACKNER, HOLTING, Ewald KRUSE, Hans WEISS, Erich DIETEL, Paul ANGER, and Franz STAUDINGER, all with appointments in various branches of the Sofindus organisation. In this way Amt VI was able to operate independently of WINZER.

5. SCHELLENBERG's Sonderlinien in Spain.

The third line of development in Amt VI activities in Spain was through SCHELLENBERG's personal 'Sonderlinien'. These were two in number, Prinz von HOHENLOHE and Graf ~~X~~ PODEWILS. HOHENLOHE was an influential business man in Spain with extensive and excellent contacts in Spanish social circles. His reports, which were passed to SCHELLENBERG via SINGER, represented his own summary of political trends in Spain based on his contacts in political, business or military circles. Graf ~~X~~ PODEWILS also had good social connections and was friendly with SUNER. Her reports dealt with the results of her conversations with representatives of foreign missions in Spain.

6. Developments in 1944.

By 1944 the change in the general war situation enabled the Allies to bring pressure to bear on the Spanish government regarding the expulsion of German nationals known to be carrying on espionage activities in the country. Owing to the influence of BERNHARD only a few minor personalities were expelled, but it became apparent to SCHELLENBERG that provisions would have to be made to meet a threatening situation. Attempts were made therefore to send more Amt VI officers to the Peninsula in case Allied pressure on the Spanish government should become effective. It is uncertain whether in fact any new replacements were sent though it is known that GUMPRECHT, who joined VI B 4 late in 1944 did go to Spain soon afterwards; he returned however after a short stay. It is believed that GUMPRECHT returned however to Spain early in 1945 in company with Hastuf KRUEGER, SINGER's assistant, and a certain Hastuf SCHUMANN who is otherwise unknown.

7. The I-Netze in Spain and Portugal

Arrangements were likewise made in 1944 for the organisation of I-Netze in Spain and Portugal. Spain offered of course

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favourable conditions through the Sofindus organisation especially in the transfer of sufficient funds to maintain the I-Netze for some time. Arrangements were left to MOSIG, but details of his work in this connection are still unknown. In Portugal VOLLBRECHT and NASSENSTEIN failed to achieve any results, though the latter is thought to have succeeded in penetrating a Brazilian firm for the purpose. Both in Spain and Portugal, however, one overriding consideration prevailed; the I-Netze had been planned on the assumption that some form of central authority would remain functioning in Germany itself, and as this condition was nullified by the German collapse, the I-Netze, even if they were successfully organised, were organised to little purpose.

Probably connected with the organisation of the I-Netze was the mission entrusted in the Autumn of 1944 to a certain MEYER, who had previously been the W/T technician for Amt VI in Tangiers. MEYER was sent under cover of the Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft to recruit Spanish born W/T operators. The network was meant to operate in the event of a diplomatic break between Spain and the Allies or when Allied pressure succeeded in having German representatives expelled from Spain. It is not thought however that MEYER met with any success in his mission as it was undertaken at too late a date. GUMPRECHT took who has been mentioned in paragraph 6 above, had been given the assignment of recruiting some fifty Spaniards from a Spanish camp in the Tyrol, who were meant to be sent to Spain as intelligence agents. The agents were in fact recruited, but training was not undertaken owing to the speed of the Allied advance. The selected agents were assigned in the end to fighting units.

D. Other Amt VI Activities in Spain

1. ARNOLD in Madrid

Karl ~~ARNOLD~~ worked independently in Madrid through SINGER. Although stationed in the Peninsula, ARNOLD was in fact a VI D representative and operated on behalf of that Gruppe in the organisation of a courier service to South America. His activities, together with those of MEYWALD, also a VI D representative, are dealt with in the War Room Publication on VI D.

2. Activities in Tangiers

Early activity against Tangiers had come under the control of Hastuf ~~SCHMUCK~~ alias ~~SCHMIEDOW~~, who was attached to the German Consulate in Tetouan in 1940. SCHMUCK's special assignment was to submit reports on public opinion in French Morocco, for which purpose his chief agent was the notorious John ~~DOLLAR~~. SCHMUCK remained in Tangiers until January 1942 when he returned to Germany, being eventually sent to Portugal in February 1944 to work under SCHROEDER. Subsequent activity in Tangiers were under the control of Ustuf ~~SCHULZE~~ with his assistant, Kriminal Assistant ~~SEIDEL~~. SCHULZE established contact with the Arab nationalist leader, YASSANI, from whose entourage he claimed to have recruited some fifty agents for operations in Spanish Morocco. SCHULZE made extravagant claims regarding his operations, and when the Consulate in Tangiers was closed in May 1944, he had great difficulty in explaining away the large amounts of money which had been expended by him for so little result. He was eventually dismissed from the Amt and later worked for the DNB. His assistant, SEIDEL, was expelled at the same time from Tangiers and later worked in Seville.

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The exploitation of French North Africa after the Tangiers expulsion devolved on the newly formed VI B 4 (Parseval).

3. DOEHRING and Unternehmen Parseval

DOEHRING has already been referred to under VI B 2 in his capacity as a member of the Dienststelle of BdS Frankreich. In Paris DOEHRING had specialised in French North Africa, a subject in which NOSSEK too had shown considerable interest. During his period of service in France DOEHRING had made several visits to Spain with a view to establishing a channel through Spain for the despatch of agents into French Morocco. His plans for a network however were cut short by the invasion, and after the retreat from France Referat VI B 4 (Parseval) was formed with DOEHRING as Referent and having as his assistants Ostuf WIEDEMANN, Oschaf SCHNELI and Hans SEIDEL, referred to in paragraph 2 above. Details of enterprises undertaken by Parseval are still lacking. In the early part of 1945 however DOEHRING was attached to Leitstelle Walter (Part III, C, paragraph 7).

4. Miscellaneous Representatives

Ostuf ~~KALLAB~~ had the important assignment of acting as VI B 4 representative at Hendaye on the Franco-Spanish frontier, where he carried out his work under cover of the Sofindus organisation. KALLAB's function was to facilitate the passage of VI B agents from France into Spain, as well as documents and equipment which could not be sent openly to the country. He was assisted in this type of work by Paul ~~XANGER~~ who specialised in the smuggling of important material such as tungsten out of Spain.

E. Activities in Portugal

1. The Main Representatives

Information on Amt VI activities in Portugal is even less complete than that on its activities in Spain. JOST's first representative in Portugal was Ostuf ~~FAST~~ who is almost certainly identical with Waldemar ~~FAST~~, the VI C representative in Turkey, at present under arrest. FAST was replaced in 1941 for a short spell by Ostuf SCHOENBECK who had previously been Amt VI representative in Finland. Latterly under SCHELLENBERG the two Amt VI representatives were Stubaf ~~NASSENSTEIN~~ and Stubaf ~~VOLLBRECHT~~.

2. Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer and Amt VI.

The general situation in Portugal differed from that in Spain in two respects. Firstly there was no Polizei Attache as SCHROEDER, who took up his appointment in Portugal in October, 1941, was only recognised as a Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer. His position was not so strong as that of WINZER in Spain, but nevertheless his relations with Amt VI representatives were never cordial. Secondly the general attitude of the Portuguese government was not so well disposed towards Germany as that of the Spanish government.

3. Later Amt VI representatives

During the period 1942-43 Kurt ~~FOERSTER~~ had acted in the interests of Amt VI, but was expelled in March 1943 as a result of

an unfortunate attempt at recruitment of an agent which ended in failure. FOERSTER was replaced by VOLLBRECHT, who remained in Portugal from August 1943 onwards.

NASSENSTEIN acted in the dual capacity of VI B 4 and VI D representative as his duties involved specialisation on South American matters. It is not possible on available evidence to assess the work of VOLLBRECHT and NASSENSTEIN: it is significant however that SCHELLENBERG considers both as complete failures in their work.

Part VI - Miscellaneous

A. General Summary

In assessing the work of Gruppe VI B in the six years of its history it should be remembered that it is more than a little inaccurate to say that Amt VI evolved out of the old SD-Hauptamt III/3. The extension of SD activity from security operations to offensive operations and from the domestic to the foreign field was in fact a step which broke new ground. It was really only in Eastern Europe that the old SD-Hauptamt laid any good foundations for the work of the new Amt VI. Gruppe VI B, therefore, dealing with Western Europe, was faced with a difficult task, as only in the case of Switzerland was there any previous SD work which it could further exploit. For the Gruppe to have been successful therefore in its initial stages it would have required both energetic direction from the Amtschef combined with sympathetic cooperation from other organisations. Neither of these conditions were in fact fulfilled in the first two years of Amt VI activities in the west. Generally speaking therefore Gruppe VI B did not succeed in overcoming the difficulties with which it was faced. It failed almost dismally in France, Holland and Belgium: it did not achieve the success it might have done in the case of Switzerland, while Italy represented a case of lost opportunity, but for reasons not attributable to the Gruppe itself. But the failures in these countries were due not only to the opposition of other Aemter in the RSHA, to the hostility of the Foreign Office, nor to the lack of cooperation with the Abwehr, but also to the inefficiency and lack of imagination on the part of most of the leading personnel in the Gruppe. The results achieved were meagre in comparison with the effort expended. Only in the case of the Iberian Peninsula is it likely that the final assessment will reflect favourably on the work of Gruppe VI B, and while the final assessment is not yet possible in this connection, it would not seem that Amt VI took full advantage of the very favourable circumstances which existed in Spain.

B. Arrests

Apart from Spain and Portugal, from which countries Amt VI representatives have not yet been expelled, the situation regarding arrests of personnel of Gruppe VI B can be considered as very satisfactory. The arrested personnel are shown in Appendix VII, and it is not likely that further interrogations will add much that is useful to the general picture of Gruppe VI B activities in France, Holland, Belgium and Italy. In the case of Switzerland the details are still lacking regarding the sources used by DAUFELDT, but his final interrogation report should complete this gap.

Main Sources(a) On the general work of the Gruppe

PF.600,561
PF.601,109

Brif SCHELLENBERG
Stubaf HUEGEL

Amtschef VI
Referent VI B 3

(b) Referat VI B 1

PF.601,109
PF.602,609

Stubaf HUEGEL
Sstuf KAPPLER

BdS Italy Abt. VI
Polizeiattache
Rome

PF.602,139
SF.52/4/5(30)

Stubaf HOETTL
Otto LECHNER

VI E
Secretary to
KAPPLER

(c) Referat VI B 2

PF.602,735
PF.601,267
PF.601,080
PF.
PF.

Ostuf BERNHARD
Hastuf ZSCHUNKE
Hastuf AHRENS
Hastuf SENNER
Haschaf ZUANG

Referent VI B 2
VI B 2
Abt VI BdS Holland
VI B 2
VI B 2

(d) Referat VI B 3

PF.601,109
PF.45727

Stubaf HUEGEL
Stubaf DAUFELDT

Referent VI B 3
Representative in
Switzerland

(e) Referat VI B 4

PF.602,422
PF.66168

Ostuf NEUBURG
John DOLLAR

VI B 3
VI B 4 agent

Distribution

Standard for Liquidation Reports

W.R.C.3a.
17.10.45.

APPENDIX IChart of Distribution of Work in Amt VI from 1939 to 1945

	1939 - 1940	Early 1941	Mid 1941-1942	1942 - 1944	1944 - 1945
VI A	Administration etc.	General Intelligence Tasks Abroad (7 sections)	Administration etc.	Administration etc.	Administration etc.
VI B	Technical Section	Europe Africa Near East (10 sections)	Slovakia Hungary Roumania Yugoslavia Greece Turkey Iraq, Iran Afghanistan	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal Italy (since 1941)
VI C	Russia Baltic States Far East	Russia Far East (11 sections)	Russia Japan China Finland Baltic States	Russia Near East Far East (13 sections)	Russia Near East Far East (4 sections by mid-44)
VI D	Hungary Slovakia Yugoslavia Roumania Bulgaria Greece Turkey	Anglo-American sphere (9 sections)	Gr. Britain Br. Empire U.S.A. S. America Sweden Norway Denmark	Anglo-American sphere (3 sections)	Anglo-American sphere Scandinavia (from summer 1941)
VI E	Italy Spain Portugal Central and South America	Ideological Enemies abroad (6 sections) (previously VI H)	France Low Countries Spain Portugal Italy Switzerland	Central Europe and Balkans Italy Scandinavia	Balkan States
VI F	France Low Countries Switzerland Luxemburg	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section
VI G	Gr. Britain Br. Empire U.S.A. Norway	-	Ideological Enemies abroad	Research (from August 1942)	Research
VI H	Ideological Enemies abroad	-	-	-	-

NOTE: The above Chart serves merely as a rough guide to the organisational changes in Amt VI. The dates should be taken as approximate only.

APPENDIX IIGruppe VI B Personnel at RSHA

Note: The location and function of personnel as given in these Appendices is roughly as at 1st January 1945. Several formations however which disappeared before then have been included owing to their importance; e.g. Abt. VI Bds Frankreich. As a result some personalities may appear twice under different formations. Arrested personnel are underlined.

Gruppenleiter	Staf STEIMLE
Vertreter	Stubaf REICHLE

VI B 1 (Italian Referat)

Referent	Oblt HOHMANN
	Oblt HANSEN
	Ostuf JOHN
	Ustuf MOELLER
	Krim Ass BRINKMANN
VI B 1 (Vat)	Hastuf <u>REISSMANN</u> (dead)

VI B 2 (France and Low Countries)

Referent	Ostubaf <u>BERNHARD</u>
	Hastuf ERNST
	Hastuf MARTSCHKE (1944)
	Hastuf <u>ZSCHUNKE</u> (Belgium)
	Hastuf HAUX
	Ostuf <u>VERNUNFT</u>
	Ustuf CROME (1943)
	Ustuf TENGLER
	Ustuf SCHOEFFLER
	Ustuf BOERDE
	Haschaf MEINEL
	Haschaf RICHETER
	Uschaf HUBNER
	Ang MAHLIS
	Ang GERSPACK

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APPENDIX II
(cont)

VI B 3 (Switzerland)

Referent	Oblt HOHMANN
	Hastuf RADEN
	Hastuf WURDIG (1943)
	Ostuf <u>FELFE</u>
	Ostuf URBANEK
	KOS POERSCHKE
	Ang KROHNE
	Ang LAPPE

VI B 4 (Spain and Portugal)

Referent	Stubaf FENDLER
	Hastuf BAUS (1943)
	Hastuf LANGBEHN (1943)
	Hastuf ALISCH
	Ostuf WIEDEMANN
	Ostuf ENDEMANN
	Ostuf Dr NEUBOURG
	Ostuf WULFENN
	Haschaf SEITZ
	Oschaf VOLT
	Stuschaf SPECK
	Dr SCHLAARSCHMIDT
	Ang PRAUSER
	Ang GUMPRECHT
	Ang ROTTMANN
	Ang GODEFROY
	Ang METZGER
	Ang BENZ

VI B 4 (Pars)

Hastuf DOEHRING
Hastuf WENKHAUSEN

APPENDIX IIIReferat VI B 1 Personnel at OutstationsBdS ItalyStubaf HUEGELHastuf SCHOENPFLUG

Ostuf RIED

Ustuf DIDINGER

Ustuf MAIER

Ustuf BANDORF

Ustuf LECHNER

Oschaf GIFFEY

Haschaf MUELLER

Frl. WENTZKY

Frl. WEILBACHER

Einheit Ida

Stubaf HASS

Ostuf SCHUBERNIG

Oschaf EBER

Haschaf AGOSTINI

Haschaf GASTEINER

Schaf-BOEHN

Schaf DAPRA

Schaf RINGOLD

Aussenkommando Bologna

Ostuf Ernst MOELLER

Aussenkommando Merano

Ustuf ZIRNBAUMER

Aussenkommando Milan

Ostuf ZIMMER

Aussenkommando GenoaUstuf MICHELSSENAussenkommando San Remo

Rottenf SCHOFFREGER

Aussenkommando RomeHastuf GROEBEL (1942) (dead)
Stubaf LOOSSBdS Adriatic Coast

Ustuf WOLFF

APPENDIX IVReferat VI B & Personnel at OutstationsBdS Paris (1944)

Stubaf HAGEN (1942)	Ustuf BOURJEAU
Stubaf BICKLER	Ustuf REISSMANN
Stubaf <u>NOSSEK</u>	Ustuf WILD
Stubaf LANG	Ustuf <u>Gerhard PREIL</u>
Hastuf DETTERING	Ustuf Hermann DOBRITZSCH
Hastuf ALISCH	Ustuf RAHE
Hastuf ZUCHRISTIAN	Ustuf ZACH
Hastuf GUTEKUNST	Oschaf MUELLER
Hastuf <u>KUNZE</u>	Oschaf SCHNELL
Hastuf KOENIG	Haschaf ZUANG
Ostuf GERARDIN	Sdf KLEY
Ostuf LOBA	Dr KELLER
Ostuf SCHMIDT	Ang VOELKER

BdS Brussels

Hastuf <u>ZSCHUNKE</u> (1942)	Ustuf ECKERT (1943)
Hastuf <u>LAWRENZ</u>	Ustuf <u>ALLIGER</u> (1942)
Hastuf BAUS (1942)	Ustuf POLONI (1942)
Hastuf LOCHELT (1941)	Oschaf HENZE
Ustuf KRATZ	

BdS Holland

Hastuf <u>AHRENS</u>	Ustuf EGIDY
Hastuf <u>HINCKFUSS</u>	Ustuf JARL
Hastuf <u>FELFE</u>	Uschaf ASBACH (W/T)
Hastuf MUELLER	Stuschaf ULBRICH

Vichy

Hastuf REICHE (1942) (dead)
Hastuf SCHMID (1944)

Metz

APPENDIX IV

(cont)

Strasbourg

Stubaf FREISE

Krim Kom UHRING

Stubaf SCHNEIDER

MarseillesHastuf SENNERUnternehmen Bertram and Tosca

Stubaf GOHL

Hastuf SENNERHastuf Werner NEISSERLeitstelle Walter

Staf BICKLER (and staff of BdS Paris above)

Stubaf HUBIG

Ostuf MORITZ

Hastuf WENGER

Ostuf ESCHELBOECK

Ostuf HERMANN

Ustuf WESTENBERGER

Ostuf MORO

ODENDAHL (W/T)

Leitstelle SiegfriedStubaf WOLFF

Stuschaf KATZBACH

Hastuf LAWRENZ

Stuschaf SCHUTZ

Ostuf EINFELD

Uschaf KROHNE

Ostuf FRANKE

Uschaf POLLMANN

Haschaf BAAKE

Ang VOELKER

Haschaf VIERCK

APPENDIX VReferat VI B 3 Personnel at Outstations.Representatives in SwitzerlandOstuf DAUFELDTGraf DOENHOFAdolf SONNENHOHL (Consular staff)Representatives in SD-Stellen working against Switzerland

SD Stuttgart

Ostuf BAUER (1944)

Hastuf OUNSZEIT

Ustuf EHMANN

Oschaf EISELE

Dr. HESS

SD Aussenstelle

Löerrach

Ustuf BECKER

SD Aussenstelle

Mulhouse

Stubaf BLECHER (suicide)

SD Aussenstelle

Friedrichshaven

Hastuf BUCHELE

SD Leitabschnitt Munich

Ostuf DAUSER

Ustuf HIERL

SD Aussenstelle Waldshut

Ostuf KEMMET

SD Leitabschnitt

Karlsruhe

Ostuf WANDHOFF

MiscellaneousSCHELLENBERG's personal agent - Stubaf EGGEN

STEIMLE's personal agent - Dr. GARDEMANN

APPENDIX VIReferat VI B 4 Personnel at OutstationsRepresentatives
in Spain(a) Subordinated to Polizei Attache WINZER

Ostuf SINGER

Hastuf KRUEGER

Ustuf KULAS

Hastuf ARNOLD (for VI D 4)

(b) The Grille Organisation under cover of
Oberfuehrer BERNHARD

Stubaf MOSIG

Fritz LACKNER

Frl. BRUECKNER

Haschaf HOLTING (W/T)

Ewald KRUSE (Pielles Fur Company, Madrid)

Hans WEISS (Pielles Fur Company, Madrid)

Erish DIETEL (Sofindus, Madrid)

Paul ANGER (Marion Transport Company, Madrid)

Franz STAUDINGER (Minerales Mining Company,
Madrid)

Ostuf KALLAB (Sofindus, Hendaye)

(c) Representatives in Tangiers

Hastuf SCHMUCK (Tangiers 1940-41)

Ustuf SCHULTZE (Tangiers until May 1944)

Hans SEIDEL (Tangiers until May 1944)

Oschaf LECHNER

Representatives
in Portugal

Ostubaf SCHROEDER (Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer)

Ostubaf NASSENSTEIN

Stubaf VOLLBRECHT

Kurt FOERSTER (until March 1943)

- SUMBECK

Ostuf FAST (1939-40)

Hastuf SCHMUCK (previously Tangiers)

Representative at
SD-Leitstelle Munich

Hastuf SCHWARZ

APPENDIX VIIAlphabetical Index of Gruppe VI B Personnel

(Arrested Personnel are underlined)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Referat</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
AGOSTINI	Haschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida
<u>ABENS</u>	<u>Hastuf</u>	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.
<u>ALISCH</u>	<u>Hastuf</u>	VI B 2	Also VI B 4
ALLIGER	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Belgium 1943. Transferred VI E. Arrested USFET.
ARNOLD	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid; also VI D 4
ASBACH	Uschaf		
BAAKE	Haschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
BANDORF	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy
BAUER	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
BAUS	Hastuf	VI B 2	Transferred VI A 2 in 1944.
BECKER	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Loerrach.
BENZ	Ang.	VI B 4	
BERNHARD	Oberf	VI B 4	Sofindes Company, Madrid.
<u>BERNHARD</u>	<u>Ostuf</u>	VI B 2	Referent VI B 2. Arrested USFET.
BICKLER	Staf	VI B 2	Leiter Leitstelle Walter.
<u>BLECHER</u>	<u>Stubaf</u>	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Mulhouse. Suicide.
BOEHM	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
<u>BOERDE</u>	<u>Ustuf</u>	VI B 2	
BRINKMANN	Krim. Ass.	VI B 1	
BUCHELE	Hastuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Friedrichshaven.
CROME	Ustuf	VI B 2	
DAPRA	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
<u>DAUFELDT</u>	<u>Ostuf</u>	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland. Arrested USFET.
DAUSER	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Munich.
DEITERING	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
DIDINGER	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
DOERITZSCH	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.

APPENDIX VII
(cont)

<u>DOENHOF</u>	Graf	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland. Arrested Italy.
DOEHRING	Hastuf	VI B 4	VI B 4 (Parseval)
EBNER	Oschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
ECKERT	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland 1943.
<u>EGGEN</u>	Stubaf	VI B 3	Arrested Italy.
EGIDY	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
EHMANN	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
EISELE	Oschaf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
EINFELD	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
ENDEMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
ERNST	Hastuf	VI B 2	
ESCHELBOECK	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter
FANELSA	Ostuf	VI B 2	Representative at SD-Metz.
<u>FELFE</u>	Ostuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.
FENDLER	Stubaf	VI B 4	Referent VI B 4.
FORSTER		VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
FRANKE	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
FREISE	Stubaf	VI B 2	Former Gruppenleiter. Representative at Strasbourg.
GASTEINER	Haschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
GERARDIN	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
GERSPACK	Ang.	VI B 2	
GIFFEY	Oschaf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
GODEFROY	Ang.	VI B 4	
GOHL	Stubaf	VI B 2	Unternehmen Bertram.
GUTEKUNST	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HAAGEN	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leiter Abt. VI BdS France 1942.
HAMMES	Krim. Kom.	VI B 4	Representative in Barcelona
HASS	Stubaf	VI B 1	Leiter Einheit Ida.
HAUX	Hastuf	VI B 2	
HESS	Dr.	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
HERMANN	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HIERL	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Munich.
<u>HINCKFUSS</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.

<u>HUEGEL</u>	Stubaf	VI B 1	Leiter Abt. VI BdS Italy. Arrested Italy.
HUBIG	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HUBNER	Uschaf	VI B 2	
JARL	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
JOHN	Ostuf	VI B 1	
KATZBACH	Stuschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
KEMMET	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Waldshut.
KLEY	Sdf.	VI B 2	BdS Italy.
KOENIG	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
KROHNE	Uschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
KRATZ	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels.
KRUEGER	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
KULAS	Ustuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
<u>KUNZE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter. Arrested French Zone.
LANG	Stubaf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
LANGBEHN	Hastuf	VI B 4	
LAPPE	Ang.	VI B 3	
LAWRENZ	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels.
LOBA	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
LOCHELT	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels 1941.
LOOSS	Stubaf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Rome.
MAHLIS	Ang.	VI B 2	
MAIER	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
MARTSCHKE	Hastuf	VI B 2	
MEINEL	Haschaf	VI B 2	
METZGER	Ang.	VI B 4	
<u>MICHELSEN</u>	Ustuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Genoa. Arrested Italy.
MOELLER	Ustuf	VI B 1	
MOELLER	Ostuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Bologna.
MORITZ	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
MORO	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
MOSIG	Stubaf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.

APPENDIX VII
(cont)

MUELLER	Haschaf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
MUELLER	Oschaf	VI B 2	BdS France.
MUELLER	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland (1943)
NASSENSTEIN	Ostufaf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
<u>NEISSER</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris; transferred VI S. Arrested French Zone.
<u>NEUBURG</u>	Ostuf	VI B 4	Arrested American Zone.
<u>NOSSEK</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested FrenchZone.
ODENDAHL	Scharf	VI B 2	W/T operator Leitstelle Seigfried.
ONUSZEIT	Hastuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
POERSCHKE	KOS	VI B 3	
POLLMANN	Uschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
<u>POLONI</u>	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels 1943. Transferred VI E.
PRAUSER	Ang.	VI B 4	
<u>PREIL</u>	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested Italy.
RADEN	Hastuf	VI B 3	
RAHE	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
<u>REICHE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative Vichy; dead.
REICHLE	Stubaf	VI B	Vertreter to Gruppenleiter.
<u>REISSMANN</u>	Hastuf	VI B 1(Vat)	Dead
RICHTER	Haschaf	VI B 2	
RIED	Ostuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy
RINGOLD	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
RISSMANN	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS France.
ROTHMANN	Ang.	VI B 4	
SCHLAARSCHMIDT	Dr.	VI B 4	
SCHMIEDOW	Krim. Ass.	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
SCHMIDT	Ostuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
SCHMID	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative atVichy.
SCHNEIDER	Ostufaf	VI B 2	Representative at Strasbourg 1943.

APPENDIX VII
(cont)

SCHELL	Oscaf	VI B 2	BdS France.
<u>SCHOENPFLUG</u>	Hastuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy; arrested Italy.
SCHOEFFLER	Ustuf	VI B 2	
SCHOEFFREGER	Rottenf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando St Remo.
SCHROEDER	Ostufaf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
<u>SCHUBERNIG</u>	Ostuf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida. Arrested Austria
SCHUTZ	Stuschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
SCHWARTZ	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative SD-Munich.
SENNER	Hastuf	VI B 2	Unternehmen Bertram.
SEITZ	Hascaf	VI B 4	Identical with SEIDEL.
SINGER	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
<u>SONNENHOHL</u>	Consul	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland; arrested Italy.
SPECK	Stuschaf	VI B 4	
STEIMLE	Staf	VI B	Gruppenleiter.
TENGLER	Ustuf	VI B 2	
<u>UHRING</u>	Krim. Kom.	VI B 1	Representative at Strasbourg; arrested French Zone.
ULBRICH	Stuschaf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
URBANEK	Ostuf	VI B 3	Was Abt. III BdS Holland.
<u>VERNUNFT</u>	Ostuf	VI B 2	Arrested American Zone.
VIERCK	Hascaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
<u>VOELKER</u>	Ang.	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried. Arrested American Zone.
VOLLBRECHT	Stubaf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
VOLT	Oscaf	VI B 4	
WANDHOFF	Ostuf	VI B 3	
WEIDEMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WENDTHAUSEN	Ostuf	VI B 2	
WENGER	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
WIEDENMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WILD	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
WULFFEN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WURDIG	Hastuf	VI B 3	
WOLFF	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Adriatic Coast.

APPENDIX VII
(cont)

<u>WOLFF</u>	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leiter Leitstelle Siegfried. Arrested American Zone.
ZACH	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
ZIMMER	Ostuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Milan.
ZIRNBAUMER	Ustuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Merano.
<u>ZSCHUNKE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Arrested BAOR.
<u>ZUANG</u>	Haschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested French Zone.
ZUCHRISTIAN	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.

Addenda

<u>BIELSTEIN</u>	Hastuf	VI B	Gruppenleiter 1939-41; arrested in Denmark.
<u>ELLING</u>	Ostuf	VI B 1	Representative at Vatican; arrested Italy.
<u>FAST</u>	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal 1939-40. Probably identical with FAST of VI C (arrested BAOR)
GUMPRECHT	Ang.	VI B 4	
HOLTING		VI B 4	W/T operator Madrid
KALLAB	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative at Hendaye
LECHNER	Oschaf	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers 1944
<u>LECHNER</u>		VI B 1	Secretary to KAPPLER: arrested Italy.
<u>LORENZ</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative in France 1939; arrested.
PETER, Dr.		VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland 1939-40.
PFISTERER	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Spain 1941.
<u>PLATH</u>	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Spain 1939-40. Dead.
SCHMUCK	Krim Ass	VI B 4	Identical with SCHMIEDOW; representative in Tangiers 1940-42; later in Portugal.
SCHOENBBECK	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal 1940-41.
SCHULTZE	Ustuf	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers until 1944.
SEIDEL	Hans	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers until 1944; later VI B 4 (Pars)
SUMBECK		VI B 4	Assistant to VOLLBRECHT in Lisbon.

Anexo 10 - Safehaven report official assets of the German Secret Service in Spain
 Archivo CIA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
 MADRID SPAIN

Cand
 XBAZ-494

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE NO 408
 FEBRUARY 6, 1946

SAFEHAVEN REPORT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report:
 Recovery of Official Assets of
 the German Secret Service (Abwehr)
 in Spain

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED:

The recovery of official assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain was accelerated by the cooperation of Karl Zimmer, an assistant cashier of the organization. He maintains his cooperation was not on a basis of expectation of personal gain, but to prevent the dispersal of official German funds to the personal benefit of certain individual officials of the Secret Service. On the whole, his information has proven accurate, but it has been found necessary to carefully analyse his statements because of his personal animosities toward his former chiefs.

There are attached the following:

1. Statement in Spanish by Karl Zimmer, dated May 14, 1945.
2. Translation of above.
3. Translation of resumé of funds and valuables stated by Zimmer to have been in the possession of various members of the Abwehr.
4. Supplement to the above, dated October 10, 1945.
5. List of members of the German Secret Service in Spain known to Karl Zimmer.

INDEX

On the basis of the information supplied by Zimmer, a Note Verbale was sent to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which resulted in the recoveries listed in the enclosures to Safehaven Report no. 101 of June 14, 1945, and through German intermediaries, the items listed in the enclosures to Safehaven Report no. 88 of May 22, 1945 were delivered directly to the Embassy. On August 20, Hans Schöne voluntarily delivered the automobile in his possession.

CATEGORY - 2

DE-INDEXED

Erich Zimmer, who was in charge of transportation for the Abwehr, was interviewed on several occasions in an effort to locate all the motor vehicles in order to deprive the users of ready means of movement and therefore tie them to ordinary transportation facilities and the procurement of securing Spanish safe-

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-2-

conducts. He proved unwilling to cooperate, however, and it was necessary to use threats even to force him to deliver the official German property in his possession. Efforts are being made to recover five automobiles understood still to remain in his possession.

Lieutenant Colonel (Air) Ernst Arno KLEYENSTÜBER, the Chief of the organization in Spain since January, 1944, volunteered in October, 1945 to assist in recovering the assets of the Abwehr through Gerhardt LINDENBERG (see Safehaven Report no. 70 of May 14, 1945), and immediately commenced interviewing his subordinates in and around Madrid. He called his confidants Dr. Karl PANHORST (in charge at Barcelona) and Hans FRANZBACH (his chief Cashier, who was residing near Valencia) to Madrid to assist him. The services of Dr. Hans Schöne, the Chief of the Int Section, were also utilized to establish a small office, with Frau MUELLER and Frau KIRSCHNER as stenographers.

The activities of the group resulted in immediate returns of equipment and funds. A special effort was made to recover the photographic apparatus described in Safehaven Report no. 361 of January 2, 1946. A resumé of all the material recovered through the information supplied by Zimmer, and through the efforts of Kleyenstüber's group, is attached.

The Embassy had learned of the establishment of two businesses, called ARDIA and ZARAGOZA, the latter being the code name for an unknown company. Kleyenstüber stated that they had been formed by his organization in Barcelona, and that Dr. Panhorst, who was thoroughly consonant with those businesses, would make full explanations. Dr. Panhorst was carefully questioned, and he and Kleyenstüber submitted memoranda on the companies which clarified their status to the satisfaction of the Trusteeship after independent investigations confirmed their statements.

On the basis of the report submitted by Karl Zimmer (enclosure no. 4) Dr. Panhorst volunteered to obtain the additional information still lacking upon his return to Barcelona.

Several Section Chiefs refused to report to us through Kleyenstüber, and arrangements were made for them to call individually.

Lieutenant Colonel KIECKERBUSCH, in charge of the First (direct espionage) Section, called at the invitation of the Embassy and delivered what he maintained to be the sole remaining official money and property in his possession. He was closely questioned regarding the apparatus he had used for infra-red ray photographing of vessels, and about a large telescope for spotting

vessels

-3-

11/

vessels from an establishment maintained in Algeciras for the purpose. He maintained that the property had been rented from the owner and that certain improvements, to the value of Ptas. 200,000, had been made, building a false façade to prevent detection by the British authorities. However, in 1943 the pressure brought to bear on the Spanish Government by the British forced him to evacuate his quarters and abandon the establishment in Algeciras. He refused to give definite information regarding the infra-red ray apparatus or the telescope, but he tacitly admitted that the apparatus had been turned over to the Spanish Naval Command; he declined to specify the persons to whom delivery had been effected.

At about the same time, Captain ~~KUHLENTHAL~~ ^{ced}, who was believed to have been in charge of the training and school section of the Abwehr in Spain, also called, after having refused to cooperate through Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber, and delivered considerable property, including tires, an automobile, and money, which neither the Trusteeship nor any informant had been aware were in his possession. Kuhlenthal apparently fears that he will be subjected to a prison sentence on his arrival in Germany, and he therefore made every effort to qualify his actions as voluntary; Kleyenstüber states that he was unaware of the official funds in Kuhlenthal's possession, especially the \$2500 and Escudos 5000\$00.

12/

13/

On December 8, on instructions of Kleyenstüber, Walter ~~IOEBE~~ ^{ced} lieutenant in charge of the radio apparatus of the Abwehr, called to account for the material for which he was responsible. There is attached hereto a translation of his letter listing this radio equipment, which checked with the information already available to the Embassy. There is also attached a memorandum of an investigation covering the radio installation.

14/

Max Franzbach, Kleyenstüber's Chief Cashier (~~Oberstabsintendant~~) submitted a full accounting of his funds. The accounting was first presented by Franzbach to Kleyenstüber for certification, the customary practice they had previously followed, and was handed to a representative of the Embassy by both men in a semi-formal ceremony. An English translation of the letter of transmittal and the detailed accounts are attached. The cash sum of Ptas. 97,583.35 was collected and entered in the accounts of the Trusteeship as a credit to official funds.

The funds listed by Franzbach as in his possession on May 8, 1945 were carefully checked against other information available to the Embassy. All the foreign exchange listed under section B, which was handed to the Foreign Office, was delivered to the Trusteeship by the Spanish authorities on August 1,

1945,

3

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1945, except for Swiss francs 38,000. The Ministry will be requested to account for these missing Swiss francs. The sum of Ptas. 96,668 delivered by Franzbach to the Foreign Office has been acknowledged as received and will in time be credited to the Trusteeship. This sum has been previously mentioned in section 2 of the enclosure to Safehaven Report no. 320 of December 12, 1945.

The account appears clear, and as it checks with the information furnished by Zimmer, it is believed to be an accurate settlement of the funds of the Abwehr in possession of Kleyenstüber, Franzbach, and the group cooperating with them.

The following section chiefs have accounted for their funds through Kleyenstüber and Franzbach:

Colonel von Rohrscheidt <i>ced</i>	Chief Section III
Captain Obermüller <i>ced</i>	Chief Section IM
Lieutenant Loëbe	Radio Chief
Captain Schöne	Chief Section IH
Photographer Lamprecht <i>ced</i> (" " 16)	

The following section chiefs have accounted for their funds directly to the Trusteeship:

Lieutenant Colonel Kieckebusch	Chief Section I (Direct Espionage)
Captain Kuhlenthal	

The following section chiefs, and all the other officers not listed above, as well as the employees indicated in enclosure no. 5, are yet to be interviewed:

Colonel von Wenckstern <i>ced</i>	Chief Section II
Engineer Dr. Wiehs <i>ced</i>	Chief Section ITLW
Captain Moeller <i>ced</i>	Chief Secret Section IM
Captain Gerstung <i>ced</i>	Chief of Radio Installers

Kleyenstüber prepared a short general summary of his activities to recover outstanding funds and property. A translation of the resumé is attached.

15/

CGilbert/et

Enclosures:

1.

4

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Enclosures:

1. Statement in Spanish by Karl Zimmer, May 14, 1945.
2. Translation of 1.
3. Translation of resumé of funds and valuables, made by Zimmer.
4. Supplement to 2, dated October 10, 1945.
5. List of Abwehr members known to Zimmer.
6. Conversation with Arno Kleyenstüber.
7. Resumé of material recovered through information given by Zimmer.
8. Memorandum: Abwehr and Karl Panhorst.
9. Dr. Panhorst's declaration about ARDIA.
10. Memorandum: Dr. Karl Panhorst.
11. Memorandum: Infra-red Rays.
12. Declaration by Walter Loebe (translation).
13. Memorandum: Lieutenant Loebe.
14. Letter transmitting Franzbach's accounts (translation).
15. Kleyenstüber's resumé of his recovery of funds and property.

Distribution:

Hectograph to the Department.
American Embassy, London, in duplicate.
British Embassy, Madrid, triplicate.

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Enclosure no. 1 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Yo declaro que, viendome en determinadas ocasiones hablando con un señor, el cual al parecer simpatizaba con los alemanes y ignorando yo que este señor se trataba de un policía que mas tarde pude comprobar. Pues las conversaciones iban encaminadas a esclarecer las anomalías que han ocurrido en la Embajada Alemana, en la cual prestaba yo mis servicios de funcionario cajero, siendo mi categoría inspector administrativo de carrera. Ya visto que las preguntas del referido policía ya iban encaminadas y estaba casi totalmente enterado, pues ya yo me decidí a preguntarle como le interesaba tanto lo que habia ocurrido en la Embajada. El me contesto: "yo soy muy curioso pues como soy alumno de ciencias politicas y economicas me gusta mucho enterarme del funcionamiento de la administracion de las naciones extranjeras, toda vez que afecta a mi futura carrera." Pero era todo lo contrario. Se trataba de una informacion. Pues al parecer ordenada por las autoridades españolas, toda vez que dia mas tarde pude comprobar que por el Sr. GUNTIN y otros colegas habian sido detenidos mis antiguos jefes y compañeros de la seccion de la Embajada a la cual pertenecia. Y entonces al ver al dia siguiente al ya mencionado Sr. GUNTIN en compañía del catedrático y profesor FROHBERGYA le he dicho: "Vd. sabe todo y estoy dispuesto a decirle todo cuanto ha pasado." Contestacion a que viene eso, "pues Vd. es un agente del servicio secreto". Interviniendo el profesor, le conozco hace tiempo como alumno mio y matriculado en ciencias politicas y economicas. Y entonces sonriendo el Sr. GUNTIN, dijo: "caballeros, ha llegado la hora de la verdad. Efectivamente llevo este servicio y espero de su caballerosidad de Vds. que me ayuden que en bien de Vds. y de sus camaradas lo hacen." Entonces nos explico las anomalías que ocurrían: contestando nosotros que estabamos dispuestos a facilitar y ayudar la labor que Vd. (SR. GUNTIN) esta llevando a cabo asi que cuenta con nuestra colaboracion desde este mismo momento como hubieramos hecho, si hubieramos conocido antes su cargo de Vd. que lo ignorabamos hasta la fecha en que Vd. nos lo dice. En aquel mismo momento yo referi todo cuanto yo sabia y estaba enterado. Yo soy conocedor de lo siguiente:

- 1) El jefe superior de mi seccion, Sr. KLEYENSTUBER, dio orden a su jefe de la caja, Sr. FRANZBACH, asi como jefe inmediato mio, de apoderarse de todo el dinero asi como de los valores y divisas extranjeras y de la cantidad de estupefacientes (opio o cocaína) que yo por razon de mi cargo guardaba en la caja fuerte

-2-

de la Embajada, o sean: 3 cajas de oro en moneda de 12,8 kilos cada una, 1 caja de oro en moneda de ca. 7 kilos, 1 caja de oro en moneda de ca. 6 kilos, 3 cajas de la droga arriba indicada con un peso total de 2,900 gramos, distribuidas en la siguiente forma: por orden de los Srs. KLEYENSTUEBER y FRANZBACH. A saber: KLEYENSTUEBER: 1 caja, mas una cantidad de dinero. FRANZBACH: 3 cajas de oro y toda la cantidad de la droga ya arriba indicada. Obermuller: 1 caja de oro y todo el material fotografico

El dia 7 de mayo de 1945 entregue al Sr. FRANZBACH por orden de el las siguientes cantidades de dinero:

497,000 francos franceses en billetes
9,000 dolares americanos en billetes
150,000 escudos portugueses en billetes
2,800 libras esterlinas en billetes
99,000 francos suizos en billetes
2,600 florines holandeses en billetes

Ademas de esto han recibido:

Sr. KIECKEBUSCH 250,000 pesetas en billetes
Sr. von ROHRSCHEIDT 300,000 pesetas en billetes
Sr. KUHLENTHAL 80,000 pesetas en billetes (que guardaba en una caja particular de la Embajada y la cual obra en su poder).

La recibida cantidad de dinero Sr. KIECKEBUSCH no ha querido firmar con su firma, estampando unicamente una x; asunto que he comunicado personalmente al Sr. FRANZBACH. Contestación de FRANZBACH: "eso no tiene importancia alguna, toda vez que hay orden del jefe superior, Sr. Kleyenstueber, de destruir y quemar todos los libros de caja así como otra documentación existente en esta dependencia." Sr. Franzbach me informó de que 1 caja de oro y toda la droga mencionada estaban enterradas en Medinaceli. Más tarde me enteré por Sr. Amberg que él personalmente había ido a Medinaceli a recoger la referida cantidad de la droga y la caja de oro y la había entregado en compañía del Sr. Minameyer a la Embajada de los UU. EE., diciéndome que la habían tomado como en depósito a la disposición de la comisión de control aliada que en su día será nombrada.

2) La oficina Kleyenstueber-Franzbach dispone además de las siguientes subsecciones que guardan igualmente fondos, a saber:

Barcelona cajero Sr. Pfau, 500.000 pesetas,
San Sebastián encargado y cajero Sr. Furch,
100.000 pesetas, mas 1.000.000 de francos franceses en billetes,
San Sebastián encargado y cajero Sr. Gensorowski,
100.000 pesetas, mas buena cantidad de francos franceses en billetes,

Melilla

7

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Melilla

ex-cónsul Kraemer, estrecho colaborador del Sr. Kieckebusch ha sido expulsado de Marruecos al parecer, pero no obstante dirigía su antiguo cargo en Marruecos desde Madrid, obra en su poder 300.000 pesetas y buena cantidad de francos marroquies.

Tetuán

encargado Canaris (Madrid) y su cajera Quitzeu (Tetuán) obra en su poder 30.000 pesetas y buena cantidad de francos marroquies.

- 3) La oficina Kleyenstuber-Franzbach tiene además un parque móvil de ca 50 coches repartidos en sus secciones, cuya administración está a cargo de los Srs. Franzbach y Mainzer. Dichos Srs. tienen además la administración de las máquinas de escribir repartidas en la oficina y sus subsecciones en cuestión.

Esta es mi declaración con relación a todo cuanto yo sé por razones de mi cargo, la cual hago yo con el deseo de afirmar de que yo tengo nada que ver con los actos ilegales de esos individuos.

Mayo 14, 1945

Enclosure no. 2 to Safehaven Report no. 406, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

I declare that several times I talked with a gentleman who apparently sympathized with the Germans, whom I did not know as a policeman, which later I proved. The conversations tended to deal with clearing up the unusual occurrences in the German Embassy, where I served as cashier, my classification being career administrative inspector (inspector administrativo de carrera). Inasmuch as the questions of the abovementioned policeman were well phrased, and as he was almost completely informed on the subject, I decided to ask him why he was so much interested in what had happened in the Embassy. He answered: "I am very curious because as I am a student of political and economic sciences, I like to learn about the functioning of the administration of foreign countries, insofar as it affects my future career."

But it was exactly the opposite. It was a matter of investigation, apparently instituted by the Spanish authorities; I was later able to verify that my former chiefs and fellow-workers of the section of the Embassy to which I belonged had been arrested by Sr. Guntin (the policeman) and his companions. And the next day, when I saw said señor Guntin in company with Professor Frohberg (FROHBURG), I said to him: "You know everything, and I am inclined to tell you everything that has happened." His answer was, "Well, you are a secret service agent." The professor intervened, and I recognized him as an old pupil of mine enrolled in political and economic sciences. And then Sr. Guntin, smiling, said: "Gentlemen, the time for truth has come. I am investigating this matter, and I hope that through your own goodness you will help me, for it is for your good and that of your comrades that I do it."

Then he explained the unusual events which had occurred: we answering that we were inclined to facilitate and help in the work you (Sr. Guntin) are carrying out, and you may also count on our collaboration from this moment as we would have done if we had known sooner what your work was, but we were ignorant of it until you told us. At that time I told everything I knew.

I know the following:

1. The head of my section, Kleyenstueber, ordered his chief cashier, Franzbach, who is my immediate superior, to take charge of all the money and also of the valuables and foreign exchange and the quantity of

opiates

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opiates (opium or cocaine) which I, because of my position, kept in the Embassy safe, that is,

- 3 boxes of gold coins, 12.8 Kgs. each
- 1 box of gold coins, about 7 Kgs.
- 1 box of gold coins, about 6 Kgs.
- 3 boxes of the abovementioned drug, with a total weight of 2900 grams, distributed as follows: by order of Kleyenstueber and Franzbach.

That is to say,

Kleyenstueber	1 box, plus a quantity of money.
Franzbach	3 boxes of gold all the drug.
Obermueller	1 box of gold all photographic material.

On May 7, I delivered to Franzbach on his instructions the following quantities of money:

- 497,000 French francs in bills
- 9,000 U.S. dollars in bills
- 150,000 Portuguese escudos in bills
- 2,800 English pounds sterling in bills
- 99,000 Swiss francs in bills
- 2,600 Dutch florins in bills

In addition, they have received:

KIECKEBUSCH	Ptas. 250,000 in bills
von ROHRSCHEIDT	Ptas. 300,000 in bills
KUHLENTHAL	Ptas. 80,000 in bills (which he kept in a private safe in the Embassy, which he still has.)

Kieckebusch would not sign with his signature for the money delivered, merely putting an X; I personally told Franzbach this. Franzbach's answer: "That is of no importance, so long as there is an order from the chief, Kleyenstueber, to destroy and burn all the cash books as well as other documentation in this office." Franzbach told me that one box of gold and all the drug mentioned were buried in Medinaceli. Later I learned from señor Amberg that he personally had gone to Medinaceli to recover said quantity of the drug and the box of gold, and had delivered it, in company with señor Kinameyer, to the Embassy of the United States, telling me that they had taken it as on deposit for disposition by the Allied Control Council, which would be duly named.

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2. The Kleyenstueber-Franzbach office also has the following subsections which likewise have funds:

Barcelona ~~Pfau~~^{cc}, cashier; Ptas. 500,000.
 San Sebastian ~~Furch~~^{cc}, chargé and cashier;
 Ptas. 100,000 plus more than French
 francs 1,000,000 in bills.
 San Sebastian ~~Gensorowski~~^{cc}, chargé and cashier;
 Ptas. 100,000 plus a good amount of
 French francs in bills.
 Melilla ~~Ex-consul Krachner~~^{cc}, close collaborator
 of Kieckebusch, has been expelled from
 Morocco apparently, but nevertheless
 he directed his old position in Morocco
 from Madrid; he has Ptas. 300,000 and a
 good quantity of Moroccan francs.
 Tetuan ~~Charge Canaris~~^{cc} (Madrid) and his cashier
 Miss ~~Gutzau~~^{cc} (Tetuan); Ptas. 30,000 and
 a good amount in Moroccan francs.

3. The Kleyenstueber-Franzbach office also has a car depot of about fifty cars divided among its sections, the administration of which is in charge of Franzbach and Mainzer. They also have the administration of the typewriters in the office and in the subsections in question.

This is my declaration about all I know through my job, which declaration I make with the wish to affirm that I have nothing to do with the illegal acts of those individuals.

May 14, 1945.

(Karl ZIMMER)

Trans: ET.t

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Enclosure no. 3 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Resumé of missing Reich properties,
according to my previous declarations
- - - - -

1. Franzbach: Chief person responsible for Abwehr properties in Spain.
 - 3 boxes of gold coins of various countries.
 - 3 boxes of opium (cocaine 2.900,-g)
 - Ptas. 205,000 deposited by Spaniards in order to create a cash reserve after the blocking of German funds.
 - 3 suitcases of Portuguese cigars and cigarettes worth Escudos 12,000. If these were sold, where is the money?
 - US\$34,000, which señor Op Der ~~Beck~~ changed to approximately Ptas. 375,000. The exchange of these dollars was delivered to Franzbach after he left jail.
 - 2 large cartons of medicines. In these cartons were 3 small cameras, with 3 extra rolls of 360 films each.
 - 1 good radio set.
 - 1300 liters of gasoline in tickets delivered by Zimmer.
 - 2000 liters of gasoline at least, taken from the tank at María de Molina.
 - 15 - 20 tires which were taken from María de Molina to another place.

On May 7, 1945 he delivered all the money of the office; that is,

- 497,000 French francs in bills
- 9,000 US dollars in bills
- 150,000 Portuguese escudos in bills
- 2,800 pounds sterling in bills
- 99,000 Swiss francs in bills
- 2,600 Netherlands florins in bills.

Said assets I delivered to Franzbach in the presence of Otto Stein, who with Miss Seemann had to count it. Franzbach gave no receipt; the next day he confirmed the exact delivery of those sums. ced

Franzbach is an estraperlista of two interned French cars.

Franzbach did not give orders to deliver the cars and typewriters; on the contrary, he gave instructions not to deliver them.

4 typewriters from his office.

-2-

2. Kleyenstüber: Chief of the Abwehr; he had
- 1 box of gold.
 - Ptas. 45,000 advance payments.
 - Ptas. 30,000 for the purchase of furniture.
 - Jewels worth RM 12,000, official value.
 - 1 Mercedes car, Ptas. 75,000; this he still has.
 - 1 Peugeot car, Ptas. 58,000; camouflaged by Eger.
- In agreement with Franzbach, Kleyenstüber did not permit delivery of the Abwehr property--money, cars, etc.
- His office had 2 typewriters.
3. Obermüller: chief of the IM section; he had
- 1 box of gold.
 - All photographic and optical material of his section.
 - 3 cars so far not delivered.
 - 4 typewriters from his office.
 - 1 radio.
4. Kieckebusch: chief of I section; he had
- Ptas. 250,000, delivered by me.
 - 1 CD car; this he still has.
 - 1 radio
 - 2 typewriters from his office.
5. von Rohrscheidt: chief of Section III; he had
- Ptas. 300,000, delivered shortly before the end of the war.
 - 3 typewriters from his office.
6. Kuehlenthal: section chief; he had
- Ptas. 80,000.
 - 1 car.
 - 2 typewriters from his office.
7. ^{Walter Engel}
Kraemer: formerly Consul at Melilla; he had ✓
- Ptas. 300,000 in the cashbox at Melilla, and a good quantity of Moroccan francs.
 - Ptas. 43,000, war damages payments.
 - 1 Mercedes car, which he sold for Ptas. 50,000.
- He was responsible for the Abwehr properties in Melilla.
8. Canaris: chief of the Tetuan office; he had
- Ptas. 30,000 in the cashbox at Tetuan, and a good sum of Moroccan francs.
 - Typewriters, cars, furniture, etc. of the Abwehr, which Srta. Quitzau administered.
 - 1 typewriter from his own office.

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9. Gensorowski: chargé and cashier in San Sebastian:
Ptas. 100,000.
1 car.
1 typewriter.
10. Furch: chargé and cashier in San Sebastian:
Ptas. 100,000.
French francs 1,000,000.
1 typewriter.
Office furniture.
Radio broadcasting apparatus.
11. Paul: ~~chief~~ ^{ed} of a section in Barcelona:
Ptas. 250,000.
1 Topolino car.
12. Dr. Panhorst: chief of a section in Barcelona:
Ptas. 130,000 when the Consulate was closed.
"Ardia, S.A."
"Zaragoza."
--according to my report on the trip to Barcelona.
13. Pfau: cashier at Barcelona: see my report.
Ptas. 320,000, which he spent according to the statement of accounts he made in writing.
1 radio.
He knows the distribution of the Barcelona typewriters and office furniture.
14. Kessler: ^{ed} radio technician in Barcelona.
He knows the location of the radio apparatus.
(Galgo restaurant, Calle de la Cruz, Madrid.)
15. Lindenberg: Lufthansa office; guard.
Furniture for one floor of a liquidated office.
16. Gerstung: chief of a group for placing broadcasting stations.
2 cars.
3 typewriters from his office.
Radio material.
17. Loewe: ^{ed} chief of radio service.
Administration of all radio material, which represents a great value. He sold part of it, to be divided among the employees of his section.
2 cars.
10 typewriters.

18.

14

-4-

18. ~~Engels~~: ^{ed} radio technician.

He gathered together radio material buried in the mountains. He sold said material.

1 motorcycle with sidecar.

19. ~~Thom~~: ^{ed} radio technician in San Sebastian;

He sold radio material in the Furchy office (10).

20. ~~Lamprecht~~: chief of the photographic laboratory.

He knows the location of the photographic material, which is of great value.

Secret inks for the information service.

21. ~~Dr. Weihs~~: chief of a section.

1 car.

2 typewriters from his office.

22. ~~von Buch~~: ^{ed} chief of a section.

1 car.

3 typewriters from his office.

23. ~~Dr. Schoene~~: section chief.

2 typewriters from his office.

24. ~~Richard Horberg~~: ^{ed} chargé d'affaires -- Barcelona, June 1944.

1 car.

1 typewriter.

Furniture.

25. ~~Claus~~: ^{ed} chargé at Huelva.

1 car.

1 typewriter.

26. ~~Knittel~~: ^{ed} Kienenthal's employee.

1 good radio.

27. ~~Heise~~: ^{ed} Hummel's office.

2 typewriters.

1 radio.

28. ~~Rosbund~~: ^{ed} Hummel office.

1 DKW motorcycle.

29. ~~Huepel~~: ^{ed} employee of ~~Lenz~~ ^{ed} (Miss)

1 typewriter.

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30.

15

-5-

30. Mainzer:

With Franzbach, in charge of cars and typewriters.
He knows the location or distribution.

He has 3 Abwehr cars, and gives public service.
(Citroen, Opel-Chevrolet, Hillman.)

He has a private agency, Remado, ^{ced} to camouflage
Abwehr services since the closing of the Embassy.

- 1 BSA motorcycle.
- 1 Harley-Davidson motorcycle.
- 2 typewriters from Franzbach's office.
- 2 bicycles.
- 2 calculating machines.
- 1 electric adding machine.

31. *Finck: ^{ced}

Officer of a Navy accounting office; he administered large sums which he did not deliver.

- 1 typewriter from his office.
- 1 calculating machine--Abwehr.
- 1 bicycle--Abwehr.
- 1 radio--Abwehr.
- 200 liters of gasoline--Abwehr.

32. *Martens: ^{ced} officer of a Navy accounting office.

He administered large sums which he did not deliver.

- 2 cars.

33. *Pape: ^{ced} Franzbach's employee; estraperlista de divisas.

He sold wardrobes from Franzbach's office; he did not deliver the money to the cashier before the closing of the Embassy.

34. *Schulze: ^{ced} Chargé in Vigo.

He has embezzled Ptas. 47,000, which he administered in the accounting office.

Trans: ET/t

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Enclosure no. 4 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Report on the trip of Karl Zimmer
to Barcelona

*Almudena
Hil ant.*

On October 5, 1945 I visited the cashier of the office of the German military service, Helmut PFau, in order to check the use of funds of that office. Pfau gave me a liquidation in writing, which is enclosed herewith. After the closing of the Barcelona consulate the funds remaining in Señor Pfau's account were completely spent.

In my first report made some months ago I estimated the money of the Barcelona office after the close of the consulate at Ptas. 500,000. The following must be borne in mind:

1. Major Paul (now in Caldas) still has Ptas. 175,000 to form a cash reserve for the secret service. In spite of repeated invitations to deliver this sum, nothing has been accomplished. This sum has left Señor Pfau's cashbox.
2. Major Paul has also misspent Ptas. 75,000, reserved for the six months' salaries after the closing of the consulate for the employees of his own office. These would have been left without money, if Pfau had not paid them their salaries for three months. Through Paul's deceit they are still out three months. Paul himself is a millionaire. Said Ptas. 75,000 thus belong to Pfau's cashbox, too.
3. Prepayments of Ptas. 80,000, which were not returned to the cashbox.
4. Ptas. 320,000 in coins, completely spent according to Pfau's liquidation attached.

Pfau paid after the closing of the consulate, on order of Dr. Panhorst. Through Pfau I learned that Panhorst insulted me terribly when he heard about the detention of Kleyenstüber, Franzbach, etc. Panhorst was not at all in favor of delivering the funds to the consulate by means of Pfau. In addition to that, he demanded that Pfau sell the cars. Pfau refused to do this, as I kept him informed by letters. Of course, Panhorst alone should not have taken on that responsibility. When there was nothing for it but to deliver the cars, Panhorst said to Pfau: "Now we are doing the same thing that Zimmer has already done. From now on I shall avoid my old friends."

Dr. Panhorst was Kleyenstüber's adviser in Spanish affairs and his principal confidant. He liked to talk

to

-2-

to women in order to learn the names of Germans who disagreed in the matter of the war and the German policy. For example, he frequently went to visit Señora Leutner, who knows many Germans in Barcelona, without her knowing the real reason for his visits. (Her husband is in Caldas and was Pfau's predecessor.) This activity of Panhorst's had nothing to do with his duties as a member of the military secret service; on the contrary, it resembles Gestapo work. Panhorst himself has told me this.

W. J. 7
~~LEUTNER~~
~~PAUL~~

In March or April, 1945 Kleyenstüber and Dr. Panhorst founded the camouflaged secret service enterprise called "ZARAGOZA." At that time Panhorst spent about Ptas. 50,000 on furniture and books. This purchase was made in Madrid. How much money has been spent for this undertaking in Barcelona through camouflaged invoices I naturally do not know, but certainly purchases were made there also. Through Pfau I learned that this "ZARAGOZA" is now hidden in a Madrid organization, also that the name "ZARAGOZA" is apparently altogether deceptive. As this enterprise, because of the end of the war, can no longer aid the military secret service, it could only further Panhorst's personal future.

I learned from Señora Leutner that Panhorst promised her that her husband was to be released from Caldas about the end of November. It is known that last year the Embassy used certain people as dummies in the internment camps in place of those who should have gone. It is said that in this case, Leutner had to go to Caldas in place of Paul, after a conference of Rueggberg, Dr. Panhorst, Paul, etc. I knew about it last year.

Moreover, Panhorst lives very well today, and according to what Pfau tells me, has a great deal of money. That does not surprise me, for aside from his salary Panhorst used to spend Ptas. 10,000 every month for personal expenses.

I have the impression that Pfau in no way has gotten rich from the money in his cashbox, but I also feel that he has failed to tell me everything. I begged him to help me reveal the fraud committed by many of our compatriots. To this he said, that if evil can be removed from the world, then he would help me. He spoke of the slight success of my own denouncement of Kleyenstüber, Franzbach, etc., who are still living well, at liberty and unpunished, and moreover spending State funds. On the other hand, he said that many unimportant men were in Caldas.

I asked Pfau for a complete list of the distribution of typewriters. But in his own report he did not mention these machines.

Kessler

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Kessler can tell you where the radio equipment is. He was radiotelegrapher in Barcelona (Funker). His father has the restaurant "El Galgo" in Madrid.

~~Fingado~~, formerly a member of the secret service, has been naturalized as a Spaniard, according to Pfau. Fingado has a job in the Spanish police in Barcelona. He also told Pfau that part of the internees in Caldas may remain in Spain, for example, Leutner; the rest must go back to Germany. There were lists of names in this respect.

I also visited Mr. ~~Scheel~~, formerly an employee of ~~SOFINDUS~~. He said something about the existence of a secret fund of several million pesetas. Moreover, he knew about a camouflaged enterprise called ~~Xanton~~. He asked him to make declarations of the details. He answered that it would be very dangerous, because very high Spanish personalities were involved; besides, it was not worth the effort as long as high Party functionaries went about freely in cars and lived in luxury.

(card under
Aut. WAKLE)

The enterprise administered by Panhorst (a secret service enterprise) with the name "Ardia" in Barcelona had to finance itself for a few years. This enterprise is legitimate. So far only expenses have been paid out. Thus after three years under Panhorst the company must have a large capital; Panhorst's monthly expenditures were at least Ptas. 60,000. Only Panhorst can tell you how much of this has been invested in "Ardia", because the accounting has been done in camouflaged invoices.

Aside from my former chiefs, the following people can testify to the existence of "Ardia" and "ZARAGOZA":

1. Otto Stein, employee of the secret service accounting office, who knows as much as I do about the money matters.
2. Helmut Pfau, as cashier of the Barcelona office.
3. Erich Mainzer, who has done the purchasing for "ZARAGOZA" with Panhorst.

Madrid, October 10, 1945.

Signed: Karl Zimmer

Trans: ET/et

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Enclosure no. 5 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

ABWEHR PERSONNEL IN MADRID

Kleyenstüber
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief for Spain

v. Rohrscheidt
Colonel
Chief, Section III

Grobien
Captain (professional)

Grobien, Mrs.
Neumann
Employee

Renz (Miss)
Employee

Lezius (Miss)
Employee

v. Rudorff (Miss)
Employee

v. Wenckstern
Colonel
Chief, II Section

v. Buch
Soldier

Koch (Miss)
Employee

Voigt (Miss)
Employee

Dr. Weihs
Engineer
Chief, ITL Section

Colman
Captain (professional)

Backer (Miss)
Employee

Reppert (Miss)
Employee

Bohs
Engineer

Buckup (Miss)
Employee

Obermüller
Captain
Chief, IM Section

Sick
Non-commissioned officer

Bugge
Sergeant

Kuettner
Soldier

Steinbrüggen
Soldier

Moldenhauer
Soldier

Broschat
Non-commissioned officer

Goedel (Miss)
Employee

Hoffmann (Miss)
Employee

Berger (Miss)
Employee

Moeller
Captain
Chief, IM section; secret

Rossbund
Soldier

Zimmerman
Soldier

Heise (Miss)
Confidential employee of
Kleyenstüber;

Kieckebusch
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief, Section I

Kraemer
Consul

Kuehlenthal
Captain (professional)

Knappe
Soldier

Knittel
Non-commissioned officer

Zierrath
Employee

Heinsohn (Miss)
Employee

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Preusse

-2-

✓ Preusse *ced* (Miss)
Employee

✓ Meyer-Quittlingen *ced* (Miss)
Employee

Canaris
Captain (professional)

✓ Spindler *ced* (Miss)
Employee, since married.

Dr. Schöne
Captain
Chief, IH section

✓ Schöne *ced* Mrs.
Employee

✓ Loewe *ced* Frau
Employee

Heupel (Miss)
Employee

Franzbach
Chief cashier for Spain.

Zimmer
Cashier for Madrid.

✓ Stein *ced*
Soldier

✓ Weinzer *ced*
Employee

Pape
Employee

✓ vom Riehd *ced*
Employee

Seemann (Miss)
Employee

Frohberg
Professor

Radiotelegraphers

Loewe
Lieutenant
Chief

✓ Herz *ced*
Sergeant

✓ Bergerhoff *ced*
Private

✓ Kanthak *ced*
Private

✓ Domke *ced*
Private

✓ Kurz *ced*
Soldier

✓ Müller, Helga
Confidential employee
of Kleyenstüber

✓ Brumm *ced*
Confidential employee
of Kleyenstüber

✓ Lepieroz *ced*
Soldier

Lamprecht
Photographer

✓ Kirscher *ced* (Miss)
Employee

✓ Hetter *ced* (Miss)
Employee

✓ Stürtzer *ced*
Employee

✓ Gerstung
Captain
Chief, group to establish
broadcasting
stations

✓ Haendler *ced*
Soldier

✓ Holter *ced*
Soldier

✓ Buerger *ced*
Soldier

✓ Stubbs *ced*
Soldier

✓ Dembinski *ced*
Non-commissioned officer

✓ Fuchs *ced*
Sergeant

✓ Koermann *ced*
Private

✓ Stollberg *ced*
Private

✓ Wolfrun *ced*
Private

✓ Engels
Private

Müller

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✓ Müller *ced*
Private✓ Peters *ced*
Private✓ Klaus *ced*
Private✓ Schmelz *ced*
Private✓ Lagois *ced*
Private✓ Albers
Private✓ Rathmann *ced*
Employee✓ Mohr *ced*
Private✓ Arena *ced*
Private✓ Gross *ced*
Private✓ Altenkemper *ced*
Private✓ Rhoden
Private✓ Thie *ced*
Private15 girls for key
service.Miscellaneous✓ Schlatterer *ced*
Employee
Ibiza✓ Walters (Miss)
Employee of Finck✓ Dietz *ced*
AEG employee, Seville✓ Dr. Ballweg *ced*
Employee (exchange
of shares)✓ Lübke *ced*
Radiotelegrapher; for-
merly Lufthansa.✓ Yale *ced*
Agent; formerly lived
at Paseo de Rosales 78,
Madrid.✓ Wagener, Walter
Agent, Bremen section✓ Ponten *ced*
True name: Petersen *ced*✓ Dr. Noim *ced*
True name: Schmidt *ced*
(formerly in Paris)✓ Corcho *ced*
True name: Werner
Schulz *ced*,
Section II✓ Burkhardt *ced*
Employee
Lives in Zaragoza✓ Hoffmann *ced*
Employee, Weisbaden
section✓ Müller, Enrique
Sergeant, Colonia sec-
tion✓ Dr. Lichtenstein *ced*
True name: Leistner. *ced*
Agent, Dresden section.ABWEHR PERSONNEL IN VARIOUS CITIES OF SPAINSan Sebastian✓ Gensorowski
Captain (professional)
Section III✓ Mrs. Gensorowski *ced*✓ Furch *ced*
Soldier
Frontier duty

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San Sebastian--Continued✓ Eger *ced*
Soldier✓ Mohren *ced*
SoldierThom
RadiotelegrapherBilbao✓ Messmer *ced*
Employee✓ Hinrichsen *ced*
EmployeeVigo✓ Meyer, Conrad *ced*
Employee
Chief till autumn, 1944✓ Schulze, Alfred *ced*
Soldier
Chief after autumn, 1944✓ Arnold, Edward *ced*
Employee✓ Ehlers, Annakatrina *ced*
EmployeeHuelva✓ Claus *ced*
EmployeeMelilla✓ Kremer
ConsulThrough error, they sent
his brother to Jaldas.Seville✓ Dräger *ced*
ConsulLas Palmas✓ Niemann *ced*
EmployeeAlicante✓ von Knobloch *ced*
ConsulTetuán✓ Quitzau (Miss)
EmployeeCartagena✓ Fricke *ced*
Consul✓ Schneider *ced*
RadiotelegrapherValencia✓ Meyer *ced*
EmployeeAlmeria✓ Fyssler *ced*
ViceconsulGijón✓ Herberg *ced*
EmployeeMálaga✓ Giese *ced*
Employee (of Schultz Bros.)✓ Schiefer *ced*
SoldierSanta Cruz de Tenerife✓ Rahn *ced*
Employee (of the German Coal
Company)

326-5-6-7

BarcelonaRüggeberg

Consul and chief at Barcelona from summer, 1944.

Leutner

Cashier till November, 1944.

Paul

Commandant and chief at Barcelona till summer, 1944.

Gonzalo

Employee (Mexican)

Kessler

Radiotelegrapher (son of Galgo, Madrid)

Endres

Captain, chief of TLW section

Steinbrück

Lt. Colonel and chief of Section III from February 1945.

True name: Dr. Garganico

Strohberg

Soldier

Müller

Employee

Müller Scherz (Miss)

Employee

Fingado

Soldier (now naturalized in Spain)

Keller

Employee

Vollbrecht

Employee (mails)

Werthwein

Employee--formerly agent of IM section in Madrid

Naberhaus

Panhorst's personal agent.

Loewe (Tarragona)

Panhorst's personal agent.

Schwädtko

Panhorst's personal agent. San Sebastian and Barcelona.

Feuerstark (Miss)

Rüggeberg's confidential employee

Pfau

Cashier after November, 1944

Pivonka

Employee

Köpke, Peter

Employee

Dr. Panhorst

Commandant and chief of II section

Luhmann (Miss)

Panhorst's confidential employee.

Göritz

Commandant and chief of section III in Tangier, then in Barcelona till February, 1945.

Urban

Inspector formerly in frontier service in France

MacLean (Miss)

Employee

Raskes

Employee

Fingado (Mrs.)

the mother, and principal agent of Section III in Madrid (v. Rohrscheidt)

Nutz

Soldier--formerly in Alicante with v. Knobloch.

Riemann

Employee working for Stuttgart section; considerable funds available for network of said section in Spain.

Enclosure no. 6 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

November 27, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Conversation with Arno Kleyenstüber

I had the above call on me in connection with the Safehaven activities of the Abwehr. I pointed out the difficulties we were running into in determining and collecting the assets of the section, and stated that I considered him responsible for the activities of the section located at María Molina.

He agreed with me, and expressed his personal disgust with the situation. He said he had hoped a true capitulation would take place, whereby he could have turned his office over to the Allied representatives and have held himself responsible. He stated that as he was a career officer he would endeavor to contact the chiefs of the different sections and require them to make restitution.

I believe his intentions are bona fide, although he did express himself as somewhat in doubt as to the cooperation possible. At present he is planning to contact the chiefs and have them call on me. He is leaving immediately for the mountains to see if he can find Franzbach. In the meantime, he has turned in to me one automobile and a motorcycle, which he says were Government property. This was done voluntarily before I could bring up the matter.

Kleyenstüber is a Lieutenant Colonel of Aviation. He was born in Kiel on February 15, 1912. His mother is living in Giesselrade b/ Ahrensbök, which is in the province of Holstein. He is not married. While in Madrid he will live with his friend Von ~~Enger~~ *et al* Calle Maldonado 24, 2º Dercho; Tel. 54266.

He has promised to keep me currently advised of his activities and expects to report the next time in about four days.

CGilbert/et

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Enclosure no. 7 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Agreement of Bailment and
Release from Liability

December 18, 1945

The undersigned, Max FRANZBACH
as cashier, Military Secret Service
hereby deposits with the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, the following:

Ptas. 97,583.85

and states that the foregoing were and are assets of the German Military Secret Service.

The depositor clearly understands, agrees and represents to the Embassy, and in accepting the deposit the Embassy specifically relies upon the depositor's understanding, agreement and representation that

- a. the deposit is accepted by the Embassy as a bailment, without assumption of any liability of care of the property deposited or any other liability toward the depositor or any other individual or entity,
- b. the Embassy shall not be required to return the property or any portion thereof to the depositor or any other individual or entity,
- c. the deposit is held by the Embassy subject to disposition by the Allied Governments.

Signature of the Depositor

On the same form, receipts were made out for other property as follows:

Max FRANZBACH
December 20, 1945

1 Citroen car, license M-71341
with documentation.

-2-

Max FRANZBACH
December 21, 1945

Ptas. 4600.00--proceeds of
the sale of 4 type-
writers

Gensorowsky, Alfred O.
January 5, 1946

1 Citroen car--motor DD-08727
4 tires, 2 spares
no documentation

1 portable Erika typewriter
No. 1.071.354/5

Kieckebusch, Eberhard
December 21, 1945

Ptas. 9,593; in accordance
with his statement of the
same date.

December 22, 1945

Opel car, license M-71238
without documentation

Citroen car, license M-71386
with Permiso de Circulaci6n

Kleyenstüber, Arno
November 26, 1945

Fiat motorcar, matriculation
M-64087.
Gasoline ration card.
Tire rationing card

1 BSA motorcycle, VA-2 224
Gasoline ration card.

Peugeot sedan, license B-70774

December 14, 1945

2 glass tubes labelled, each,
100 grams of crystallin
Vitamin D

January 8, 1946

Portable radio receiver and
battery.

Kuhlenthal, Karl Erich
December 21, 1945

Ptas. 62,400
\$2,500
Escudos 5,000.00
Ptas. 2800.00

December 22, 1945

Tires Continental 1021377/4 UM
Firestone 241366
Firestone 247213
Continental 1020083 4 UM
Firestone 249262
Continental 9750462 5 BM

Typewriter Continental
Portable R 203802

December 30, 1945

Mercedes car, license M-63531
Motor 416011
Documents except gas ticket
4 spare tires
1 car radio

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Colonel ~~X~~ Lafite *eed*
 (Receipt signed by *eed*
 Eliseo Varela)
 December 18, 1945

Opel-Blitz truck, license M-64075
 with documentation

Wanderer motor car, license M-66922

Walter Lobe
 November 29, 1945

Citroen motor car, license M-71237
 Circulation permit

Lamprecht, Alfred
 November 21, 1945

1 camera, Leica, with Sumistar 1:2
 1 tripod for reproductions, in
 canvas case
 1 electric dryer
 1 copying press
 1 photocopier (case)

November 29, 1945

1 Focomat enlarger, complete
 1 electric drier
 1 contact watch
 1 wooden tripod
 3 enameled iron trays
 1 rubber squeegee
 1 lamp for dark camera
 2 developing boxes with reels
 and belts
 2 reels with 4 belts

December 10, 1945

1 pair binoculars MF 12,20,40x80
 No. 13814 (Carl Zeiss)
 complete
 1 pair binoculars DF 8x60
 No. 737 (Carl Zeiss)
 complete
 1 pair binoculars 12,20x80
 No. 25079 (Huet, Paris)
 complete

Mainzer, Erich
 October 20, 1945

Hillman car, with documentation
 Documentation of Citroen New
 at Lerma, Burgos
 2 bicycles

eed
 vom ~~X~~ Riedt, Wilhelm
 December 27, 1945

Ptas. 1,271.15

von Rohrscheidt, Kurt
 January 15, 1946

Erika portable typewriter--
 Triumph typewriter--262758

Schöne, Hans
 August 28, 1945

Fiat automobile, SS-10795

December 27, 1945

1 pair binoculars, Wetzlar;
 Leitz type
 2 Erika portables--1088247/5
 999293/5

eed
 X Steinmetz, Carlos
 January 29, 1946

Ptas. 912,878

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Enclosure no. 8 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

November 3, 1945.

URGENT

To Mr. Herwin Mr. Milton
Mr. Baldwin Mr. Head
Mr. Fogler PCO

Subject Abwehr and Karl PANHORST

Milant
As a result of the investigations I am making to get additional assets of the Gestapo, I have discovered that the Barcelona company "ARDIA" is a Gestapo organization in which Arno Kleyenstuber, Professor Froberg, Karl Panhorst, and Minister Zechlin *end* are interested on instructions from their Berlin Headquarters. I have information to indicate that possibly Pesetas 2,000,000 have been invested in the company.

I understand Herr Panhorst is in Madrid and in contact with Minameyer or other member of the German group. He is unaware of the information I have and additional material regarding the official assets he personally should have. If anyone is interviewing him please let me know so that we can coordinate our efforts.

I also understand that Professor Zechlin has his wind up and came to Madrid with photostats of the contracts of the ARDIA company. If any information is available I would like being informed.

Another company, known by the code word "Zaragoza," had also been formed by the Abwehr. I cannot locate that organization, in which several millions may have been invested. All information would be welcome.

Please don't give the bag away, as I have reason to believe none of the people mentioned has as yet become aware of my interests and knowledge in these companies. I would like to request that in case Panhorst has not given any information, I call him in for questioning on several matters of official assets which he should have in his possession.

CGilbert/et

Enclosure no. 9 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Declaration about "ARDIA"
by Dr. Panhorst

When in 1941 I was withdrawn from front service without cause on my behalf, and was sent to Spain by the OKW High Command of the Wehrmacht for general information on account of my long Spanish-American studies (see biography), I was allowed to elect the town where to install an office. As I had nothing to do with the information service of the German Embassy, but depended directly on Berlin, I did not choose Madrid but Barcelona as fixed habitual residence.

ced hired three furnished rooms from a stopped firm *(Dumen)* which had nothing at all to do with my business and called for a suitable secretary from Germany. In order to give the whole business a name, I took over the Spanish representation of the "Archiv der Gegenwart" (*Archives of the Present*) edited in Vienna since a couple of years ago (with whose proprietor, Baron Siegler, I was personally well acquainted) also with the particular intention to publish one day a Spanish edition. By lack of money this edition has never appeared, nevertheless the Spanish title of the edition was established and the proud translation "Archivo de Información Actual" led to the abbreviation ARDIA. Thus *ARDIA* was brought to life. It was no registered firm, no Company, no editorial, but only a name, written on paper.

Neither editorially nor informatively (not even in direct or indirect-financial way) has the Vienna Editorial House of the "Archives" ever had anything to do with my information service.

The German "Archives" is a branch of the old Dutch edition which belongs to the Jewish Dutch families Keesing, who at the same time are the owners of the editions already founded before the war in England and America. The German edition was passed to Baron Siegler by Keesing in an absolutely friendly manner.

When in 1942 on account of the requisition of the Dutch edition by Seyss-Inquart the Keesing families expressed a wish to emigrate to America, Baron Siegler and I succeeded against many difficulties in obtaining permission for the emigration of the different Keesing families. The eldest Keesing took leave of me in those days at Madrid. I may especially stress that none of the involved or named persons knew anything of

CS COPY

my

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position as soldier or about my information service. For them I was a private citizen. Also with the people of the British or American edition I never had any relation, either directly or indirectly. On the other hand, together with Baron Siegler, I have defended later Keesings' rights against the grip of Commissar Seyss-Inquart by various personal protests.

Thus I have to point out that all the editor's rights and stocks as well as the patents of the "Archives" belong exclusively to the Keesing families and to the Austrian subject Baron Siegler.

For my own interest I am actually busy in knowing the whereabouts of both.

The information service I had been ordered to set up was established as it is known, on a very modest scale. In many cases I had to take care of important travellers on their way from Berlin. The funds I disposed of and which were measured for the most necessary expenses - forbidding therefore a major staff of collaborators - were liquidated and controlled regularly every 2 months. The reserve funds which I had received two years ago have been delivered already last year to the German Embassy, according to my proposal by order from Berlin. Witnesses are available at any moment in Madrid. Thus, in the days of the collapse no reserve funds were any more at the disposal of "Ardia." Moreover I had been already ordered in January last a certain staff reduction together with ample personal limitations. My assistant and secretary was ordered to return to Germany in February. As to my office, I soon cancelled the contract, gave up all relations, fulfilled all other obligations by corresponding indemnifications which were allowed to me, including an assignment of the office furniture amounting to Ptas. 1.500 contained in a special liquidation. I made every preparation in order to be able to return to Germany any moment I was commanded. Certain indications pointed to the fact that my duty was finished. Perhaps my return has been avoided only by the suspension of the Air Service. The chauffeur was dismissed and received the gifts, i.e., indemnification for his services ordered by Berlin. The automobile which I disposed of has been handed over as the only object of worth, to the American Consulate at Barcelona. (For details ask Mr. Doyle.)

The stock of the "Archives"--about 30 books--I have kept in order to return it to the legal owners, Keesing or Baron Siegler. I, myself, should like to return to Germany as soon as possible in order to investigate about my family.

Madrid, December 8th 1945.

(Signed) Panhorst

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Enclosure no. 10 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

MEMORANDUM

Subject Dr. Karl Panhorst

Dr. Panhorst was assigned to the Abwehr in Barcelona; he is a close friend of Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber and of Lindenberg of the Luftwaffe.

He is obviously of the intelligentsia rather than a member of the Intelligence Service. Apparently he is a famed historical writer, and has made many trips abroad to compile data for research, mostly in Spain. He visited the United States in 1922 as a student tourist, in 1928 with a historical research group, and again in 1936 en route to Venezuela and Peru for archive research there. He returned to the United States from South America in 1940 for repatriation to Germany. A branch of the Panhorst family is located in Erie, Pennsylvania.

Dr. Panhorst states that he was assigned to Spain to obtain general political information for the Abwehr rather than for specific duties of intelligence work. His monthly allotment was between Ptas. 35 - 45,000, mostly spent on salaries, car upkeep, chauffeur, secretary, entertainment of Abwehr visitors, and the transmission of small lots of coffee and tea to Germany to members of the Abwehr group.

He had engaged in historical research work with Kessing in Germany, mostly on Spanish history of the XV, XVI, and XVII centuries, and in the India Archives in Seville. During his several visits to the United States he became well known to Dr. Stevenson of the Hispanic Society of New York. Additional persons with whom he had associated were Baron Siegler (Heinrich Siegler von Eberswald, who is believed to be still in Vienna), and the Prince of Auresperg, whom he labels as a well-known anti-Nazi.

Dr. Panhorst was questioned regarding the two groups of "ARDIA" and "ZARAGOZA," inasmuch as Colonel Kleyenstüber said that he was more fully aware of the details than anyone else. He said that "Ardia" was a company formed by himself but never officially inscribed in the Industrial Register of Spain and never reported to the Ministry of Hacienda. It was merely a cover for his office, and had no assets or liabilities; it had no property except one or two desks, which were normal office supplies.

The

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1/ The group "Zaragoza" was formed under the circumstances described in a translation of a memorandum prepared by Kleyenstüber, which is attached hereto. In addition to information contained in Kleyenstüber's memoranda, the following information was given by Dr. Panhorst:

Because of Kleyenstüber's and Lindenberg's interest in postwar civil aviation, and in view of their frank appraisal of the situation that the Germans had lost the war, conversations were commenced in 1944 regarding postwar civil aviation, and it was decided to form the company ~~INDINA~~ ^{INDINA} ~~company~~ ^{company} was to be devoted to the purchase of books, publications, etc., but like Ardia, it was never inscribed in the Industrial Register of Spain, nor had the company been organized in conformity with Spanish law. However, in January-February, 1945 a number of books were purchased through Dr. Panhorst and kept in his office.

2/ These activities were suspended at the end of February, due to the military situation then prevailing, and the inventory was turned over to the Deutsche Lufthansa in a formal document signed on February 26, 1945, which is described in Kleyenstüber's memorandum and is attached hereto. The Deutsche Lufthansa had voluntarily been turned over to the British and American Embassies Trusteeship by Lindenberg in May, 1945, and the property of INDINA is actually in the possession of the Trusteeship and will form part of the assets of the company.

Dr. Panhorst was questioned regarding his association with General Kraemer, the German Air Attaché, and maintains they had been extremely cold and only in the acquaintance stage. Dr. Panhorst apparently is a man of huge friendship, and was personally known to von Moltke, the Ambassador who died in Madrid several years ago. General Kraemer apparently resented the personal relationship between Dr. Panhorst and von Moltke, and as a result of the coolness Dr. Panhorst rarely came to Madrid. General Kraemer was not involved in the formation or control of "Ardia," as previously rumored.

Dr. Panhorst was inducted into the Abwehr in 1940, due to the impossibility of his continuing historical research, because of his knowledge of foreign countries and languages, and because of his social qualifications. He was sent to Barcelona for political information work, commissioned a major in the Air Corps Reserve in order to give him proper rank for supervising his subordinates.

CGilbert/et

- 1/ Memorandum from Colonel Kleyenstüber
- 2/ Protocol of transfer

Report about INDINA

KLEVENSTUEBER

In my position as assistant of the Air Attaché I had to occupy myself since my arrival in Spain - among others - with matters of civil aviation. The reason of it was besides my personal interest of this matter, my friendly relations to Herr Lindenberg.

After my return from Germany on January 2, 1945 I talked again with Herr Lindenberg, to whom I ever could talk with absolute confidence, about the seriousness of the situation. We considered at this occasion - besides general items - the necessity of a Civil Air Attaché (at those times brought to the idea by the arrival of Mr. Pirout+ at Madrid). We realized that after the already foreseen collapse a representation and cultivation of the civil aviation according to the given possibilities would never be possible relying upon the way of thinking of the at those times leading persons of the Embassy, not regarding the fact, that from these persons never could have been expected an interest and the necessary understanding for the relations by air between nations. Beyond this we agreed that every step we would undertake in this direction, given the sharp supervision of his as well as of my person, would lead to the suspicion of "defaitism" of us both. As I had come to the conviction during my last stay at Berlin, and Herr Lindenberg had come to the same conclusion on account of his correspondence with the DMH-Direction at Berlin, that not a single stone would be left of the DMH Central Office and that all records would be destroyed, we studied the way to enforce his person for a future cultivation of the civil aviation idea.

As we had to reckon with the loss of the Berlin records, we depended on the creation of a basis by collecting records available in Spain about civil aviation as well as on establishing a register of the matter. At first there had been proposed the foundation of an Archive or Institute which was to be called "INDINA". But on Herr Lindenberg's desire and in order to procure absolute clearness in this matter, this intention was dropped, adopting instead as final solution a transfer to the Lufthansa under renouncement of any further claims on behalf of the Reich or my person. Thus the finality pursued became the amplification of the already existing civil aviation records of the DMH.

Dr. Panhorst was entitled to buy books libraries and files, and it was also he who settled financial liquidation. This matter received - as it was the habit - the book keeping characteristic-"Zaragoza."

The transfer took place at the end of February or beginning of March last celebrated by a glassful of Sherry, at which occasion I passed all the rights to Herr Lindenberg as to the representative of Lufthansa,

+ Reference is made to A. Ogden Pierrot, American Civil Air Attaché.

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Berlin, expressing that I hoped he would be able to conserve in the coming difficult times the idea of an air traffic uniting the peoples, although it had to be done on a modest scale.

Between Herr Lindenberg and myself there has been signed a protocol of transfer.

Madrid, December 16, 1945.

(Signed) Kleyenstüber

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Protocol of transfer.

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I transfer to you hereby on the present day, as to the empowered person of the "Deutsches Lufthansa" in Spain, the following objects (office furniture and library of civil aviation according to special list.) The idea of this transfer is to give you as independant representative of the German Civil Aviation living in Spain, the opportunity to continue by amplification of your own records, and at the moment of unforeseen events the care for a civil-aviation-idea, which may lead to peoples' unification, according to the then prevailing possibilities.

I confirm you on special desire, that there will not arise any claim of any kind whatsoever either from the German Reich or from my person or others, either against you or the Deutsche Lufthansa.

The total furniture passes hereby into the possession of the Deutsche Lufthansa, Berlin, and will be included in its inventory.

Madrid, February 26, 1943.

Received:

signed: Ländenberg

Delivered:

signed: Kleyenstueber.

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I N V E N T O R Y

Archive for Civil Air Service

Office

1 bookcase	1 old wooden armchair
1 round table	3 metal filing cases
1 old leather armchair	1 old wooden chest
1 straight wooden chair	1 small vase
1 wooden armchair	

Library

1 old Spanish suite--sofa and four chairs	1 copper bucket
1 old wooden Spanish table, (Sevilla) and 4 chairs	1 copper pot
2 leather armchairs and 2 upholstered armchairs	1 copper floorlamp
3 bookstands	1 drink service with table
1 old Spanish desk	1 cocktail set--shaker and 6 glasses
1 bookcase	3 glass inkwells
1 carved bar	2 real elephant's teeth
1 plain wooden table with drawer	2 glass vases
1 iron flower stand	1 glass pencil tray
	several old pictures.

Madrid, February 26, 1945

Catalogue of Books, with author and publisher

Aero-Engine Theory	Construcción de Aeromodelos
Archer & Ree	J. J. Maluquer
Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd.	Seix y Barral, S.A.
Aeronautica	Curso Elemental de Aero-
Capt. R. Diaz	nautica
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.	A. M. Zuloaga
Aeromodelismo Elemental	J. Torres, Buenos Aires
U. S. Thorwel	De Palos al Plata
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.	Franco y R. de Alda
Aviación Heroica	Espasa-Calpé, S.A.
J. J. Maluquer	El Autogiro ayer, hoy, y mañana
Seix y Barral, S.A.	T. de Martín
Aviación sin motor	Espasa-Calpé, S.A.
J. J. Maluquer	El Avion y la Practica del vuelo
Seix y Barral S.A.	Kiffner-Flueters
Cinematica Aeronaval	Labor, S.A.
L. C. Blanco	
Editorial Naval	

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- El Alma de la Aviación
Militar Española
V. Acedo Colunga
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.
- Elementos de Aviación
A. Armengue
Gustavo Gili, Bl.
- El Hombre Vuela
Karlson-Fluiter
Labor, S.A.
- El Mecánico de Aviación
R. Rodríguez y R.
Candiani, Madrid
- El Piloto de Aviación
R. Muñoz de Brea
Candiani, Madrid
- El Piloto elemental de
Aviación y el piloto
de Velero
Bodlées-Fluiter
Labor, S.A.
- El Vuelo Madrid-Manila
Gallarza-Loriga
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.
- El Vuelo Vertical
J. J. Maluquer
Seix y Barral, S.A.
- Ephémérides Aéronautique,
1936
Gauthier-Villars, Paris
- España y las Rutas del Aire
J. de Armijo
Instituto de Estudios
Políticos, Ediciones
España
- Fotografías desde Aeronaves
Centafio del. Paz
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.
- Fotogrametria Terrestre y
Aerea
K. Schwidofsky
Labor, S.A.
- Geografía Económica
Prof. W. Schmidt
Labor, S.A.
- Geografía Física
Prof. S. Guenther
Labor, S.A.
- Geografía Industrial
J. Russell Smith
Labor, S.A.
- Geografía Política
Prof. Arthur Dix
Labor, S.A.
- Globos y Dirigibles
J. J. Maluquer
Seix y Barral, S.A.
- Historia de la Aeronautica
en España, Portugal,
Países Hispano-Ameri-
canos y Filipinas
Emilio Herrera
Libr. de Pedro Vindel
- Instrumentos de a Bordo
K. Rehder
Labor, S.A.
- La Aviación
Eug. López Iturriz
Labor, S.A.
- La Aviación actual
Toussaint-Caracciolo
Montaner y Simon
- La Conquista de la Tierra
W. Treue-F. Payarols
Labor, S.A.
- L'Air et le Monde Aereu
Arthur Mangin
Alfred Mame et Fils.
- La Técnica del Aeromode-
lismo
R. Müller-Fluiter
Labor, S.A.
- L'Exame Teorico del Pilota
R. Muñoz de Brea
A. Candiani, Madrid
- Los Mundos Lejanos
B.H. Bürgel-Castrillon
Labor, S.A.
- Manual de Aeromodelismo
J. J. Maluquer
Seix y Barral, S.A.
- Manual de Aviación
Victor W. Page
Gustavo Gili, S.A.
- Meccanica del Volo dei
Dirigibili
U. Nobile
Libreria Sc. de Pellerano
- Marine Aircraft Design
William Munro
I. Pitman & Sons, London
- Materials of Aircraft Con-
struction
F. T. Hill
I. Pitman & Sons, London

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Medicina Aeronautica
Dr. L. Pescador
Científico Medicina

Motores de Aviación
Gino de Brai
El Ateneo

Navegación Aérea
J. M. Aymat
Labor, S.A.

Navigazione Aerea
F. Cavallotti
U. Hoepli, Milano

Piratas del Aire
R. R. F. Andes
Ediciones Mariscal

Quax, el Piloto Destrozón
H. Grote-Valiente
Afrodisio Aguado

Tus Alas
A. Jordanoff-Dervert
Luis Gili, Bl.

El Vuelo España-América
M. España y R. Tomas
Ciudad Lineal, Madrid

Vuelos con Instrumentos
Gonzalo, F. Aragonéz
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.

Vuelo de Escuela, Vuelo
Acrobatico y vuelo
de Crucero
Schulze-Eckardt-
J. C. Fluiters
Labor, S.A.

Una Aventura en el De-
sierto
R. M. Esteve
Espasa-Calpé, S.A.

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Enclosure no. 11 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

December 28, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

To Mr. Baldwin
Subject Infra-red Rays

I am returning herewith the various memorandums regarding infra-red ray system of detecting ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. Eberhard Kieckebusch of the German Secret Service was in charge of these activities.

From the chief cashier of the Abwehr, Max FRANZBACH, I learned that the Villa Isabel at Algeciras was rented and later renovated at a cost of Ptas. 200,000 by Kieckebusch. The money for the renovation of the cottage was furnished by the German Secret Service, and consisted mostly of building a high stone wall and a false facade to eliminate possible detection by the British. Franzbach recalls that the lease provided that any improvements of the property would be for the benefit of the lessor, and therefore it appears to me that there is no possibility of recovery of assets.

Franzbach further added that he had remonstrated with Kieckebusch that instead of renting the property, they should purchase it outright, as it could have been secured for Ptas. 30,000 when they commenced operations. The property and the infra-red ray service, he added, were abandoned late in 1943 because of the strong pressure brought to bear on the Spanish Government by the British Embassy. They had not utilized the property since that date, and abandoned all interest therein.

They had rented several other buildings in Algeciras, but again because of British pressure the Spanish Government required them to depart from Algeciras. They abandoned their equipment in 1943 and January, 1944. He did not give details of the other buildings they had used there.

Kieckebusch acknowledged that the equipment in the Villa Isabel was under his custody and direction, and referred to Carbo as the "pobre" who was the facade for the organization but had no intimate know-

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ledge

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ledge of what was going on. He attempted to give the impression that Carbe was a stooge.

Kieckebusch refused to state the present location of the equipment. He maintained that he could not answer any questions regarding his professional activities, and held to that position throughout the interview. It was pointed out to him that only three means of disposing of the apparatus could be considered:

1. it had been permanently destroyed;
2. it had been delivered to the Spanish Government;
3. it was still in his possession.

I therefore demanded an accounting for the apparatus, and by elimination (that is, he denied it was in his possession or that he had destroyed it) we arrived at the tacit admission that he had delivered the apparatus to the Spanish naval authorities as a free gift in 1943. He refused, however, to divulge the names of the authorities or the organization to which he had delivered the equipment.

During the course of later conversations, he admitted that not only the infra-red ray equipment but the huge telescope had been given to the Spanish naval authorities.

He expects to be repatriated, and is very fearful that a similar line of questions will be directed at him on his arrival in Germany.

Kieckebusch quarrelled with Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber in the presence of Franzbach regarding the dissolution of the Abwehr in Spain. It appears to me that Kieckebusch had plans for a continuance of the organization contrary to the request of Kleyenstüber; and Franzbach, whom I can presume to quote as a typical Prussian soldier, was considerably agitated because Kieckebusch had dared to question the orders of his superior, Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber.

My impression is that direct interrogation of Kieckebusch in the presence of Franzbach after their repatriation to Germany may prove very interesting.

CGilbert/et

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Enclosure no. 12 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

DECLARATION
(Translation)

Madrid, 8.12.45

I declare hereby the following fact: I have sold the following apparatus for a total amount of Ptas. 62.100.--

- 4 Radio sets type "Hallicrafter"
- 1 " " " "National"
- 2 " " " "unknown (one defective)
- 3 motor generators
- 1 attachment

The reason for this measure was the fact that among my former subordinates there were several of smaller income who by the closing of the Embassy were put into an extraordinary situation of need, especially as they have to care for their families.

The distribution of the money was concluded in October last. I excluded myself, and declare that the whole amount has been distributed.

The motor car Citroen No. M-71237 which I used has been delivered to the Allied Commission on November 29th. Other State property is neither in my possession nor administration.

Signed: Walter Loebe

Enclosure no. 13 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

December 28, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject Oberleutenant (Reserve) Loebe

The above, the chief of the radio communications section of the German Military Secret Service, was interviewed regarding the material, apparatus, cars, and other equipment said to have been in his possession.

He was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber, he states, to make a clear declaration, and he was prepared on his "oath as a German officer" to cooperate with us. He stated he was prepared to answer any pertinent questions regarding German property, but must decline to answer about his professional activities prior to May 5, 1945. He delivered the two cars utilized by his section, a Ford and a Citroen, to me. He maintains he has no other equipment in his possession.

Questioned regarding the radio sets, he maintained that he had eight receiving sets normally, which he had sold. As they were sold through an intermediary, he is taking steps to verify their present location in order that he may supplement his statements. The funds he received from the sale have been turned over to Franzbach, who in turn included them in his recapitulation of money, which has also been delivered to me.

Loebe maintains he had five sending sets in all: four 80 watt and one 250 watt stations. On instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstüber, he states, he made no attempt to sell them, but instead destroyed them by reducing them to slag with the assistance of Termite powder. It is recalled that a quantity of this powder had been found in María Molina when we took over the building. Loebe took me to the place where he maintains the slag parts were abandoned, and after a search in the débris we actually uncovered some parts which I believe, because of the aluminum metal and the peculiar shapes of odds and ends of pieces, were really the base of a transmitter set. However, the metal had been so distorted by melting that there was of course no definite proof.

This differs from the information given by Mr. Baldwin in his recent memorandum, which states he had seven receiving sets and six sending sets. The totals agree, but there is one more receiving set and one less sending set, according to Loebe's statement.

CGilbert/at

Enclosure no. 14 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

According to my opinion the liquidation report of Herr Franzbach is correct, as far as an examination is possible lacking the necessary documents. My opinion is largely due to the fact that I have always known Herr Franzbach as a decent and correct administration officer.

Madrid, December 11, 1945.

Signed: Kleyenstüber

Madrid
December 9, 1945.

R e p o r t
for Lieutenant Colonel Kleneystueber
=====

Re: Final liquidation report on Reich funds of the Administration Group of Kriegsorganization (War Organization), Spain.

A. Balance of accounts on May 8, 1945.

1. From cashier Zimmer I took over on May 8, 1945 liquid:

French francs	497,791.95
Dutch guilders	2,615.--
English pounds	2,909.18
Escudos	150,000.--
Swiss francs	99,000.--
US dollars	9,000.--
Pesetas	11,000.--

2. From Lieutenant Colonel Kleyenstueber I received:
Swiss francs 10,000.--

3. Cashier Zimmer had initiated the change of US\$34,000.-- which at the moment of delivery (see A,1) was not yet concluded. The conclusion of the conversion was done by myself.

In consequence, there is to be given account of:

French

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French francs	497,791.95
Dutch guilders	2,615.--
English pounds	2,909.18
Escudos	150,000.--
Swiss francs	109,000.--
US dollars	43,000.--
Pesetas	11,000.--

B. The Spanish Foreign Ministry, Dirección General de Política Económica has received from me the following amounts from May 20 to June 30, 1945, which therefore have to be deducted:

French francs	497,791.95
Dutch guilders	2,615.--
English pounds	2,909.18
Escudos	100,000.--
US dollars	4,277.--
Swiss francs	38,000.--

C. Differences to be accounted for:

1) Escudos	50,000.--
2) US dollars	38,723.--
3) Swiss fr.	71,000.--
4) Pesetas	11,000.--

at 1) Justification of difference in Escudos:

Payment to v.Rohrscheidt	25,000.--	
Payment to Navy attaché (Finck)	<u>3,000.--</u>	
Total	28,000.--	
Balance converted to pesetas	22,000.--	Ptas. 13,200.--

at 2) Justification of difference in dollars:

The total amount was converted into pesetas at 1:9	348,507.--
---	------------

at 3) Justification of difference in Swiss Francs: These were converted into pesetas--

25,000 in small notes	95,000.--	
46,000	<u>184,000.--</u>	279,000.--

Total conversion of Foreign currencies to Pesetas justified under 3)	Ptas. 640,707.--
--	------------------

at 4) Justification of Ptas.

Received (C 4)	11,000.--
Conversions (at 1:3)	640,707.--
Sale of a safe	2,500.--
Sale of 2 tin cases	500.--
Sale of small table and 2 chairs	200.--
Sale	

EX COPY

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Sale of Telefunken radio
(New, 2,133) 1,500.--
(These sales performed before May 8)
Payments of office rents Cl.C 123
From Dr. ~~Walters, Navy Attaché~~ 18,000.--
From Finck, Navy Attaché 6,000.--
Total Ptas. 680,407.--

I. From this amount were spent to
alien groups:

a) Colman <i>Ced</i>	20,000.--	
b) Canaris	15,000.--	
c) v. Rohrscheidt	25,000.--	
d) Obermueller	100,000.--	
Returned by Bugge <i>Ced</i>	10,000.--	90,000.--
e) Dr. Schoene	75,000.--	
Returned	9,900.--	65,100.--
f) For Dr. Schoene	80,000.--	
	40,000.--	
	5,000.--	
	2,000.--	
	15,000.--	142,000.--
Balance		357,100.--

II. Payments of my Administration Group:

1) Losses by reconversion of Swiss francs delivered to the Foreign Ministry (see Par. B)	32,200.--	
2) Payments of salaries not yet made on closing of the Embassy, but al- ready ordered	129,700.--	
3) Liquidation of travel expenses	9,633.20	
4) Fidelity fees for Spanish friends	15,200.--	
5) Medical and dentist bills (about)	10,000.--	
6) Automobile expenses	9,883.--	205,616.20
Cash on hand		116,690.80
Less travelling expenses:		
Kleyenstueber	5,696.75	
Franzbach	5,036.25	
Panhorst	3,923.30	
Schoene	311.70	
Frau Mueller	2,454.50	
Lamprecht	681.80	
Kirschner	1,002.65	19,106.95

TOTAL BALANCE TO MR. GILBERT

27,583.85

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Enclosure no. 15 to Safehaven Report no. 408, dated February 6, 1946, from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, on the subject "Preliminary Report: Recovery of Official Assets of the German Secret Service (Abwehr) in Spain."

Result of the questioning about still existing State property and about Administration funds of the Group chiefs still unsettled on May 8, 1945


- I. Administration Group, Madrid
See report of the Group Chief.
- II. Independent cashier office, Barcelona
Reports to have liquidated regularly and according to orders with the Gobierno Civil (and later with the U. S. Consulate General) (except branch of Herr Paul).
- III. Herr Loebe
Reports not to dispose any more of State property, having delivered all motor cars. Referring to sale of radio sets, see attached special report.
- IV. Herr von Rohrscheidt
Reports to have made orderly use of the funds he disposed of. No amount left. Motor car has been delivered.
- V. Herr Dr. Schoene
Reports to have made legal use of the funds he disposed of. A remainder of Ptas. 9,900.-- had been returned to the Administration Group Madrid. Motor car has been delivered.
- VI. Herr Kieckebusch
Declines the actual authority of myself and of Herr Franzbach. From the formerly subordinated Obermueller and Lamprecht (see VII and VIII) I have received directly a corresponding declaration.
- VII. Herr Lamprecht
Reports not to dispose of any State property.
- VIII. Herr Obermueller
Declares to have disposed legally of his funds; a surplus amount of Ptas. 10,000.-- was returned to the Administration Group, Madrid. The motor car has been delivered. Delivery of the photographic and optical apparatus is being performed.

The gentlemen have been asked to make similar inquiries to their former subordinates and to insist on delivery or liquidation of State property still existing

Madrid, December 22, 1945

Signed

von Stauber



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<https://www.legazpi.eus/burdinola/>



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IZENA.....
Nombre
HELBIDEA.....
Domicilio
TELEFONOA **E-MAIL**.....
Teléfono
K.K. (20 zenbaki).
C.C.

URTEKO KUOTA / Cuota anual: **40 €**

BURDINOLA ELKARTEA

Latxartegi 10, behea.

64. p.k.

20230 LEGAZPI

Tel: 943034071

burdinolaelkartea@gmail.com

